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Vietnam is a newly emerging nation that is transitioning from a planned economy to 
a market oriented economy. There are very few previous investigations into the 
Vietnamese economy found in the literature. This thesis intends to be among the 
pioneers by examining, first, the effect of board diversity on earnings quality; 
second, the effect of board diversity on corporate social disclosure (CSD); third, the 
relationship between CSD and earnings quality of Vietnamese listed firms. It will 
also examine whether the relationship between CSD and earnings quality is 
moderated by state ownership and foreign ownership. 
 
Board diversity is identified in two dimensions covering a wide range of attributes. 
One dimension covers structural attributes and the other dimension covers 
demographic attributes of the board of directors. Those attributes are then used to 
construct a diversity-of-boards index (structural dissimilarities among firm boards) 
and a diversity-in-boards index (demographic dissimilarities among directors within 
a board). These dimensions are considered as two scenarios. One scenario considers 
that attributes are equally important, (i.e. unweighted diversity-of-boards and 
diversity-in-boards indices), while the other scenario considers that attributes are not 
equally important (i.e. weighted diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards indices). 
The relative importance of attributes is measured using a survey questionnaire from 
the executives of listed firms that inquire into the relative importance of the attributes 
of the board of directors. This study then uses these two scenarios to examine the 
effect of board diversity on earnings quality and on CSD. In this study, earnings 
quality is a standardised aggregate measure compiled from four accounting-based 
measures of earnings quality: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, and earnings smoothness. 
 
CSD is measured as perceived by stakeholders. This study constructs a three 
dimensional CSD index where one dimension is the quantity of CSD, and other two 
relate to disclosure type quality and disclosure item quality. A content analysis of 
annual reports is used to measure the quantity of CSD. The two aspects of disclosure 




(employees, lawyers and regulators, local communities, and customers) to obtain 
their perceptions on disclosure type preference (i.e., narrative; monetary 
quantification; numerical quantification; both monetary and numerical), and about 
disclosure reporting items (i.e., items in the social indicators of the Global Reporting 
Initiative 3.1). 
 
Based on agency theory in hypothesis testing, this study finds a significant and 
positive linear relationship about the effect of diversity-of-boards (using weighted 
and unweighted indices) on earnings quality. Based on resource dependence theory 
in hypothesis testing, this study finds a non-linear U-shaped association about the 
effect of diversity-in-boards (using weighted and unweighted indices) on earnings 
quality. The results also show that the weighted and unweighted board diversity 
indices have a similar effect on earnings quality. 
  
According to agency theory in hypothesis testing, this study finds that diversity-of-
boards (both unweighted and weighted indices) does not have a significant impact on 
CSD, thus these findings do not support agency theory. According to resource 
dependence theory in hypothesis testing, this study finds diversity-in-boards (both 
unweighted and weighted indices) has a positive effect on CSD. The weighted and 
unweighted board diversity indices also have a similar effect on CSD. 
  
In terms of stakeholder theory and agency theory in hypothesis testing, this thesis 
finds that earnings quality has a significant and positive effect on CSD, which 
suggests that stakeholder theory (long term perspective argument) explains better 
than agency theory (managers‟ opportunistic incentives argument) about the effect of 
earnings quality on CSD of Vietnamese listed firms. Furthermore, the effect of 
earnings quality on CSD is weakened when the percentage of shares held by 
government increases. The percentage of foreign ownership does not impact on the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD.  
 
Overall, the empirical results of this thesis contribute on three fronts: theory, 
methodology, and practice. The theoretical front is advanced by testing theoretical 




showing a design and measurement of board diversity indices as well as a design and 
measurement of CSD instrument. The findings benefit policymakers in better 
understanding firms‟ CSD practices and stakeholders‟ expectations to improve the 
current guidelines on the CSD as well as in reviewing the implications of the current 
corporate governance codes in the context of Vietnam to increase firms‟ reporting 
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This chapter introduces the three core themes in this research: board diversity, 
earnings quality, and corporate social disclosure (CSD). Next section provides 
background information about them. Section 1.2 explains the aims of undertaking the 
planned investigations in this study. Section 1.3 outlines the motivation behind 
undertaking those planned investigations. Section 1.4 defines the main terms in the 
thesis. Section 1.5 outlines theory and methodology in this thesis. The final section is 
an introduction into the remaining chapters of this study.  
 
1.1 Background of board diversity, earnings quality, and corporate social 
disclosure 
A board of directors is the cornerstone of corporate governance frameworks. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) show that the board of directors is the critical internal control 
mechanism, being responsible for monitoring management and acting on behalf of 
shareholders. Appointed by the shareholders, the board of directors is an ultimate 
agent for shareholders to supervise the actions of management and minimise the 
costs arising from the separation of ownership from control. Jensen (1993) also 
describes such a board as the apex of the internal decision control systems of firms 
whose intention is to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are 
closely aligned. This alignment requires the board to discipline or remove managers 
when they fail to contribute to the firm‟s value, or pursue their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders‟ interests. 
 
There are numerous factors that signify various dimensions of a board, and board 
diversity is one of the most important (Milliken and Martins 1996; Kang et al. 2007). 
This is because board diversity brings advantages to the firm where board members 
are likely to bring diverse views to be considered in making decisions (Carter et al. 
2003). Following Carter et al. (2003), board diversity has the following five 
advantages. First, firm diversity promotes a better understanding of the marketplace 
because matching the diversity of a firm with the diversity of the firm‟s customers 
and suppliers helps the firm to penetrate markets. Second, diversity increases 




vary systematically with demographic variables such as age, race, and gender 
(Robinson and Dechant 1997). Third, diversity produces more effective problem-
solving, because while heterogeneity may initially produce more conflict in the 
decision making process, the variety of perspectives that emerges help board 
members to evaluate more alternatives and their consequences. Fourth, diversity 
enhances the effectiveness of corporate leadership because homogeneity at the top 
managers of a firm is believed to result in a narrow perspective while a diversity of 
top managers takes a broader view. Indeed, diversity at the top gives a better 
understanding of the complexities of the environment and enables more astute 
decisions to be taken. Finally, diversity promotes more effective global relationships 
because cultural sensitivity is critical in an international environment and ethno-
cultural diversity makes corporate leaders more sensitive to other cultures.  
 
The breadth of factors relating to board diversity may make it difficult to define the 
term explicitly (Harrison and Klein 2007), so several scholars have examined the 
implications of board diversity in relation to firm‟s outcomes by defining it 
operationally (Hafsi and Turgut 2013). The recent increase of scholarly investigation 
into board diversity is a cue for advancing its importance for corporate governance.  
 
Earnings quality is adversely affected when managers opportunistically manipulate  
the reported earnings (Schipper and Vincent 2003), but  this sort of manipulation is 
often difficult for the market to detect (Nelson et al. 2003). Additionally, accounting 
scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Global Crossing in the United States, 
HIH in Australia, Parmalat in Italy and APP, and Saytam in Asia have increased 
concern about the earnings quality reported by firms (Gaio and Raposo 2011). The 
focus on quality matters has been further stimulated by the work of the IFRS 
Foundation, whose principal objective is: “To develop a single set of high quality, 
understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards 
based upon clearly articulated principles” (IFRS Foundation 2013, p. 1). These 
concerns have increased pressure on directors to protect the interests of shareholders 
by taking care of reported earnings quality. More recent studies in the U.S. have 




board of directors results in more effective monitoring of the reported earnings 
quality (Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011).  
 
The impact of firm activities on society is a growing global concern. These concerns 
have increased the expectations of consumers, employees, investors, government, 
and local communities about the role of firms in society (GRI 2002). In response, 
various independent institutions have designed guidelines, principles, and codes for 
firms to increase their accountability through corporate conduct. Corporate social 
disclosure (CSD) is one of them where firms provide information to the public 
regarding corporate activities that relate to society, such as managing human 
resources, ensuring health and safety at work, building local community relations, 
and maintaining relationships with suppliers, customers, and other stakeholders. By 
participating in social activities, firms can project a favourable image among 
stakeholders that will not only help them build community ties but also increase their 
reputation as a responsible corporate citizen. These outcomes improve firms‟ ability 
to negotiate more favourable contracts with governments and suppliers, charge 
premium prices for goods and services, and reduce the cost of capital (Fombrun et al. 
2000). In order to improve the quality and quantity of CSD, it is important to study 
the factors influencing CSD practices. Little research has been conducted that 
examines the impact of board diversity on CSD (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) and the 
impact of earnings quality on CSD (Kim et al. 2012).  
 
1.2 Aims of the study 
This thesis has three main aims. The first aim is to examine the effect of board 
diversity on earnings quality. The second aim is to examine the effect of board 
diversity on CSD. Despite the apparent widespread support for board diversity, most 
literature focuses on specific attributes relating to the demography of directors such 
as the diversity of gender, age,  race or ethnicity, and nationality (e.g. Carter et al. 
2003; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009). Similarly, 
studies have mainly focused on specific attributes relating to the structure of the 
board of directors, such as the chairperson also being the CEO, board independence 
and director ownership. In response, this research has constructed two indices of 




of directors into a demographic diversity index (i.e. diversity-in-boards index), and 
the other combined several structural attributes of a board of directors into a 
structural diversity index (i.e. diversity-of-boards index). It has been argued that a 
board of directors‟ demographic and structural attributes in a firm are designed to 
control the opportunistic behaviour of managers and improve the accountabilities of 
corporate disclosures. This not only assists investors, but also other stakeholders, in 
making informed decisions about firms. As the first aim, this thesis examines the 
question „Does board diversity improve earnings quality?’, and as the second aim, it 
examines the question „Does higher board diversity exhibit more CSD?’. 
 
The third aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between earnings 
quality and CSD. There is a lot of research into corporate social responsibility, of 
which CSD in this thesis is an integral part, has been carried out.  Additionally, a lot 
of research into earnings quality has also been carried out, but only a few studies 
have examined the relationship between earnings quality and corporate social 
responsibility (Chih et al. 2008; Yip et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012), and they provide 
mixed evidence about this relationship. It is also noted that this relationship is 
contextual, and Vietnamese context has been largely unexplored, so as a third aim, 
this thesis examines the question „Is CSD associated with earnings quality?’. 
 
1.3 Motivation for the research 
Five factors motivated this research into board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD 
of Vietnamese listed firms. First, directors play a critical role in corporate 
governance because they control the reliability and relevance of corporate 
disclosures which help investors make informed decisions about firms. This research 
does not consider the audit committee, even though it also plays an important 
monitoring role, because Tran et al. (2014) point out that audit committees in 
Vietnamese firms appear to be more formalistic and operate as a department, rather 
than try to uphold independence. Major decisions in these firms are made by the 
board of directors and the chief executive officer (CEO).  
 
Second, many industrialised western nations have a well-developed governance 




social, and economic contexts, whereas contextual governance frameworks are 
largely absent in emerging Asian counterparts, including Vietnam. Additionally, the 
principles outlined in governance frameworks and the codes of conduct of emerging 
nations are largely derived from recommendations made in developed countries, and 
which have remained uncontested and untested (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Le and 
Walker 2008).  
 
Third, Vietnam has low investor protection. In a survey conducted by the World 
Bank in June of 2013 (World Bank, 2013), it ranked 157th out of 189 economies for 
protecting investors. Of the ten Southeast Asian countries in this survey, Vietnam 
ranked the second lowest, and is only higher than Laos. The findings of this research 
will help Vietnamese policymakers in reviewing the implications of the current 
regulations and guidance for the boards of directors, including financial reporting, 
and social disclosure practices in the context of Vietnam to increase firms‟ reporting 
transparency and accountability to investors. It might also be useful to other 
emerging nations with a low level of investor protection who are striving to improve 
corporate governance and corporate information transparency. 
 
Fourth, the understanding of corporate social responsibility in Vietnamese firms is 
still poor because it is perceived as philanthropic activities. Bui (2010) also shows 
that the main reasons why Vietnamese firms pay almost no attention to corporate 
social responsibility is because they do not understand how a firm impacts on society 
and the environment, and they lack financial resources and a legal framework. These 
factors have discouraged firms from adopting corporate social responsibilities in 
their corporate policies. However, when Vietnam joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2007, businesses elevated the status of corporate social 
responsibility because of its importance with foreign customers and partners. The 
decision to focus on social disclosure in this thesis rather than corporate social 
responsibility is made for three reasons. First, research into the field of corporate 
social responsibility  has mostly been  limited  to distinguishing between the various 
dimensions of corporate social responsibility disclosure, which makes it difficult to 
identify the effects of specific disclosure (e.g., Roberts 1992; Haniffa and Cooke 




remains has focused on disclosing labour practices, society, and product 
responsibility components rather than environmental disclosure in their annual 
reports (Saleh et al. 2010; Mahadeo et al. 2012; Lu and Abeysekera 2014). Third, 
studies find that social disclosure relates well with the overall corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (Mahadeo et al. 2012; Lu and Abeysekera 2014).  
 
The final factor that motivates this research is that as part of the „Doi Moi‟ (reform) 
economic renovation in 1986, the Vietnamese government attempts to reduce the 
level of state intervention in the economy by reducing state ownership in state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (privatisation). Following the 1986 reform, the Vietnamese stock 
market was established in 2000 to facilitate the privatisation of SOEs, reduce state 
ownership, and raise additional capital for Vietnamese firms. However, unlike 
privatisation in most other countries, the Vietnamese government still retains a  
substantial amount of ownership in many of the listed firms, especially those deemed 
to be large and strategically important to the nation (Vu 2012). With this emerging 
market setting, the empirical results in this thesis will supplement the literature by 
empirically examining the relationship between board diversity, earnings quality, and 
CSD.  
 
1.4 Definitions  
The definitions adopted by researchers are not always uniform, and therefore the key 
terms are defined in this section to establish the positions taken in this research. The 
definitions of the following terms presented here are: board diversity, earnings 
quality, and corporate social disclosure. 
 
1.4.1 Board diversity 
The  term  „diversity‟  is  generally  used  to  embrace all  matters  of  difference  in  
the  workplace, including differences in  social identities, organisational groups, and  
individual  characteristics  (Ely et al. 2003). Board diversity is defined as the variety 
inherent in the board‟s composition, and it can be measured in numerous dimensions 





Hafsi and Turgut (2013) define board diversity as dissimilarities among firm boards, 
i.e., board structure, namely diversity-of-boards, and dissimilarities among directors 
within a board, i.e., the demographic attributes of board members, namely diversity-
in-boards. This definition of Hafsi and Turgut (2013) will be used in this thesis due 
to its specificity. 
 
1.4.2 Earnings quality 
Earnings quality is a multi-dimensional concept that makes different users interpret 
the quality of earnings in different ways. Schipper and Vincent (2003) define the 
quality of earnings as „the extent to which reported earnings faithfully represent 
Hicksian income‟ (p. 98).
1
 With this concept, high earnings quality occurs when 
earnings are closer to Hicksian income. 
 
1.4.3 Corporate social disclosure  
Corporate social responsibility, of which corporate social disclosure (CSD) in this 
thesis is a part, is a growing concept around the world. The concept of corporate 
social responsibility frequently overlaps with similar terms, including corporate 
sustainability, corporate sustainable development, corporate responsibility, and 
corporate citizenship. A common definition of corporate social responsibility is given 
by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD 1999). 
Corporate social responsibility is „the continuing commitment by business to behave 
ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life 
of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at 
large‟.  
 
The importance of labour practices, human rights, and broader social issues affecting 
consumers, communities, and other stakeholders has been growing globally (GRI 
2002). Societies nowadays are concerned about the firms‟ social impact, i.e. their 
organisation impact on the social system within which they operate (GRI 2002). 
Thus, firms are expected to practice their business in an ethical and responsible 
manner, including how they treat their employees, suppliers, consumers, and other 
                                                 
1
 Hicksian income is „the amount that can be consumed (that is, paid out as dividends) during a period, 
while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period‟ (Schipper and 




stakeholders. Firms‟ activities are expected to perform well in the social aspect of 
their corporate social responsibility, and stakeholders will expect to be informed 
about their activities covering issues such as labour management, human rights 
issues, society, and product responsibility. Firms are then urged to report their social 
impact to stakeholders through their corporate social responsibility reporting and/or 
annual reports. This particular area or reporting, where their social impacts are 
reported, is classified as firms‟ CSD and used as such in this thesis. 
 
1.5 Theory and methodology 
1.5.1 Theory 
This thesis uses agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory 
to examine the association between board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD in 
Vietnam. Resource dependence theory and agency theory are two organisational 
theories that underpin how board diversity influences earnings quality and how board 
diversity influences CSD. Agency and stakeholder theories are used to test and 
explain the relationship between earnings quality and CSD.  
 
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983), 
diversity-of-boards can be used to establish better monitoring and control 
mechanisms. It is based on the assumption that directors with their own sets of 
rationalities can contribute different styles of controlling and monitoring 
management that are appropriate to a firm. From such perspective, the main goal of 
fiduciary governance is to minimise agency costs, and may also affect CSD. 
 
Resource dependence theorists have argued specifically that a combination of diverse 
stakeholder perspectives in board decision-making improves firms‟ ability to obtain 
resources that are critical to their functioning (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Resource 
dependence theory offers a rationale for the board‟s function of providing critical 
resources to a firm, including legitimacy, advice, and counsel (Hillman and Dalziel 
2003). Additionally, society nowadays demands that the economic development of 
firms be concomitant with their moral development (Labelle et al. 2010). Diverse 




environment (Boyd 1990) that can help it better manage CSD issues and practices 
and earnings quality. 
 
Stakeholder theory posits that the capacity of firms to generate sustainable wealth is 
determined by firms relating to different but relevant groups of stakeholders 
(Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Post et al. 2002). This means that by 
disclosing information on environmental and social resources, the firm can interact 
with and benefit from the stakeholders, and disclosing could be a way of firms 
meeting stakeholders‟ demands. Thus, firms may gain the support of different 
stakeholders to achieve long term performance and obtain tacit consent for their 
strategy from those stakeholders, and ultimately survive in the marketplace (Gray et 
al. 1995). In contrast to stakeholder theory, agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983) 
shows that managers can opportunistically use corporate resources to pursue goals 
that enhance their own utility in ways that are unlikely to provide significant returns 
to shareholders. It could be argued that these resources can include not only financial 
resources but also social and environmental resources. Friedman (1970) argues that 
firms that take part in corporate social responsibility practices, including CSD, only 
want to benefit from the reputation and publicity they receive, with the sole objective 
to maximise their manager‟s own profitable gains. 
1.5.2 Methodology 
The sampling frame of this study is the Vietnamese firms listed on HOSE and HNX. 
The usable sample examines 150 firms for analysing earnings quality and 133 firms 
for analysing CSD in 2010. Board diversity is measure by four indices: the 
unweighted diversity-of-boards index, unweighted diversity-in-boards index, 
weighted diversity-of-boards index, and weighted diversity-in-boards index. The 
unweighted diversity-of-boards index is developed using the inter-sample distance 
measurement method, and the unweighted diversity-in-boards index is developed 
using the terciles split method. These two unweighted board indices receive 
weightings based on the survey of executive perceptions to develop a weighted 





This study constructs a standardised aggregate earnings quality score as a proxy for 
earnings quality in the main analyses, based on four accounting measures, namely 
accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings 
smoothness. For validity purposes, this study also used four these individual earnings 
attribute measures instead of the standardized aggregate earnings quality score in the 
robustness tests. The CSD is measured using a three-dimensional index consisting of 
a disclosure quantity, a disclosure type quality, and a disclosure item quality. The 
disclosure qualities are measured from responses obtained from the 11-point scale 
survey questionnaire administered to four (labour, product, society, and human 
rights) separate stakeholder groups.  
 
The empirical models used to test the hypotheses in this thesis. The influence of 
board diversity on earnings quality is tested using OLS regression estimators for 
samples of 150 firms. The influence of board diversity on CSD is tested using OLS 
regression estimators for samples of 133 firms. The influence of earnings quality on 
CSD is tested using OLS regression estimators for samples of 133 firms, and the 
moderating effect of state ownership and foreign ownership on earnings quality – 
CSD relationship is tested using OLS regression estimators for samples of 133 firms. 
 
1.6 Structure and overview of the thesis 
This thesis contains nine chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) discusses the rationale 
and aims of this study, and outlines the motivations. The concepts of board diversity, 
earnings quality, and CSD are sated. Theory and methodology used in the thesis are 
also outlined. The remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature related to board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD. Previous studies that 
examine the effect of board diversity on earnings quality and on CSD; and the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD are also discussed. Chapter 3 outlines 
the historical background of Vietnam and includes an overview of the Vietnamese 
stock market. This chapter also introduces the main institutional frameworks 
including the framework for the corporate governance of Vietnamese listed firms, 
accounting enforcement, and guidance for disclosing information on Vietnamese 
listed firms. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework underpinning this study, 




Chapter 5 explains how the hypotheses tested in this study are developed, and 
describes the methodology used.  It also explains and justifies the sample firm 
selection, the period of the study, the definitions and measurements of the main 
variables, hypothesis variables, the model specifications, and related control 
variables. A description of the source of data, the data collection procedures, and the 
analytical procedures are also discussed. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the results of 
the empirical findings on the three main research areas of the thesis. Chapter 6 
presents the findings related to the effect of board diversity on earnings quality. 
Chapter 7 presents the findings related to the effect of board diversity on CSD. 
Chapter 8 presents the findings related to the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD. Further analyses and robustness checks which highlight extra findings and 
test the sensitivity of the main findings are also discussed in each of these three 
chapters. Finally, Chapter 9 provides an overall summary of the study and draws 
conclusions. It also discusses the implications, limitations, and recommendations for 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to board diversity, earnings quality, and 
corporate social disclosure (CSD). The literature relating to board diversity is 
reviewed under two sections with a broader set of literature, followed by narrowly 
focused literature. Section 2.2 briefs an overview on corporate governance, firm 
financial performance and information disclosure. Section 2.3 is a review of a broad 
set of literature on the board of directors. Section 2.4 reviews the narrow set of 
literature on board diversity. Section 2.5 reviews the literature on earnings quality. 
Section 2.6 reviews the literature on CSD. Section 2.7 reviews the literature on the 
effect of board diversity on earnings quality. Section 2.8 reviews the literature on the 
impact of board diversity on CSD. Section 2.9 provides a discussion of studies that 
support the relationship between earnings quality and CSD; and the moderating 
impact of ownership structure on this relationship. Section 2.10 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
2.2 A brief overview on corporate governance, firm financial performance 
and information disclosure 
The definition of corporate governance varies depending on one‟s view of the world 
(Shahin and Zairi 2007). However, it mainly falls into two major categories.   Some 
view corporate governance as a mechanism to protect the interest of 
owners/shareholders i.e. the narrow perspective; whereas others view it as a 
mechanism to protect the interests of a broader range of stakeholders i.e., the broader 
perspective. Corporate governance‟s primary objective is not to directly improve 
corporate performance, but to resolve agency problems by aligning management‟s 
interests with the interests of shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). The crash of 
the tech-bubble in the late 1990s and increasing occurrences of corporate scandals 
have made corporate governance a major issue in the business world (Webb, 2004). 
The research interest in corporate governance has increased dramatically in recent a 
couple of decades.   
 
The board of directors has been widely considered as a centrepiece of corporate 




members‟ structure and characteristics have impact on firm‟s decision in various 
aspects, such as earnings management, reporting quality, social responsibility and 
financial performace. In turn, financial performance will influence firm‟s other 
behaviors.     
 
To explain the board‟s role in corporate governance, various theories have been 
developed such as agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory 
and stakeholder theory are some of the dominant theoretical perspectives among 
them. These theories usually explain a link between various characteristics of the 
board and corporate performance (Kiel and Nicholson 2003). These theories also 
suggest that boards of directors, being the key players in corporate governance, have 
the potential to enhance corporate performance in general. For instance, agency 
theory provides the rationale for the board‟s critical  function of monitoring 
management on behalf of the shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983) indicating  that  
effective  control  mechanisms are required to monitor  management‟s  actions. 
 
Firm financial performance is generally defined as a measure of the extent to which a 
firm uses its assets to run the business activities to earn revenues. It examines the 
overall financial health of a business over a given period of time and can be used to 
contrast the performance of identical firms in similar industries or between industries 
in general (Atrill 2011). The main source of data that reports firm financial 
performance is the financial statements, the product of accounting, which consists of 
the balance sheet, the income statement, the cash flow statement, and the statement 
of changes in the owners‟ equity. 
 
Firm‟s information disclosure is the process through which an entity communicates 
with the outside world. The significance of proper and adequate corporate disclosure 
cannot be over emphasized in a free economy where the market allocates the 
resources to different sectors of the economy. Baumol (1965) reports that the lack of 
adequate disclosure can create ignorance in the securities market and can result in 
misallocation of resources in the economy. Disclosure of information in the annual 
reports of companies is management‟s attempt to reduce information asymmetry. 




making and for other investing activities (Healy and Palepu 2001; Lambert et al. 
2007). 
 
2.3 Board of directors literature 
The board of directors is the highest level of control in a firm because it has the 
power to compensate the decisions made by top management (Jensen 1993). The 
effectiveness of this control mechanism is largely influenced by the board 
characteristics, and two important characteristics are the nature of the independence 
of the chairperson and independence of directors. This review discusses the 
independence of the chairperson in the light of that chairperson is also acting as the 
chief executive officer (CEO) involved in the operations of the firm, and the 
independence of directors in the light of whether they are an independent director 
who is also a blockholder, promoters, and representative directors‟ ownership. 
 
2.3.1 Chief executive officer duality 
The chief executive officer (CEO) duality in a firm exists when the CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board of directors (Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994). Holding this 
highly symbolic position of board chair provides the CEO with a wider power base 
and more control over decisions made by the board (Boyd 1994). While some 
organisational scholars advocate combining both positions into one as a dual 
position, others propose separating the two positions to increase the effectiveness of 
the board. Supporters of the dual  role argue that it not only removes any incomplete 
communication between the CEO and chairperson, but also reduces any conflicts that 
may arise between the two (Brickley et al. 1997). They also point out that the CEO‟s 
knowledge of the business allows for timely and optimal decisions not only at the 
operational level but also at the strategic level, which results in better short and long-
term performance. Klein (1998) supports the dual role, and states that a CEO 
becoming the chairperson means appointing an inside director into key decision 
making on the board because the CEO has more knowledge and expertise of firms‟ 
activities than outside directors. Accordingly, this dual role allows the CEO-
chairperson to utilise the information and increase the effectiveness of the board. 




joint leadership provides a positive signal that the firms have a strong leadership, and 
it is considered to be an effective form of governance in that context. 
 
Due to recent financial scandals, regulators and reformers are increasingly 
demanding that the role of the CEO be separated from that of the chairperson 
(Lorsch and Zelleke 2005) because the combination of these roles could make the 
board ineffective at monitoring managerial opportunism (Jensen 1993). In reality, 
CEO duality increases their decision making power while reducing board 
independence, and thus a board cannot perform its monitoring role effectively 
(Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994; Barako et al. 2006). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) show 
that the dual role may impair board effectiveness because the CEO can control board 
meetings by selecting agendas and board members. Finally, combining the two roles 
also makes it difficult for a board to replace a poorly performing CEO (Shivdasani 
and Zenner 2004). 
 
Prior studies also report a low to no relationship between CEO duality and specific 
organisational actions such as earnings management (García-Meca and Sánchez-
Ballesta 2009), firm performance (Boyd et al. 2011), and corporate social 
responsibility (Said et al. 2009; Khan et al. 2013). It is likely that those 
organisational contexts and locations require strong leadership over strong 
monitoring from their boards in the role of governance.  
 
2.3.2 The presence of an independent director who is also a block holder 
An independent director
2
 is defined as one who is not a current or a past executive of 
the firm, and does not have a business relationship with the firm, e.g., as a supplier or 
customer (Adams et al. 2010; Agrawal and Nasser 2011). This means an independent 
director can have an ownership relationship with the firm. Blockholders are defined 
as shareholders who own more than five per cent of a firm‟s ordinary shares (Kim et 
al. 2009). An independent director who is also a blockholder, or a blockholder who is 
also an independent director (IDB), has a strong incentive to monitor management 
because they have invested private wealth into those firms (Jensen 1993; Bédard et 
                                                 
2
 In Vietnamese listed firms, the concept of outside, independent, and inside directors has not been 
clarified and practiced yet. Presently, non-executive directors are also considered as 




al. 2004).  Large shareholdings may offer an IDB direct voting power, the ability to 
form coalitions with other large shareholders, and exercise greater influence on the 
board relative to other independent directors, who typically have negligible 
stockholdings. Thus, an IDB can play a more influential governance role than a 
blockholder without a seat on the board, or an independent director without a 
shareholding of more than five per cent of a firm‟s ordinary shares (Agrawal and 
Nasser 2012a). 
 
Several studies have analysed independent directors or blockholders as separate 
variables in various contexts, but have not directly examined the role of IDBs 
(Agrawal and Nasser 2012a). Independent directors are perceived to be a tool for 
monitoring the behaviour of management (Dixon et al. 2005). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that a higher proportion of independent directors increases board 
effectiveness in monitoring managerial opportunism, and as a consequence,  
increases the voluntary information reported. Furthermore, independent directors 
may show more objectivity and may consider the needs of diverse stakeholders in 
making their deliberations and recommendations (Zahra and PearceII 1989). 
Accordingly, they provide outside perspectives, including the propensity to provide 
transparent information to a wide range of stakeholders. Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) also consider that independent directors have strong incentives to perform 
their decision making functions so as to maintain their personal and firm reputation. 
 
Studies have shown that blockholders can incentivise to control and monitor 
managers‟ opportunistic behaviour, and encourage and demand managers to report 
information relevant to their decision making. Those shareholders with blockholding 
capabilities can effectively influence firms‟ activities because first, they have the 
power to determine who will be elected onto the board (Ronen and Yaari 2008). 
Second, they have better access to a firm‟s private information, and can pressure 
boards to make decisions that align with the interests of owners (Heflin and Shaw 
2000). Third, they can effectively monitor managers‟ opportunistic behaviour 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Fourth, they can replace underperforming managers that 
fail to meet their expectations (Andres 2008) such as increasing the firm‟s market 





Blockholders can also influence firms‟ activities (Mueller 2006) opportunistically. 
Excessive monitoring by blockholders increases agency costs, as well as arguably 
possesses strong incentives to engage in short-selling activity. Since blockholders 
have access to privileged information, these controlling shareholders may seek to 
earn profits in light of adverse information (Morck et al. 2005). Blockholders only 
sell shares to outsiders when there is not enough internal capital to fund attractive 
investment opportunities (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002; Morck et al. 2005). Indeed, 
Boubaker and Labégorre (2008) also suggest that large shareholders use their power 
and influence to manipulate the timing of reporting and reporting patterns in order to 
favourably benefit themselves.   
 
Agrawal and Nasser (Agrawal and Nasser 2012b, a), have recently examined the role 
of IDB. Using 11,500 firm-year observations and a panel data model, Agrawal and 
Nasser (2012a) find that IDBs are more prevalent in firms where blocks or board 
seats are easier to acquire.  They also find that CEOs of firms with IDBs have lower 
pay, lower share ownership incentives, and greater variations between turnover and 
firm performance. The presence of an IDB on the board leads to better contracting 
with and monitoring of the CEO, and consequently leads to higher firm valuation, as 
measured by Tobin‟s Q. Their findings imply that by making it easier for 
blockholders to obtain a board seat benefits shareholders and improves corporate 
governance (Agrawal and Nasser 2012a). Agrawal and Nasser (2012b) also examine 
the role of IDBs using 9,100 firm-year observations and a panel data model on S&P 
1,500 firms from 1998 to 2006. They find that firms with an IDB have statistically 
significant influence in three ways; first, it lowers the levels of cash holdings and 
payouts (dividend yields, repurchases, and total payout), second, it increases the 
levels of capital expenditure, and third, it lowers the systematic, unsystematic, and 
total risk. Their findings suggest that IDBs play a valuable role in reallocating 
corporate resources and reducing agency costs.  
 
2.3.3 Promoters 
Following Jayati et al. (2008, p.524), this study defines promoters as controlling 




directors. Inside directors are defined as those who hold managerial positions within 
a firm as well as being directors (De Andres et al. 2005, p.199). These directors act 
as executive directors who manage and organise daily operations in the firm.  
 
Promoters are an important part of listed firms in the Vietnamese business context 
because most Vietnamese listed firms are transformed traditional state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), but the ownership of these firms is still heavily concentrated in 
the hands of large state-owned shareholders (Vu et al. 2011). La Porta et al. (1998) 
observe that controlling shareholders like promoters exist in countries where the 
legal and institutional protection for investors is low. Vietnam is one of those 
countries. However, promoters do not have statutory recognition in any laws in 
Vietnam as the term „„Promoter‟‟ is not defined therein.  
 
Because promoters are controlling shareholders, they lead key strategic decisions of 
firms using the board and management. La Porta et al. (1999) show that concentrated 
state ownership in firms gives promoters the majority voting rights and through their 
ownership stake, the State uses these firms to pursue political objectives. These firms 
pursuing political objectives can report financial losses, and then the public pays for 
these firms to continue existing  (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Under these conditions, 
promoters may help the State by inducing firms to pursue political objectives, but 
this may deteriorate firm performance (Demsetz 1983; Claessens et al. 2002).  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), however, show that promoters, because of their 
controlling ability, can reduce agency costs, and increase firm performance. These 
findings support Jensen and Meckling (1976), who state that high ownership 
concentration leads to more of an alignment effect which may provide incentives for 
promoters to maximise firm values. Because the State through their share of 
ownership may appoint most of the directors to a board, a board dominated by 
promoters who are also inside directors can have ready access to details about the 
operational activities of the firm (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Sonnenfeld 2002). 
Similarly, Klein (1998) states that inside directors possess more knowledge and 
expertise about firms‟ activities which outside directors might lack and therefore, 




Fama and Jensen (1983) and Stulz (1988) also argue that greater ownership control 
by insiders give them enough power over external owners to influence firm 
performance.  
 
2.3.4 Representative directors‟ ownership 
Although the privatisation of SOEs involved transferring state ownership to private 
ownership, the Vietnamese government still retains a substantial amount of 
ownership in many listed firms. This is especially with firms in large and 
strategically important industries or sectors such as electricity production, telecom 
infrastructure, mineral exploration, and water supply (Vu 2012). Instead of having 
government bureaucrats directly supervising the SOEs as before, the state now 
formally exercises its rights as a major shareholder by appointing representative 
directors to boards. Some are executive directors and others are non-executive 
directors in the board of directors, and regardless of their categorisation, in this study 
they are called representative directors. The role of representative directors is to align 
decisions made by firms they represent, with government objectives. Since these 
firms are large in terms of asset values, numbers of staff employed, and have a 
government presence, they are visible to stakeholders who tend to demand greater 
accountability for their actions (Amran and Devi 2008).  
 
State ownership in a firm can be called representative directors‟ ownership, if there 
are assigned representative directors. Because, state may also assigns State Capital 
Invesmtnet Corproate or members in auditing committee as representative owner of 
state shares, representative directors‟ ownership is not necessary equal to all state 
ownership, instead, is part of state ownership. Representative directors‟ ownership is 
also not managerial ownerhisp. Managerial ownership in general definiaton is the 
ownership belond to managers, while representative directors‟ ownership in 
Vietnamese context is the ownership belong to the state and represented by the 
direcotrs. However, the directors‟ representative ownership has the managerial 
ownership attribute, because directors‟ remuneration is related to the size of their 





Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that increasing managers‟ stock ownership is a 
sufficient incentive for managers to align their personal economic interests with the 
firm‟s economic interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Elson 1996); this would 
reduce the monitoring aspect of agency costs because managers self-interests become 
shareholder‟s common interests (Davis et al. 1997). Managers‟ share ownership in 
firms can have an added benefit in that managers are more likely to have a higher 
level of commitment to firms‟ long term goals and financial returns rather than 
shareholders who are more interested in short term returns.  
 
Firms also offer stock incentives to directors as a way of paying for their 
performance. Fama (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), state there is a positive 
link between reputation and compensation of directors. Reputation is important for 
directors because it helps their career growth and their compensation, and in many 
instances, directors who perform effectively are further compensated by way of stock 
for their performance (Elson 1996).  
 
Numerous studies attest that managerial ownership improves firm performance 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990; Chung and Pruitt 1996; Palia and Lichtenberg 1999). 
Although many scholars have studied the influence of share ownership by various 
stakeholders on firm performance, none of these studies have specifically examined 
the influence of representative directors‟ ownership in shares on firm performance. 
Brickley et al. (1988) show that owning shares in firms provides managers and 
directors with an incentive to increase firm performance, but other studies are not so 
clear about the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
For example, Demsetz (1983) shows that as managerial ownership in firms increase, 
managers are more likely to prioritise their own interests over shareholders‟ interests, 
and such opportunistic behaviour can decrease firm performance.  
 
2.4 Board diversity literature 
Gender diversity is the most common type of diversity examined in the literature 
(e.g.  Webb 2004; Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Srinidhi et al. 2011), possibly because 
it has become the most visible form of diversity in the boardroom. A few studies 




diversity within a board of directors into a composite measure, and characteristics 
relating to diversity between boards to formulate a comprehensive picture of their 
simultaneous influence on various organisational outcomes (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; 
Hafsi and Turgut 2013). 
 
More recently, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) identify boardroom diversity as having two 
dimensions. One dimension considers the diversity within a given board based on 
demographic factors of board members; they evaluate several factors that make up 
diversity within the board and present a composite index called diversity-in-boards 
index. The other dimension considers the diversity among different boards. They 
evaluate factors relating to the constitution of the board, compare them among boards 
of different firms, and then present a composite index called diversity-of-boards 
index. These two dimensions of board diversity are measured by a diversity-of-
boards index (dissimilarities among firm boards, a dimension which relates to board 
structure) and a diversity-in-boards index (dissimilarities among directors within a 
board, which relates to the demographic attributes of board members) (Hafsi and 
Turgut 2013). Although Ben-Amar et al. (2013) also build two different board 
diversity indices for the demographic and structural dimensions, these two indices 
are still measured using the same method, which makes the meaning of these two 
indices similar. This thesis therefore adopted Hafsi and Turgut‟s approach to 
determine the two dimensions of board diversity in firms. 
 
A heterogeneous board can benefit from cognitive conflict among board members 
because this should result in solutions that have been examined extensively. 
Furthermore, this heterogeneity can also lead to greater board independence 
(Robinson and Dechant 1997) because the differences in gender, ethnicity, and/or 
cultural backgrounds among directors can elicit questions that would not arise from 
directors with similar backgrounds or experience (Arfken et al. 2004). Such diversity 
in attributes among board members can also increase creativity and innovation, and 
therefore, provides competitive advantage to the firm (Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et 
al. 2003). Teams that are diverse can potentially be more creative than homogeneous 
teams and may lead to more alternative decisions being considered. Diversity can 




Maznevski 2000). Additionally, Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) argue that diversity 
in boards is a necessary ethical obligation of the board of directors, and also state that 
a board of directors must be responsible for the interests of the owners but also 
represent the diversity of the owners, thus leading to a more diverse board of 
directors. Board diversity also calls for a more general responsibility towards the 
society in which a firm operates (Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). 
 
However, diversity also has negative aspects. Heterogeneous groups are more likely 
to disagree, thereby weakening the team consensus (Hambrick et al. 1996). Diverse 
boards could also become divisive and conflict could stifle rather than encourage 
meaningful discussion in board meetings (Ruigrok et al. 2006). There is, therefore, 
the potential for a poorer rather than richer information environment with diverse 
boards. In addition, Bryson (2004) find that the burden on the board of directors 
increases with diversity because the community expects the firm to be more 
responsive and accountable.  
 
Although there has been mixed evidence and constant debate in empirical research 
regarding board diversity (e.g. Dulewicz and Herbert 2004; De Andres et al. 2005), 
based on the evidence gathered so far, a diversity of board membership is desirable 
for the following reasons. First, it can enhance the exchange of ideas among board 
members in making informed decisions (Schippers et al. 2003; Knippenberg et al. 
2004) on how to increase organisational economic value and financial performance 
(Siciliano 1996; Carter et al. 2003). Second, diversity can ensure that the interests of 
stakeholders are been served through the business. In this context, Van der Walt and 
Ingley (2003) argue that diversity in boards can also increase the breadth of ethical 
obligations that the board of directors believe should be served by firms. Their 
argument is based on a notion of legitimacy where a firm should respond to the 
norms and values of society (Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). Third, the premise of 
equal opportunities implies that capacities and abilities are distributed equitably 
among people, and thus management and directors should also be drawn from and 
represent an equitable labour pool (Brammer et al. 2007). This equity refers to equal 
possibilities of representation regardless of discriminative features (such as gender or 




and Ingley‟s (2003) views, Brammer et al. (2007) state that women and ethnic 
minorities would be represented on corporate boards in the same proportions as they 
are in society. 
 
Organisational demography is conceptualised as the distribution of organisational 
members along any demographic traits or any set of demographic traits (Pfeffer 
1985). Relevant research has covered issues regarding the way that directors‟ 
demographic attributes such as gender, age, educational qualifications, and the 
nationality of directors affect organisational performance and effectiveness (Erhardt 
et al. 2003; Kang et al. 2007; Post et al. 2011), so the next section contains a brief 
discussion of those attributes.  
 
2.4.1 Gender  
Customers, employees, and investors are key stakeholders that have demanded 
greater diversity in board representation relating to gender (Brammer et al. 2007). 
Customers believe that boards with gender diversity bring direct benefits by 
promoting and communicating the preferences, aspirations, and concerns that 
enhance relations with customers (Bilimoria and Wheeler 2000). Also, firms that 
have a board that reflects gender diversity may reap improvements in workforce 
motivation and loyalty (Burgess and Tharenou 2002). The economic benefits of 
greater equality of representation may also be derived indirectly through improved 
relationships with external institutions, principally institutional investors, equal 
opportunity pressure groups, and regulators of employment law (Sherry 1999; Carter 
et al. 2003). Many institutional investors, especially those in pension funds, have 
publicly expressed a preference for an increased representation of females and 
minority groups at board-level such as Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - 
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAACREF), Calvert and Domini (Brammer et 
al. 2007).  
 
It could be argued that it is unethical and immoral to exclude women from boards 
based on gender. In order to fulfil the moral imperative about fairness and equity, 
firms should promote gender diversity in order to encourage economic empowerment 




fulfilling the moral obligation could be seen as a socially responsible act in itself, 
further arguments point out that female representation is associated with better firm 
performance. So if firms ignore the female talent pool, the economic argument 
suggests they fail to access the best candidates to support firm performance and gain 
a competitive advantage (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008). The OECD (2008) has 
reported that women are generally more educated than men, indeed more than one 
half of all university degrees are awarded to women. Francoeur et al. (2008) also 
document a positive relationship between gender diversity and financial performance 
when firms operate in riskier environments because women on boards appear to be 
able to deal with more complex strategic issues. 
  
In addition to those moral and economic arguments, studies also show that women 
can provide boards with unique resources. Daily and Dalton (2003) show that female 
directors are more likely to provide unusual perspectives and experiences than their 
male counterparts. Studies also have shown that female directors can be more 
valuable in industries where females constitute majority customers because they are 
more likely to empathise more insightfully with market place dynamics and 
contribute to a firm‟s competitive advantage (Daily and Dalton 2003; Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera 2008). Brammer et al. (2007) have observed that the external business 
environment and industry membership are two factors that can explain why some 
firms have more gender diversity. Having more females on the board improves 
collaboration in the boardroom and decreases any conflicts of interest among board 
members (Ferreira 2011). The collaborative approaches have led to improved 
communication among directors, and between the board and management.  
 
2.4.2 Age  
Directors‟ age may be indicative of their business experience and maturity (Kang et 
al. 2007; Hafsi and Turgut 2013), and it can also influence how they perceive events 
and the decisions they are more likely to make (Wiersema and Bantel 1992). As 
directors advance in age, their flexibility to change decreases and their resistance to 





Studies show that directors who are younger are likely to support less stable and 
more volatile strategies (Hambrick and Mason 1984),  although these strategies may 
result in superior firm performance (Child 1974; Norburn and Birley 1988). Child 
(1974) shows that firms with younger directors are more likely to pursue innovation 
or growth strategies than their older counterparts, and they are also more likely to 
possess contemporary technical knowledge (Bantel and Jackson 1989).  
 
Vroom and Pahl (1971) however, disagree with the „volatile‟, „changeable‟, actions 
of younger directors, and believe that such action can lead firms into taking decisions 
that can contribute to a more volatile firm performance. Some researchers state that 
older directors are likely to make more conservative and morally balanced judgments 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; McCabe et al. 2006). These studies assign such conduct 
to older directors aspiration to lead financially stable careers (Hambrick and Mason 
1984). Given that younger and older directors can bring variations in thinking that 
can translate into corporate decisions, some authors point out that having directors of 
varying ages means corporate boards can consider a range of decisions, and this 
allows the board to make the best choice for firms (Kang et al. 2007; Post et al. 2011; 
Mahadeo et al. 2012). 
 
2.4.3 Educational qualifications 
Directors‟ educational qualifications are indicative of their knowledge, cognitive 
orientation, and skill base (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Research shows that 
directors who are more formally educated are likely to adopt new ideas, accept 
innovations (Guthrie et al. 1991; Wally and Baum 1994; Carmen et al. 2005) and 
entertain a broader view of ideas (Post et al. 2011). Board members with diverse 
educational qualifications can therefore evaluate a range of solutions to a given 
problem before making decisions (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Milliken and Martins 
1996). However, there is a downside to having board members with a diversity in 
education, it leads to greater turnover, and higher coordination and integration costs 
stemming from conflicts that can arise from this diversity (Milliken and Martins 





2.4.4 Nationality diversity 
As globalisation has increased, firms tend to modify their governance structures by 
having more foreigners on their boards (Carpenter 1998; Oxelheim et al. 2013). This 
is based on an implicit assumption that foreign directors are better able to understand 
the international business environment and can bring alternative investment and 
operating decisions that might otherwise not be considered by domestic board 
members. Foreign directors help a firm to access resources internationally with 
sources and contacts known to them, and also help to open up new business 
opportunities (Cox and Blake 1991; Oxelheim et al. 2013). Based on those factors, 
Cox and Blake (1991) show that the nationally diverse directors can bring 
competitive advantages because firms that embrace this diversity are more likely to 
attract more productive human capital. The diverse knowledge base of those 
directors means they can make decisions where they respond more favourably to 
changes in the business environment. However, not all studies have found positive 
effects on having diverse boards based on nationality; for example, Milliken and 
Martins (1996) have shown that diversity in national background may reduce a 
board‟s initial effectiveness and performance but it can become more efficient and 
productive later.  
 
2.5 Earnings quality literature 
The term „earnings quality‟ has been widely used within accounting research 
(Dechow et al. 2010). This term has evolved into numerous different shapes and 
today there is no consensus on what earnings quality means or how to measure it 
(Schipper and Vincent 2003; Dichev et al. 2013). 
 
Consistent with the decision usefulness approach in accounting research, reported 
earnings are considered to signal superior quality when they correspond to 
fundamental earnings as closely as possible (Schipper and Vincent 2003; Dechow 
and Schrand 2004). Fundamental earnings are considered to reflect the true economic 
performance of a firm. Earnings quality can then be defined as „the reduction of the 
market‟s uncertainty about the firm‟s terminal value due to the earnings report‟ (p.1) 
(Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). Based on a the perspective of financial analysts, 




current operating performance; [...] be a good indicator of future operating 
performance; and [....] accurately annuitize the intrinsic value of the company‟ (p. 2). 
When tested empirically, earnings would for example be considered to be of superior 
quality when they are strongly associated with returns because a high correlation 
with stock market data is interpreted as an indicator that earnings are useful in the 
context of equity valuation decisions (Lev 1989; Schipper and Vincent 2003; Francis 
et al. 2004). 
 
In the review of more than 300 earnings quality studies, Dechow et al. (2010) argue 
that the term earnings quality becomes meaningful if it is considered in the context of 
a specific decision model only. The idea here is that different stakeholders might 
have differing views on what constitutes a reported high quality earnings. Investors 
depend on the earnings reported, and in it, earnings quality becomes a driver to more 
accurately assess firm value and firm performance so that they can make accurate 
economic decisions relating to the future (Bushman and Smith 2001; Gaio and 
Raposo 2011). Earnings reported are also useful for financial analysts who make 
stock pricing forecasts (Siegel 1982). Lev (2003) states that institutional investors 
and corporate boards are interested in earnings to evaluate the quality of managerial 
performance, whereas shareholders use earnings as a basis for awarding bonuses and 
executive stock options for senior managers (Peasnell et al. 2000). 
 
Until recently, earnings quality research has focused mainly on firm characteristics 
as their determinants (Demerjian et al. 2013) and the effects of numerous firm 
characteristics on earnings quality have been examined. These firm characteristics 
that are systematically linked to earnings quality are typically referred to as „innate‟ 
drivers of earnings quality (e.g. Francis et al. 2005; Francis et al. 2008a; Francis et al. 
2008b; Demerjian et al. 2013). Innate refers to the factors being driven by the firm‟s 
business model and operating environment and as such, they are not easily 
influenced by management in the short term (Francis et al. 2005).  
 
The research literature has empirically measured earnings quality in two ways. 
Francis et al. (2004) use „earnings attributes‟ to represent earnings quality, where 




accounting-based attributes are measured using accounting information only, while 
the market-based attributes are based on the relationship between the stock market 
and accounting data. The accounting-based attributes assume that the function of 
earnings is effective allocation of cash flows to reporting periods via the accruals 
process. In terms of market-based earnings attributes, the assumption is that the 
function of earnings is to reflect economic income which is represented by stock 
returns. Stock returns are also affected by several factors other than managers‟ 
actions. Managers in firms are more likely to manipulate accounting-based measures 
because it is driven by those preparing financial statements. It is also much harder for 
them to manipulate market-based measures as it is driven by investors participating 
in the market place (Prior et al. 2008). Most of the research has used the accounting-
based earnings quality for organisational research (Francis et al. 2005). 
 
The literature has identified four common earnings attributes that use accounting-
based earning quality measures (Francis et al. 2004; Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006). 
They are accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings 
smoothness. The first earnings attribute is accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). Dechow and Dichev has used an empirical model to estimate the errors in 
accruals and subsequent corrections of these errors in earnings. High errors mean low 
accruals quality, and that is low earnings quality.  
 
The second earnings attribute is persistence. Persistence indicates the sustainability or 
recurrence of earnings (Francis et al. 2004). Lipe (1990) describes persistence as the 
time-series relationship between the current period unexpected earnings and future 
earnings. Unexpected earnings consist of „persistent‟ and „transitory‟ components. 
Earnings persistence affects the expectations of future earnings and cash flows while 
transitory earnings do not affect expectations (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lev 1989). 
The effect of persistence is positive with earnings quality because persistent 
components embedded in earnings makes earnings sustainable.  
 
The third earnings attribute is predictability. Predictability is based on the view that a 
current earnings number repeats itself into the future, and a higher repetition 




increases when the variance decreases. Analysts and investors prefer earnings with 
high predictability because the current earnings information becomes more useful in 
predicting future earnings. Although both predictability and persistence are measured 
by current earnings and past earnings, these two earnings attributes are different. 
Predictability is measured by the variation in earnings from one period to another 
period, persistence is measured by the similarity of earnings (Lipe 1990).  
 
The fourth earnings attribute is smoothness, which is based on the volatility of 
earnings relative to some benchmark such as cash flow. There are two opposing 
opinions on whether earnings smoothness is a desirable attribute. On one hand, some 
researchers support the benefits of smooth earnings (Demski 1998; Francis et al. 
2004; Gaio and Raposo 2011) because managers can use their private information 
about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuations and thereby achieve a more 
representative, and more useful, reported earnings number. On the other hand, some 
researchers view earnings smoothness as an undesirable earnings characteristic 
because managers can manipulate earnings smoothness by timing the recognition or 
changes in accounting policies, and hence they use earnings smoothness as a proxy 
for earnings management (Leuz et al. 2003; Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006). 
 
2.6 Corporate social disclosure literature 
The globalisation trends and growing demand from stakeholders for wider 
accountability have encouraged firms to be involved in CSD practices and also report 
them (Chapple and Moon 2005). Studies have shown that corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, of which CSD is an integral part, is likely to change the 
way stakeholders see firms (Gray et al. 2001; Saleh et al. 2010; Haji 2013). This is 
because stakeholders are likely to favour firms that take a keen interest in aspects 
relating to society, which is outside their mandatory performance and reporting 
boundaries. These reporting matters are usually outlined in firms‟ annual reports, and 
include matters such as those relating to reducing pollution, protecting the 
environment, and addressing employees‟ welfare (Gray et al. 1996). 
 
Although such stakeholders‟ scrutiny is much stronger in developed nations, recent 




disclosure in the annual reports of firms in developing countries (Haji 2013). Studies 
in developed and developing countries have mainly focused on the quantity of 
disclosure, by measuring the extent (presence or absence) of items disclosed (Ho and 
Wong 2001; Xiao and Yuan 2007). Only a limited number of studies have examined 
the quality of disclosure (Haji 2013). Some of those studies measured disclosure item 
quality by assigning varying levels of importance to all items on a numerical scale 
assigned by financial analysts on the survey (Stanga 1976; McNally et al. 1982; 
Barako et al. 2006), while others measure disclosure type quality by assigning 
varying levels of importance to types of disclosure such as narrative, qualitative, and 
quantitative disclosures using a detailed scoring scheme of 1, 2, 3 (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 
2004; Saleh et al. 2010; Haji 2013). The disclosure item quality in these studies is 
mainly assessed by conducting a survey of only a group of the respondents such as 
financial analysts. A matter to note here is that the judgment of different respondent 
groups such as employees, customers, or local communities is based on their interest 
in each disclosure aspect, i.e. labour practices, product responsibility, or society, 
respectively (Potluri et al. 2010 and Lu and Abeysekera 2014). Additionally, the 
disclosure type quality in prior studies is mainly measured by using a detailed 
scoring scheme of 1, 2, 3 which is not based on the perspective of stakeholders 
through a survey. The detailed scoring scheme may result in a greater degree of 
subjectivity which could reduce the reliability of the results (Haji 2013).  
 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an independent foundation and a co-
operational organ of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). GRI is a 
non-profit organisation whose approach is to combine long term profitability with 
social justice and environmental awareness. They provide firms with the means to 
start their own sustainability reporting and increase transparency and accountability 
towards a wider group of stakeholders. Studies undertaken have used the GRI 
framework to identify items that constitute corporate social responsibility disclosure 
practices for the firm reporting. GRI identify CSD items under four aspects: labour 
practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. The importance of  
labour practices, human rights, and broader social issues affecting consumers, 





2.7 The impact of board diversity on earnings quality 
A large body of literature has already examined the relationship between the 
structural factors relating to the board of directors and earnings quality. The 
structural factors discussed in the literature mainly include the proportion of 
outside/independent/non-executive directors (e.g. Klein 2002; Park and Shin 2004; 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010), other factors such as CEO duality (e.g. Xie et al. 
2003; Rahman and Ali 2006), and director ownership (e.g. Anderson et al. 2003; 
Ahmed et al. 2006). These studies identify structural factors as necessary attributes 
for the „best practices‟ in governance, but most studies focus on specific factors such 
as the duality of the chairman being the CEO, the proportion of independent directors 
on the board, and the directors‟ ownership in the firm. In a real life scenario, one or 
more of these factors will exist simultaneously, but thus far studies have largely 
ignored their combined effect for a given outcome.  
 
Isolated factors about the structure of the board of directors have had various 
influences on different outcomes. For example, several studies have shown that a 
greater proportion of independent directors associates with firms making less 
discretionary accruals (Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 
2010), whereas Park and Shin (2004), and Rahman and Ali (2006), find no 
statistically significant association between the two. Park and Shin (2004) show at 
least four possible reasons why independent directors generally fail to curb earnings 
management in Canada: (1) independent directors, as a whole, may lack financial 
sophistication and/or access to relevant information to detect and correct earnings 
management; (2) independent directors may not be interested in curbing earnings 
management because they lack ownership interest in the firm they monitor; (3) the 
presence of dominant shareholders in many firms may make it difficult for 
independent directors to effectively curb earnings management; and (4) the labour 
market for independent directors may not be well developed in Canada. Rahman and 
Ali (2006) examining firms in Malaysia also show that independent directors are 
ineffective at discharging their monitoring duties. They assign this ineffectiveness to 






More recent studies have begun to examine the relationship between gender as a 
specific demographic factor, and its relationship with the quality of reported 
earnings, by focusing on firms in the U.S. (Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Adams and 
Ferreira 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011). Their findings show that having more female 
director on boards is positively associated with earnings quality. Ye et al. (2010), 
however, find that having more female executives on Chinese firms has no statistical 
influence on improving earnings quality. It is suggestive here that societal culture 
may influence the outcome. Table 2.1 summarises the research designs undertaken 
and the findings of the relationship between board diversity and earnings quality. 
These studies have used empirical modelling and regressions to analyse their data. 
They mainly examine an isolated factor (gender) constituting board diversity and 
earnings quality, mostly based on U.S. data. The measures of earnings quality used in 
these studies vary, whereas gender diversity is mainly measured by the percentage of 
female directors.   
 
Table 2.1. Summary of empirical studies investigating the effect of board diversity 
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the database of 
Fortune 500 firms 
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Catalyst and 
Compustat in the US 













Two groups: the 
high gender 
diversity group 
(i.e. firms in the 
first quartile of 
Catalyst with 
average of 20.3 per 
cent of senior 
managers are 
women) and the 
lower gender 
diversity group 
(i.e. firms in the 
fourth quartile of 
Catalyst with 
average of 1.9 per 
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A sample of 2,622 
firm-year 
observations 1,448 
and 1,174 for 2005 
and 2004, 
respectively from 
CFO profile data and 
the Compustat 
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the Dechow and 
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78 firms in Canada 
or 156 observations 
in 2005 & 2006 from 
the Canadian Social 
Investment Database  
The cross-sectional 
version of the Jones 
model modified by 
Dechow et al. (1995). 
Diversity 
management (DM) 











Ye et al. 
2010 
5216 firm-years 
from the Peking 
University CCER 
Sinofin database in 







the accuracy of 
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forecasts of future 
cash flows); the 
association between 
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CEO gender, and 









future cash flows, 
the association 
between earnings 
and stock returns, 
and the absolute 
magnitude of 
discretionary 




firms with female 







the S&P Compustat, 
Corporate Library‟s 
Board Analyst, and 
IRRC databases in 
the US for the period 
2001–2007 
Discretionary 
accruals quality, the 
lower propensity 
among firms whose 
unmanaged earnings 
are just shy of 
earnings benchmarks 
to manage earnings 
and beat the 
benchmarks by a 
small amount. 
 
The presence of 
female director on 
board; female 
nonexecutive 
director on board; 











Gul et al. 
2013 
Using a sample of 
2,200 U.S. listed 
firms from 2001 to 





Accuracy in analysts‟ 
earnings forecasts; 
and dispersion in 
analysts‟ earnings 
forecasts. 
The presence of 
female directors or 
female non-
executive directors 
or female audit 
committee 
















2.8 The impact of board diversity on corporate social disclosure 
The empirical studies conducted on the disclosure of corporate social responsibility, 
of which CSD in this thesis is an integral part, mainly dealt with developed Western 
economies (Dobers and Halme 2009; Wood 2010), but literature has begun to 
emanate from emerging nations, particularly the Asian continent (Scholtens and 
Kang 2013). Kolk et al. (2010) analyse the notion of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure by sampling eight large retailers in China, including the four largest 
Chinese retailers and the four largest international ones (the countries of origin are 
France, Malaysia, Thailand and the U.S.). The results show there are differences 
between the Chinese and international retailers, where the former reports more on 
economic dimensions, including philanthropy, while the latter reports more on 
product responsibility.  
 
Welford and Frost (2006) show that labour issues are generally seen by firms in Asia 
as the most important aspect considered for corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
Baughn et al. (2007) examine the social and the environmental aspect of firms across 
15 Asian countries, and reveal that a country‟s economic, political, and social 
contexts, and its institutional capacity to promote and support corporate social 
responsibility practices is a major influence on the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure in firms. By examining the relationship between the corporate 
responsiveness strategy and stakeholders in 15 Korean electronics firms, Lee (2007) 
shows that most firms understand the importance of managing relations with key 
stakeholders such as shareholders, customers, employees, the local community, the 
government, the media, and the general public. Additionally, corporate social 
responsiveness has to do with a firm‟s external responsive strategy, which depends 
on the willingness of top management to address social issues (Lee 2007). Lattemann 
et al. (2009) compare corporate social responsibility between Chinese and Indian 
multi-national firms and shows that Indian firms disclose more about their corporate 
social responsibility primarily due to a more rule-based rather than a relation-based 
governance environment. Firms in the manufacturing industry tend to disclose more 
corporate social responsibility. Firm-level characteristics such as size, the duality of 
CEO and board chairperson, and the percentage of external members on the board 




and Welford (2009) compare corporate social responsibility disclosure between firms 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan and found very little difference between Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, indeed according to the authors, these two countries have similar 
sensitivities to corporate social responsibility disclosure. In both countries, multi-
national firms have significantly more policies in the four areas, implicitly assuming 
formalised responsibilities, i.e. human rights, labour standards, environment and anti-
corruption, examined than the local listed firms. This study also suggests that 
corporate social responsibility is underdeveloped as a concept in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh because only sporadic attempts have been made to drive corporate social 
responsibility through written policies in two these countries.  
 
Apart from examining what constitutes corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
compares them between nations, studies have also examined various factors that 
influence the corporate social responsibility disclosure in firms. By using data from 
Malaysia, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) find a significant relationship between CSD and 
boards dominated by Malaysian directors, boards dominated by executive directors, 
chair with multiple directorships, and foreign share ownership. Also in the Malaysian 
context, Saleh (2010) shows that Malaysian listed firms can attract and maintain their 
institutional investors when they engage in social activities. Lu and Abeysekera 
(2014) examine the influence of various stakeholders and firm characteristics on the 
social and the environmental aspects of socially responsible Chinese listed firms. 
Their findings indicate that corporate social and environmental disclosures have a 
significant and positive association with firm size, profitability, and industry 
classification. The roles of various powerful stakeholders in influencing corporate 
social and environmental disclosures were generally weak in China. 
 
Previous studies mainly examine the impact of isolated factors about the structure of 
the board of directors on corporate social responsibility or corporate social 
performance (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Naser et al. 2006; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
2009). In addition, their findings are inconsistent. Some studies find that independent 
directors are positively associated with corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(e.g., Webb 2004; Lattemann et al. 2009), others find a negative association (e.g., 




2011; Michelon and Parbonetti 2012). Similarly, prior literature primarily focuses on 
the individual factor of the board of directors‟ demographic dimensions, mainly 
gender diversity, impacting on corporate social responsibility disclosure. Table 2.2 
recapitulates the design and findings of prior research regarding the impact of board 
diversity on corporate social responsibility or corporate social performance. Research 
already suggests that firms with a higher percentage of female board members have a 
higher level of charitable giving (Wang and Coffey 1992; Williams 2003), and better 
work environments (Johnson and Greening 1999; Bernardi et al. 2006). Corporate 
social responsibility or corporate social performance in these studies is measured 





Table 2.2. Summary of empirical studies investigating the effect of board diversity 
on CSR/CSP
/a 
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calculated as the 
percentage of pre-tax 
earnings given to 
charities. 
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asked to allocate up 
to 10 points among 
four statements in 
each of several sets 
of statements. Each 
of the four 
statements in a set 









instrument used in 
this study contains 
20 such statements. 
The scores on each 
of the four 
dimensions are 
Two groups: the 
female and male 
directors. 
The results show 
female directors 










between the 2 
genders with 
respect to both the 





Author(s) Sample  
The measure for 
CSR/CSP 
The measure for 
board diversity 
Results 
summed to arrive at 
a respondent‟s 
orientation toward 




Data from 240 
YMCA firms. The 
survey instrument 
is mailed to 298 
firm executives in 
1989. Responses 
total 240 usable 
questionnaires 
(81%).  
(1) Measuring social 
performance: to 
assess the firm‟s 
effectiveness in 
achieving its social 
mission, a staff 
consultant provides 
rankings [ranging 
from poor (1) to 
excellent (5)] for 
his/her firm(s) in the 
region. 
(2) Measuring 
the level of 
donations available 
to each firm: a ratio 




United Way and 
government grants) 
to total revenues is 
calculated.   
In each category 
(occupational 
background, 
gender, age), the 
highest percentage 
of any of the 
subgroupings is 
subtracted from 
100 (so that a high 
score would 
represent greater 
diversity) and then 
is multiplied by the 
total number of 







firms that appear to 
place greater 
emphasis on their 
social agency 
mission and have 




firm‟s ability to 
fulfil its social 
agency mission is 
enhanced by more 
equal 
representation of 
both sexes on the 
board and, in this 
group of firms, by 
adding more 
women. Diversity 
in age groupings 
has no relationship 
to the firm‟s 
efficiency measure 








levels of donations. 
Williams 
2003 
A sample of 185 
Fortune 500 firms 
for the 1991–1994 
time periods. 
The amount of each 
firm‟s giving is 




Philanthropy and the 
National Directory 
of Corporate Giving, 
measured by amount 
of each firm‟s 
charitable 
contributions, in 
both cash and gifts-
in-kind (if any), for 
The percentage of 
women serving on 
their firms‟ boards 
of directors during 
the 1991–1994 
time periods. 
The results provide 
strong support for 
the notion that 
firms having a 
higher proportion 
of women serving 
on their boards do 
engage in 
charitable giving to 
a greater extent 
than firms having a 
lower proportion of 





Author(s) Sample  
The measure for 
CSR/CSP 
The measure for 
board diversity 
Results 




A sample of 400 
SR firms and 400 
non-SR firms in 
2001. 
400 socially 
responsible (SR) vs 
400 non-SR firms. 
The 400 SR firms 
from the DSI (as of 
November 2001). 
The non-SR is 
selected by locating 
the firm closest in 
market capitalization 
(size) to each SR 
firm within the same 
three-digit SIC code 
(industry) in 2001.  
The percentage of 
women on the 
board of directors. 





et al. 2006 
The 27 firms 
appearing on both 
Fortunes „100 Best 
Firms to Work For‟ 
list and the Fortune 
500 in 2001. 
A firm‟s appearance 
on the „100 Best 
Firms to Work For‟ 
list. 
The number of 
female directors. 
There is a positive 
correlation 
between the 
number of female 
directors and a 
firm‟s appearance 
on the „100 Best 





40 Kenyan banks. A binary coding 
technique is used, 
with a score of 1 if 
an item is disclosed 
and 0 if not. The 
unweighted CSD 
index is calculated 
by dividing the 
number of banks 
disclosing a 
particular item by 
the total number of 
items. 
 
The ratio of the 
number of women 
directors to the 
total number of 






determinant of the 
level of social 
information 
disclosed by banks 




The top-500 firms 
on Fortune‟s (2007) 
Top 1,000 list; of 
these 500 
corporations, 38 
(462) appear (do 




Ethical Firms‟ list. 
Ethisphere 
Magazine‟s „World‟s 
Most Ethical Firms‟ 
list. 
The percentage of 
women on the 
board of directors. 
Having a higher 
percentage of 
women on the 
board of directors 
of a Fortune‟s 500 







Ethical Firms‟ list. 
Ibrahim et 
al. 2009 
A total of 286 
managers enrolled 
in executive MBA 
or special MBA 
programs from five 
The eight items in 
this section are 
inspired by the 
research of Becker 
and Fritzsche (1987) 
2 groups: the 
female and male 
managers. 
The females are 
more sanguine 
with respect to the 





Author(s) Sample  
The measure for 
CSR/CSP 
The measure for 
board diversity 
Results 
universities in the 
southeastern and 
northeastern USA 
are surveyed. All of 
them are working 
full time either in 
middle or lower 
management 
position. 
and Peppas (2003). 
Respondents are 
asked to assume that 
an Ethical Practices 




they are requested to 
indicate on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 5 
= Strongly Agree) 
the extent to which 
they disagree or 
agree with eight 
statements relating 
to the possible 
consequences of 




impact on the 
growth of their 
industry, and that 
pharmacists would 
welcome the code. 
Bear et al. 
2010  
51 firms from the 
fortune and KLD 
databases. Data for 
all of the 
independent and 
control variables in 
the study were 
taken from 2007 
while the dependent 
variable is taken 
from the Fortune 
2009 survey 
conducted in the 
fourth quarter of 
2008. 









The diversity of 
director resources 
(Blau‟s index) and 
the number of 
women on the 
board. 
The coefficient for 
diversity of 
director resources 







number of female 






















The proportion of 
women on boards. 
Women on boards 
are positively 





However, there is 
no significant 
relationship 
between women on 








Author(s) Sample  
The measure for 
CSR/CSP 
The measure for 
board diversity 
Results 
2013 US firms (n = 594) 
from the Socrates 
KLD and 
RiskMetrics 
databases for 5 
years (1999–2003).  
 
for corporate social 
performance (CSP) 
from KLD database: 
(1) CSP total (a 
standardized 
aggregate measure 
of the number of 
„strengths‟ and 
„concerns‟ within the 
four most widely 




CSP str. (a 
standardized 
aggregate measure 
of the number of 
„strengths‟ within 
the four most widely 
used areas, as shown 
above), (3) CSP con. 
(a standardized 
aggregate measure 
of the number of 
„concerns‟ within the 
four most widely 
used areas, as shown 
above). 
representation on 
the board divided 















on CSP metrics 
focusing on 
„negative‟ business 
practices, such as 
the „concerns‟ 





The final sample of 
95 firms listed in 
the S&P500 Index 







Developing a unified 












rights, and product) 
related social issues. 
In so doing, they 
gave all KLD 
indicators the same 
weight. They left out 
the data on social 
weaknesses, using 
those on strengths 
only. 
An index for the 
diversity of boards 
(IDoB), and one for 







within a given 
















diversity of boards. 
/a





Hafsi and Turgut‟s (2013) study differs from previous studies in that they approach 
the factors about board diversity from two dimensions which are used in this thesis. 
They classify factors relating to a demographic phenomenon as diversity-in-boards 
factors, and factors relating to a structural phenomenon as diversity-of-boards 
factors. They build two separate indices based on these two classifications, one for 
diversity-in-boards and the other for diversity-of-boards, and then examine how they 
impact on the social performance of listed firms in the S&P 500 Index. They 
discover there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
diversity-in-boards and social performance, and find no statistical relationship 
between the diversity-of-boards and social performance.  
 
Vietnam is the focus of this study, but only one study (Vu et al. 2011) has examined 
the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosures, including the social 
disclosure of 45 Vietnamese listed firms in 2008. They use the proportion of 
independent directors on the board as a proxy for corporate governance and the 
measure of disclosure as the quantity of disclosure. Controlling for the influence that 
ownership structure can have on voluntary disclosures, they find low disclosure 
levels among Vietnamese listed firms. State ownership is negatively related and 
managerial ownership is positively related to the disclosure level. Moreover, larger 
firms are positively associated with voluntary disclosure.  
 
Although this thesis is influenced by the dichotomous classification of the diversity 
of the board of directors adopted by Hafsi and Turgut (2013), it examines CSD rather 
than corporate social performance. The reason is that in Hafsi and Turgut‟s (2013) 
study, evaluating firms‟ social performance is obtained from KLD database available 
in the U.S. firms while examining the social performance of many countries, 
including Vietnam, is complex and complicated, so the computation can contain 
higher margins of errors (Yip et al. 2011). Hafsi and Turgut‟ (2013) and Vu et al.‟ 
(2011) studies are separated in this thesis, which extends the application of  Hafsi 
and Turgut (2013) on board diversity into CSD, and sharpens the examination of Vu 





2.9 Earnings quality, ownership structure, and corporate social disclosure  
2.9.1 Ownership structure 
This section examines the two important ownership identities of Vietnam‟s emerging 
capital market: state ownership and foreign ownership, and then discusses the effect 
of these ownership structures on the relationship between CSD and earnings quality. 
One of the distinguishing features of the Vietnamese capital market is that most 
Vietnamese listed firms originated as SOEs. As a remnant of this origin, this high 
concentration of state ownership has become a fundamental and common 
characteristic in Vietnamese listed firms (World Bank 2006; Vu et al. 2011). Besides 
state ownership in firms, foreign ownership also plays a crucial role in the 
development of many emerging capital markets, including Vietnam. Studies have 
indicated that foreign shareholders promote the development of emerging capital 
markets by increasing the supply of capital (Ramaswamy and Li 2001; Mangena and 
Tauringana 2007).  
 
2.9.1.1 State ownership 
Prior studies show that managers in SOEs have less pressure to manipulate earnings 
due to the different incentive structure facing state-owned firms, such as guaranteed 
returns by the state or easily obtaining additional funds (Ding et al. 2007; Wang and 
Yung 2011). Accordingly, Hoang et al. (2014) examine the effect of state ownership 
on earnings management of 150 Vietnamese listed firms in 2010 and find that 
Vietnamese SOEs have less earnings management than privately held firms. 
 
Jiang and Habib (2009) show that firms with higher state ownership also have fewer 
incentives to make more disclosure due to guaranteed returns from the state. Similarly, 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) document that firms with higher state ownership are 
discouraged from making more disclosure because of political constraints. Previous 
studies find that state ownership is negatively related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure, including CSD (Luo et al. 2006; Vu et al. 2011). Vu et al. (2011) examine 
determinants of voluntary disclosure, including the social disclosure, of 45 
Vietnamese listed firms in 2008 and explain the negative relationship between state 
ownership and voluntary disclosure as follows. Under a centrally planned economy 




for the purpose of obtaining external capital. After privatization, former SOEs firms 
still retain their same reporting behaviour and are not experienced to redirect their 
firms in a more market-oriented environment. Additionally, because the state can 
easily access information in SOEs, these firms have little motivation to disclose 
additional information. 
 
2.9.1.2 Foreign ownership 
The demands for corporate disclosures are greater when foreigners have ownership 
in firms, due to the geographic separation between management and owners, and the 
more demands as the greater proportion of foreign ownership (Schipper 1981; 
Bradbury 1991). Additionally, foreign investors are likely to have different values 
and knowledge due to their foreign market exposure. Thus, a firm with foreign 
ownership is likely to disclose more information, including social and environmental 
information, to help foreign investors in decision making to raise and retain 
investment (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Boubakri et al. 2007; Khan et al. 2013). 
Strengthening  the  supply  of  capital from foreign investors is crucial in the 
development  of  many  emerging  capital  markets (Mangena and Tauringana 2007; 
Bokpin and Isshaq 2009). The current trends of corporate social responsibility in 
many Asian firms have also been largely affected by Western-style management 
practices, which encourages higher levels of social engagement (Oh et al. 2011). 
Chapple and Moon (2005) also note that globalisation enhances firms‟ corporate 
social responsibility in Asian countries, due to a customer, supplier, and investor 
base that are more informed about the consequences of neglecting their social 
responsibilities.  
  
Firms with higher foreign ownership are considered to be associated with better 
monitoring and are thus expected to reduce the propensity of managers manipulating 
earnings for private benefit (Doidge 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009). Foreign ownership 
also has a statistically positive and significant relationship with the level of 
information transparency, and in the long term, foreign ownership can stimulate the 
growth of social responsibility in a firm, capital markets, and a country as a whole 





2.9.2 Empirical evidence in the relationship between earnings quality and corporate 
social disclosure, and the impact of ownership structure on this relationship 
The link between earnings quality and (un)ethical conduct by management is 
exemplified by Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Global Crossing in the US, HIH in 
Australia, Parmalat in Italy and APP, Saytam, and SK Networks in Asia (Choi and 
Pae 2011). Labelle et al. (2010) point out there is a „„near vacuum‟‟ of empirical 
literature which addresses the role of ethics in controlling opportunistic earnings 
management. More recent studies have begun to explore the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and earnings quality. Table 2.3 recapitulates the 
design and findings of those studies. Since commercial databases such as Compustat 
and KLD are now storing information about corporate social responsibility and 
financial data of US firms, recent research has examined the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and earnings quality in the U.S.  (e.g. Laksmana and 
Yang 2009; Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012).  
 
Table 2.3. Recapitulates the design and findings of prior research regarding the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and earnings quality* 
Author(s) Sample 





The measure for 
earnings quality 
Results 
Chih et al. 
2008 
1,653 corporations 
in 46 countries 
during the 1993–
2002 period from 
FTSE4Good 




2 groups: CSR 
firms are 
constituents in the 
FTSE4Good 
Indexes; non-CSR 
firms are included 
in the FTSE All-
World Developed 
Index (Global) but 













The type of 
relationship between 
CSR and earnings 
management (EM) 
depends on each EM 
measure. When EM is 
proxied by earnings 
smoothing, an 
increases in CSR 
mitigates earnings 
smoothing, which 
supports the myopia 
avoidance hypothesis 
but clearly rejects the 
predictable earnings 
hypothesis. When EM 
is proxied by earnings 
aggressiveness, an 
increase in CSR 
increases earnings 
aggressiveness, which 
supports the multiple 
objectives hypothesis. 










The measure for 
earnings quality 
Results 
by earnings losses 
avoidance, an increase 
in CSR mitigates 
earnings losses (and 
earnings decreases) 
avoidance, which 
again supports the 
myopia avoidance 
hypothesis. 
Prior et al. 
2008 
A multi-national 
panel sample of 593 
firms from 26 
countries between 
2002 and 2004 from 
SiRi ProTM 
database and 
financial data from 
the Compustat 
Global Vantage 
database for the year 
2000 through 2005. 
CSR scores 




There is a positive 






616 and 621 public 
firms in 2001 and 
2002, respectively, 
from Compustat and 
KLD, used to select 
the 100 Best 
Corporate Citizens 
(BCC) published by 
Business Ethics 
Magazine. 
Two groups: Firms 
selected into the 
top 100 BCC in 
2001 or 2002 are 






BCC, on average, 




earnings are more 
predictable, persistent, 




242 Korean firms 
listed on either the 
KOSPI or 




developed by Choi 
and Jung (2008). 
The degree of 
faithful 
representation; 





Firms with a higher 
level of ethical 
commitment are 
engaged in less 
earnings management, 
report earnings more 
conservatively, and 
predict future cash 
flows more accurately 
than those with a 






sample firms (8,078 
observations) over 
1995-2005 from the 
Compustat North 
America Tape and 
merge this data set 
with the CSR data 





(SRFs), those with 
a positive CSR 
index (from KLD 
database), and less 
SRFs which have a 
CSR index less 







responsible firms have 
higher quality 
accruals and less 
activity-based EM, 












The measure for 
earnings quality 
Results 
Yip et al. 
2011 
80 listed firms from 
the food industry 
and 30 listed firms 
from the oil and gas 
industry in the US in 
2006. 
Three measures of 
CSR disclosure: 




disclosing if there 
is no CSR report 
on their website; 
(2) disclosing and 
non-disclosing on 
the website. Firms 
are considered as 
providing 
disclosure on their 
website if there is a 
separate webpage 









through any of 












There is a significant 
relationship between 
CSR reporting and 
earnings management, 
and more specifically, 
the results show a 
negative 
(complementary) 
relationship in the oil 
and gas industry while 
there is a positive 
(substitutive) 
relationship in the 
food industry. This 
evidence (i.e., the 
different relationships 
in the two industries) 
supports the view that 
the relationship 
between CSR 
reporting and earnings 
management is driven 
more by the political 
environment than by 
ethical considerations. 
Kim et al. 
2012 




from KLD data and 
the Compustat 
database. 
A CSR Score, 
measured as total 
strengths minus 
total concerns in 










et al. 2005); real 
activities 
manipulation 






(Dechow et al. 
1996). 
Socially responsible 
firms are less likely 
(1) to manage 
earnings through 
discretionary accruals, 
(2) to manipulate real 
operating activities, 
and (3) to be the 











domiciled in Europe 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 and FTSE 
Shariah index for 
The average scores 
of ASSET4's 
Environmental 








There is a positive 
association between 
CSR and financial 
reporting quality. 











The measure for 
earnings quality 
Results 
the period of 2003-
2011. 
Asset4 database. environmental 
performance pillars do 
have an effect on 
enhancing the quality 
of financial reporting. 
Additionally, CSR 
firms that are not 
Shariah-compliant are 
less likely to manage 
earnings through 
accruals. The results 
suggest that Shariah 
screening processes 
appear to have no 
effect on mitigating 
the opportunistic 
behaviour of 
involving in CSR 
activities for the 
purpose of managing 
earnings. 





from the KEJI 
Index, the Data 
Guide, and the 
database published 
by the Korea Listed 
Firms Association. 
The total score of 
the seven 







CSR ratings are 
negatively correlated 
with the level of 
earnings management 
when all firms are 
considered. However, 
the relationship is 
weaker for chaebol 
firms and firms with 
highly concentrated 
ownership, which 
suggests that CSR 
practices can be 
abusively used by 
those firms to conceal 
their poor earnings 
quality. The adverse 
use of CSR is 
discouraged if the 
fraction of shares 
owned by institutional 
investors is high. 
However, no evidence 
is found for a similar 





139 firms in ten 
Asian countries 
(Australia, China, 





CSR score is 









Asian firms with 
relatively good CSR 
are engaged 











The measure for 
earnings quality 
Results 
Thailand) from the 
Asian Sustainability 
Rating (ASR) report 
in 2009 and 
Compustat‟s Global 
Vantage database 
for financial data in 
2004–2008 with 
CSR for 2008 as 





The sample consists 
of 258 observations 
between 2005-2009 
of the largest 
European firms 
applying IFRS 









and the United 
Kingdom. 
CSR data provided 
by 
Kirchho_Consult 
AG, a German 
consulting firm. 












Firms with high CSR 
ratings are more likely 
to engage in earnings 
management, to report 
bad news less timely 
and to have lower 
quality accruals. 
*
Note in the Table 2.3: CSR is corporate social responsibility. 
 
Table 2.3 indicates that studies on the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and earnings quality have yielded mixed findings. Some researchers 
suggest that engaging in corporate social responsibility is induced by the long term 
perspectives for sustainable operations of a firm, while others propose that corporate 
social responsibility is reactive in that managers use them opportunistically to serve 
their private goals (Choi et al. 2013). Based on the perspective of managerial 
opportunism  to explain the link between corporate social responsibility and earnings 
quality, some studies suggest that managers might engage in corporate social 
responsibility practices to protect their private benefits rather than for the interest of 
the firm and its stakeholders by distorting earnings information (Chih et al. 2008; 
Prior et al. 2008; Salewski and Zülch 2014). Accordingly, Chih et al. (2008) examine 
the relationships between corporate social responsibility and earnings management in 




earnings management. Similarly, Prior et al. (2008) investigate the relationship 
between earnings management and corporate social responsibility in 26 countries and 
find that opportunistic earnings management is associated with corporate social 
responsibility. Specifically, they find that managers manipulate reported earnings and 
resort to corporate social responsibility practices to ward off stakeholders activism 
and vigilance. Salewski and Zülch (2014) examine firms in Germany, France, and 
United Kingdom, and find a negative association between corporate social 
responsibility and earnings quality such that, firms which engage in opportunistic 
earnings management report bad news more often, report the news late, have poor 
accruals quality, but these firms emphasise corporate social responsibility more.  
 
In contract, some studies find there are firms that report CSD responsibly to meet the 
needs of the stakeholders (Kim et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2013). Empirical evidence in 
support of this perspective shows that firms reporting high quality earnings have 
better corporate social responsibility (Chih et al. 2008; Laksmana and Yang 2009; 
Choi and Pae 2011; Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Alsaadi et al. 2013; 
Choi et al. 2013; Scholtens and Kang 2013).   
 
Salewski and Zülch (2014) argue there are country-specific factors which moderate 
the association between corporate social responsibility and earnings quality, and 
cause the mixed results in prior studies. They explain that there are differences 
between „insider economies‟ and „outsider economies‟. An outsider economy is 
characterised by a large stock market, low ownership concentration, extensive 
outsider rights and high disclosure, while an insider economy is characterised by 
smaller stock markets, higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection, 
and lower disclosure levels (Salewski and Zülch 2014).  
 
There is only one known published study (Choi et al. 2013) that has examined the 
moderating role of ownership structure in the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and earnings quality. Using 2,042 firm-year observations of Korean 
listed firms from 2002 to 2008, Choi et al. (2013) find that managerial opportunism 
increases in firms with highly concentrated ownership, which suggests that these 




quality. Additionally, the positive association between earnings management and 
corporate social responsibility is weakened as the institutional investor ownership in 
firms‟ increases, which indicates that these investors serve as active monitors. 
However, no such evidence supports the moderating effect that foreign shareholders 
have on the relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings quality.  
 
2.10 Conclusion  
This Chapter reviewed the literature relevant to this research. First, it briefed an 
overview on corporate governance, firm financial performance and information 
disclosure. Second, it reviewed studies relating to the board of directors, board 
diversity, earnings quality and CSD. Third, the studies relating to the following three 
themes were specially captured. They were (1) the effect of board diversity on 
earnings quality; (2) the effect of board diversity on CSD; (3) the relationship 
between earnings quality and CSD, and the moderating effect of ownership structure 
on this relationship. The chapter outlined evidence relating to CEO-chairperson 
duality, the presence of an independent director who is a blockholder, promoters, and 
ownership by representative directors that constitute diversity-of-boards dimension. 
It also outlined the gender, age, educational qualifications, and nationality of 
directors that constitutes the diversity-in-boards dimension.  
 
Overall, a large body of literature has examined the effect of structural attributes of 
the board of directors relating to the diversity-of-boards in this thesis on earnings 
quality, and on corporate social responsibility, of which CSD is an integral part. This 
review showed that most of the literature focused on specific attributes, rather than 
their combined attributes, and the findings from those studies were inconclusive. The 
demographic attributes of directors are related to the diversity-in-boards in this 
thesis, and recent studies have begun to examine the effect of these attributes (mainly 
gender diversity) on earnings quality, and on corporate social responsibility. The 
findings of studies on the relationship between corporate social responsibility, 
including CSD, and earnings quality were mixed. Additionally, most of these studies 





The only study in Vietnam that examined the impact of corporate governance on 
voluntary disclosures, including social disclosure is conducted by Vu et al. (2011). 
However, they only used the proportion of independent directors on a board as a 
proxy for corporate governance and the measure of disclosure in their study was the 
quantity of disclosure using a binary coding technique. Hence, there was limited 
evidence in Vietnam that has examined board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD. 
Evidence-based literature on these three aspects was vital to Vietnam because it is 
gearing to become a responsible economic powerhouse in Southeast Asia. These 
Vietnamese ambitions call the current evidence to be evaluated objectively so that 
policymakers can make sound decisions, and listed firms can appreciate their 
responsibility towards shareholders and other stakeholders.   
 
Chapter 3 provides the historical background in Vietnam and an overview of the 





3 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
3.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the Vietnamese setting with a focus on 
institutional frameworks. In the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market oriented economy, Vietnam has implemented significant changes in its 
accountability systems to meet the demands that have arisen from a reform of the 
political system that has influenced changes in social and economic factors.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of economic 
history in Vietnam. Section 3.3 presents the development of the Vietnamese stock 
market. Section 3.4 outlines accounting enforcement in Vietnam. Section 3.5 
summarises the Code of corporate governance for Vietnamese listed firms. Section 
3.6 describes internal governance structure of listed firms. Finally, section 3.7 
outlines guidance for disclosing information on the stock exchanges in Vietnam.  
 
3.2 Overview of economic history in Vietnam 
Vietnam was a French colony for more than 90 years (1858–1954). In 1954, the 
communist forces led by Ho Chi Minh in the Northern region of the country defeated 
the French. The 1954 Geneva Conference left Vietnam a divided nation. Ho Chi 
Minh‟s Democratic Republic of Vietnam ruled the North, while Ngo Dinh Diem‟s 
Republic of Vietnam, supported by the United States, ruled the South. Whilst the 
South operated under a capitalist free market economic system, the North followed a 
centralised state planned economic system (Duiker 1995). The nationwide elections 
that were expected to seek a permanent solution to unify the country could not be 
realised so the communist regime in the North commenced guerrilla warfare against 
the South. Although the United States intervened militarily, South Vietnam was 
unable to defeat the guerrilla attacks from the North.  In 1975, the two separated 
regions unified into a single nation, but the Vietnamese economy continued with a 
long period of subsidisation with a centralised state planned economic system 
(Fforde and De Vylder 1996).  
 
During the post-war period from 1975 to 1986, there was a fundamental change in 




were forced to become State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Vu 2012). Constraints 
endemic to a centrally planned economy led to a dwindling of key resources that 
almost culminated in a collapse of the Vietnamese economy in the early 1980s. 
During that time, Vietnam was one of the poorest countries in the world, with many 
economic and social problems: hyperinflation, famine, drastic cuts in Soviet aid, and 
a trade embargo by the West (Mishra 2012).  
 
In 1986, Vietnam launched an economic reform program aimed at changing the state 
controlled economy to a socialist market-oriented economy that is referred to as „Doi 
Moi‟
3
. Doi Moi combined economic planning with free market incentives that 
promoted the establishment of private businesses to produce consumer goods, and 
encouraged foreign investment including foreign-owned firms. Following the 
implementation of economic reform in 1986, Vietnam has remarkably achieved 
economic growth (Fforde and De Vylder 1996). New laws were approved to 
facilitate and encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which helps Vietnam‟s 
economy to grow into an economic power in Southeast Asia (Harvie and Tran 1997). 
In this process, many SOEs appeared to be inefficient and could not compete with 
private firms, so Vietnam created a stock market and encouraged firms to be listed on 
the stock exchange . In the late 1990s, the Vietnamese government began privatising 
SOEs to reform the inefficient SOE system and to allow private ownership to 
participate in them (Truong et al. 2007). However, the privatisation of SOEs in 
Vietnam is unique because unlike most other developing Asian countries, the 
Vietnamese government still retains a substantial proportion of ownership in SOEs 
after privatisation and becoming listed firms, especially firms deemed to be large and 
strategically important to the nation such as electricity production, telecom 
infrastructure, mineral exploration, and water supply (Truong et al. 2007; Vu 2012). 
 
In summary, Vietnams‟ socio-economic development from 1975, and then through 
the series of Five-Year Economic Plans, was based on a Soviet central planning 
model used in the North since 1954. From 1986 to 2000, the „Doi Moi‟ economic 
reform resulted in establishing the Vietnamese stock market in 2000 which allowed 
private participation of ownership in SOEs. The „Doi Moi‟ economic revolution in 
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1986 attempted to reduce the level of state intervention in the economy by reducing 
state ownership (see also, section 1.3 Motivation for the research). It led the 
Vietnamese government to give SOEs a profit making capacity by exposing them to 
market competition. However, high concentrations of state ownership are still 
relatively common in Vietnam (World Bank 2006). Vu et al. (2011) report that the 
state still owns on an average of 30.58 per cent based on 45 random non-financial 
Vietnamese listed firms in 2008. Hoang et al. (2014) examine 150 non-financial 
listed firms at the end of the 2010 reporting period and find that the state still retains 
on an average of 27.61 per cent ownership.  
 
3.3 Overview of the stock market in Vietnam 
The year 2000 marked a significant event for the Vietnamese privatisation process 
because the first stock exchange was created in Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) is located in Ho Chi Minh City in the Southern region, and it is 
the largest stock exchange in Vietnam. In 2005, Vietnam established a second stock 
exchange, the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) located in Hanoi in the Northern 
region. The requirements for listing a firm on HOSE are generally stricter than those 
on HNX. Detailed criteria for listing shares in HOSE and HNX are presented in 
Table 3.1. To be listed, the HOSE requires firms be financially stronger in terms of 
capitalisation, profitability, and keeping debts to a minimum, than HNX.  
 
Table 3.1. Criteria for firms listed on two Vietnamese stock exchanges 
Criteria for listing shares on HOSE Criteria for listing shares on HNX 
(i) Capitalisation 
The applicant firm must have a minimum 
book value of VND 80 billion 
(approximately USD 3.8million) in paid-
up charter capital. 
The applicant firm must have a 
minimum book value of VND 10 
billion (approximately USD 475,000) 
in paid-up charter capital. 
(ii) Profitability 
The applicant firm must have been 
profitable for the last two consecutive 
years and there must not be any 
accumulated losses up to the year of 
The applicant firm must have been 






(iii) Debt position 
Any overdue debt must be earmarked for 
payment from existing reserves and 
disclosure must be made in relation to any 
debts owed to the applicant firm by any 
board member, inspection committee 
member, general director, deputy general 
director, chief accountant, major 
shareholder or an affiliate of any of these 
persons. 
The applicant firm must not have any 
overdue debts for more than one year 
and all financial obligations to the State 
must have been discharged. 
(iv) Minimum shareholders 
At least 20% of the voting shares (ie. 
ordinary shares) of the applicant firm must 
be held by at least 100 shareholders. 
At least 100 shareholders must own 
voting (ie. ordinary) shares. 
(i) Share lock-up 
A shareholder who is a board member, 
inspection committee member, general 
director, deputy general director and chief 
accountant must agree to not sell: 
(A) any of its shares for the first 6 months 
after listing; and 
(B) 50% of its shares for 6 months after 
the expiry of the time in (A).  
The shares above exclude shares which the 
shareholder holds on behalf of the State. 
A shareholder who is a board member, 
inspection committee member, general 
director, deputy general director and 
chief accountant must agree to not sell: 
(A) any of its shares for the first 6 
months after listing; and 
(B) 50% of its shares for 6 months after 
the expiry of the time in (A).  
The shares above exclude shares which 
the shareholder holds on behalf of the 
State. 
(Securities Law (No. 70/2006/QH11) 
 
The regulatory authority over the Vietnamese stock market is the State Securities 
Commission (SSC) that supervises the operations of HOSE and HNX. The legal 
framework on the securities market in Vietnam includes the Securities Law (No. 





Since HOSE and HNX were established in 2000 and 2005, respectively, they have 
become the capital market platforms to restructure SOEs, and are more largely to 
facilitate the flows of financial capital into the nation. In 2003, HOSE held 15 listed 
firms with a total market capitalisation of around $154 million USD, and contributed 
0.36 per cent of Vietnam‟s GPD (World Bank 2014b). The number of listed firms 
and total market capitalisation has continued to increase. At the end of 2012, there 
were 702 listed firms with a total market capital of $32,933 million USD, equating to 
21.14 per cent of Vietnam‟s GDP (World Bank 2014b). Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
market capitalisation of the Vietnamese stock market over a 10 year period from 
2003 to 2012. Market capitalisation fluctuated over the years because of the global 
financial crisis and the global economic recession. This period also coincided with a 
dramatic slowing down of the Vietnamese economy where the ratio of stock market 
capitalisation to GDP declined from 25.24 per cent in 2007 to 9.67 per cent in 2008 
(Figure 3.1). Since then, positive signs of recovery have emerged as a result of 
government efforts to support economic activity. The government announced its 
stimulus package for firms that included measures such as interest rate subsidy, tax 
breaks, and additional capital spending (World Bank 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Market capitalisation of Vietnamese stock market 2003-2012 (World 
Bank 2014b) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Market capitalization (mil US$) 154 248 461 9,093 19,542 9,589 21,199 20,385 18,316 32,933 




















Table 3.2 shows the indicators of stock market capitalisation (Panel A) and stock 
market capitalisation to GDP (Panel B) for the Southeast Asian countries reported by 
the World Bank (World Bank 2014b). Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that in spite of 
such rapid growth, the stock market in Vietnam still has the lowest level of market 
capitalisation compared to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. This is because the capital market in Vietnam is still very young and at a 
very early stage of development compared to other Southeast Asian countries in the 
World Bank‟s survey (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand). Singapore and Malaysia‟s stock market capitalisation has greatly 
surpassed the other countries; indeed the growth of market capitalisation of stock 
markets in Singapore and Malaysia has been remarkable. A GDP with ratios of stock 
market capitalisation to GDP was more than 100 per cent from 2003-2012, except for 
Malaysia in 2008, where it was only 80.99 per cent (Panel B of Table 3.2). 
Meanwhile, stock market capital in Vietnam and the remaining countries was less 
than the value of GDP from 2003-2012, except for Philippines with 105.58 per cent 
and Thailand with 104.65 per cent in 2012. The World Bank Survey also reported 
that in 2008, the development of the financial systems in the South Asian countries 
slowed down considerably. The indicators of stock market capitalisation and stock 
market capitalisation to GDP in these Southeast Asian countries were reduced by 
half in 2008 compared to 2007.  
 
Table 3.2. Market capitalisation of stock markets in Southeast Asian countries  
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel A. Market capitalization (million US$) 
Indonesia 54,659 73,251 81,428 138,886 211,693 98,761 178,191 360,388 390,107 396,772 
Malaysia 168,376 190,011 181,236 235,356 325,663 187,066 255,952 410,534 395,083 476,340 
Philippines 23,565 28,948 40,153 68,382 103,224 52,101 80,132 157,321 165,380 264,143 
Singapore 229,328 277,004 316,658 276,329 353,489 180,021 310,766 370,091 308,320 414,126 
Thailand 121,233 116,695 124,864 141,093 196,046 102,594 138,189 277,732 268,489 382,999 
Vietnam 154 248 461 9,093 19,542 9,589 21,199 20,385 18,316 32,933 
Panel B. Market capitalization (% of GDP) 
Indonesia 23.28 28.52 28.48 38.10 48.98 19.36 33.02 50.82 46.09 45.19 
Malaysia 152.79 152.31 126.27 144.66 168.26 80.99 126.55 165.85 136.58 156.16 
Philippines 28.08 31.68 38.96 55.95 69.11 30.01 47.60 78.82 73.80 105.58 
Singapore 245.63 253.35 256.39 198.77 209.53 100.61 160.08 170.39 125.83 150.75 




Vietnam 0.36 0.50 0.80 13.70 25.24 9.67 20.00 17.58 13.51 21.14 
(World Bank 2014b) 
 
3.4 Accounting enforcement in Vietnam 
The transition from a state-dominated to a market-determined Vietnamese economy 
required a substantial improvement in the transparency of information communicated 
in markets in which firms‟ financial reporting plays a pivotal role (Mishra 2012). The 
Vietnamese accounting measurement and reporting system also underwent a 
transition from emphasizing the government‟s needs to emphasizing the needs of 
market participants. The introduction of Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS) in 
2001 marked a milestone in the process of the country‟s accounting reform. From 
2001-2005, Vietnam promulgated its own 26 accounting standards based on the 
International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IAS/IFRS) issued up to 2003. This active „rule-making‟ phase helped Vietnam to 
integrate immediately into international accounting standards and satisfy one of the 
crucial preconditions needed to be accepted as a World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
member in 2007. However, since 2006 VAS has not been updated to reflect 
subsequent amendments to IAS and the new IFRS. This creates a concern that the 26 
existing VAS standards previously convergent with the current IAS/IFRS are not 
promoting the reporting transparency of firms (Le and Walker 2008) well enough. 
 
In Vietnam, accounting regulations are enforced by the government via company law 
and securities law. The 2005 Vietnamese Company Law (No 60/2005/QH11) 
requires firms to prepare and submit financial statements faithfully, accurately, and 
promptly, pursuant to accounting principles. The Securities Law 2006 (No. 
70/2006/QH11) provides the highest authority to the State Securities Commission 
(SSC) to oversee the Vietnamese stock market. Despite the array of regulatory 
instruments, Vietnam faces significant challenges in implementing these laws and 
strengthening the institutions responsible for the regulation, enforcement and 
development of good corporate governance for listed firms (Le and Walker 2008). 
 
3.5 The Code of corporate governance for Vietnamese listed firms 
The Code of corporate governance is an important guide for corporate governance in 




complying with corporate governance in Vietnam is rather late compared to other 
countries. In 2004, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Principles of corporate governance was first publicised in Vietnam (OECD 
2004). In 2005, the  International Finance Corporation (IFC) publicised OECD 
Guidelines on corporate governance of State owned Enterprises (OECD 2005).  In 
March 2007, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued the Code of corporate 
governance for listed firms (hereinafter Code)
4
, which was rather late compared to 
other countries. This Code was developed using principles outlined in the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, the Vietnamese Enterprises Law 2005, 
and the Vietnamese Securities Law 2006. The main principles of corporate 
governance applicable to a listed company under the Code include: (i) the rights of 
shareholders; (ii) the general meeting of shareholders; (iii) the board of directors; (iv) 
audit committee; (v) conflicts of interest and related party transactions; and (vi) 
information disclosure and transparency.  
Under the Code, the term „corporate governance‟ refers to the systemic principles 
which ensure that a listed firm is managed in a way that respects the rights of 
shareholders and stakeholders. More specifically, rules of corporate governance shall 
ensure an effective managerial structure; the rights of shareholders; the fair and 
impartial treatment of shareholders; the division of responsibilities among different 
authorities in a jurisdiction should be clearly articulated and the public interest is 
served; the transparency of reporting of firms activities; the board of directors and 




The Code is intended to implement the best international practice on corporate 
governance suitable to the conditions of Vietnam to ensure a stable development of 
the stock market and transparent reporting of listed firms‟ activities. However, 
compliance with corporate governance has still been low and needs to be improved 
gradually (Le and Walker 2008). One reason given for this outcome is that many 
SOEs have been equitised and have become listed firms, however the state still holds 
a majority interest in them and continues to makes strategic and policy interventions 
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 As of  July 2012, this Code has been updated. However, for the 2010 annual reports, which is the 
sample for this study, the Code issued in 2007 is the main code of corporate governance for listed 
firms. As such, this study focuses mainly on the regulatory standards imposed by that Code. 
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(World Bank 2006). Another reason is that some Vietnamese listed firms are owned 
by a few shareholders who steer decision making through directors and managers. 
This situation has led to abusing the rights of minority shareholders, reducing 
accountability, and inadequate transparent reporting. The third reason is that the chief 
executive officer (CEO) also acts as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors in 
many Vietnamese firms (World Bank 2006). 
 
From 2010, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Global Corporate 
Governance Forum (GCGF) collaborated with the State Securities Commission of 
Vietnam that commissioned the annual Corporate Governance Scorecard report. 
They surveyed 100 of the largest firms listed on the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchanges, which together represent more than 80 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation of these exchanges. The scorecard report is expected to: (i) provide a 
standardised, systematic framework by which regulators and investors could assess 
the corporate governance of a company and the overall level of corporate governance 
in Vietnam; (ii) enable a firm to assess the quality of its corporate governance and 
stimulate firms to improve their practices; (iii) provide a systematic way to analyse 
corporate governance across industries, and thus help to improve corporate 
governance practices; (iv) assist regulatory groups to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses in corporate governance practices, leading to further reforms; and (v) be 
available to support raising a general awareness and understanding of good corporate 
governance practices. The review and report is based on information available to 
investors about the 12 month period, including the Annual Report (AR) and financial 
statements, documents relating to the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders 
(AGM), publicly available filings with stock exchanges and the State Securities 
Commission of Vietnam (SSC), company website materials, and other media and 
public information on each company. The AR is seen as the key company 
communication document and the AGM as the key shareholder contact point. The 
third Scorecard report in 2012 remarked that listed firms should further raise their 
awareness of the importance of good governance practices. In particular, listed firms 
in Vietnam should focus more on protecting the interests of shareholders and provide 
more information to the public about transactions undertaken with related parties, 




should they eventuate, all of which can influence short and long term cash flows 
(World Bank 2012). 
 
3.6 Internal governance structure of listed firms 
According to the Code of corporate governance for Vietnamese listed firms, the 
internal governance structure includes a general meeting of shareholders (GMS), a 
board of directors (BoD), a chief executive officer (CEO) and an audit committee 
(see Figure 3.2). The BoD may set up sub‐committees to assist in its activities (such 
as development policy, internal audit, human resources, salary and bonus).
6
 The BoD 
must appoint at least one person to act as a company secretary.
7
 These structural 
items are outlined below. 
 
(i) General meeting of shareholders (GMS) 
The GMS of a listed firm is the highest decision-making body. All ordinary 
shareholders have the right to participate in the GMS and have the number of votes 
corresponding to the respective ordinary shares held by them. The GMS normally 
makes decisions only on major issues affecting the company. The GMS approves 
nominations for the Board of Directors (BoD) and Audit Committee membership, 
and it also approves the annual report and financial statements, the distribution of 
profits and losses (including the payment of dividends), amended charter capital 
(equity), amendments of the charter, re-organisation and dissolution, and 
extraordinary transactions.
8
   
 
(ii) Board of directors (BoD) 
The BoD is not involved in the day-to-day directions of a listed firm, but it does play 
a central role in the corporate governance framework. The BoD is responsible for 
guiding and setting a firm‟s strategy and business priorities, including the annual 
financial and business plan, as well as guiding and controlling managerial 
performance. It acts in the interests of the firm, protects the rights of all shareholders, 
oversees the work of the CEO and the Executive Board, as well as financial control 
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 Ibid, Article 15. 
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 Ibid, Article 16. 
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systems. An effective, professional, and independent BoD is essential for the 




The BoD of a listed firm consists of 5 to 11 members, one third of whom must be 
independent
10
 (i.e., members who do not hold management positions in the listed 
firm). A Board Member of a listed firm cannot concurrently hold Board seats in more 
than five other firms (whether listed or non-listed). The CEO of a listed firm can be 
the Chairperson of the Board if the GMS approves.
11
 Either the BoD or the GMS 




The BoD‟s role is to establish development strategies, annual business plans, the 
firm‟s organisational structure, and internal rules, and also appoints, supervises, and 
dismisses CEOs. The Board makes decisions on the basis of a majority vote of Board 
Members in a quorate Board meeting, or by collecting Board Members‟ written 
opinions, or through other methods that may be provided in the charter.  
 
(iii) Chief executive officer (CEO) and executive board 
Each firm must have a CEO who is responsible for day-to-day management of the 
firm. The CEO is the legal representative of the firm unless the firm charter appoints 
the Chairperson of the BoD to this position. The CEO is accountable to the BoD. 
Legislation, the charter and internal regulations, and the contract signed between the 
CEO and the firm regulate the authority and election of the CEO, as well as relations 




The Executive Board consists of the CEO and top executives of the firm, and may be 
referred to as a „board of management‟. A listed firm is required to establish an 
Executive Board. The Executive Board is responsible for the day-to-day management 
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 Ibid, Article 13. 
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 Vietnam law and corporate governance regulations do not distinguish between „non-executive‟ and 
„independent‟ directors. 
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 Ibid, Article 10-11. 
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 Article 26, Model Charter 2007. 
13
 Article 116, the Enterprises Law 2005. 
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(iv) Audit committee 
Listed firms are obligated to establish an Audit committee, the purpose of which is to 
carry out internal control procedures on a daily basis. The Audit committee should be 













Notes: Appointment and Removal:                               Supervision: 
 
3.7 Guidance for disclosing information on the stock exchanges 
The Ministry of Finance issued its first disclosure regulation Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock Exchange in April 2007. This 
Circular is revised and updated twice as Circular 09/2010/TT–BTC in April 2010 
and Circular 52/2012/TT–BTC in June 2012. The Circular specifically addresses the 
issue of external reporting of listed firms, which marks the beginning of specific 
rules and regulations of disclosure by the Vietnamese authority to improve the level 
of information transparency of Vietnamese listed firms. Under the Circular, all listed 
firms in Vietnam are required to provide a comprehensive annual report that should 
include the following: (i) background and strategic information of the firm; (ii) a 
chairperson‟s report; (iii) a management report; (iv) human resources and employee 
information; (v) the ownership structure and corporate board of directors 
information; and (vi) a set of financial statements. According to the Circulars, a set 
of financial statements consists of a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a 
Statement of Cash Flows and Notes to Financial Statements.  
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The World Bank (2014a) surveys and measures disclosure levels of firms in various 
countries. The disclosure index measures the extent to which investors are protected 
through disclosure of ownership and financial information. The index ranges from 0 
to 10, with higher values indicating more disclosure. Vietnamese firms had relatively 
low levels of disclosure in the years of 2005 and 2006 with the index being 3 for 
each year, compared to other countries within the Southeast Asian region and the 
World, in the World Bank survey (Table 3.2). However, from 2007 to 2012 this 
index doubled to 6 for each year. This was higher than some countries in the region 
such as Brunei, Cambodia, Lao, Philippines, and Timor, and the average for the 
World. In 2013, although this disclosure index was 7, it was much lower than other 
countries in the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand that 
each had a score of 10 for in 2013.  
 
Table 3.3. Business extent of disclosure index  
Country 
Name 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
World 4.81 4.85 4.92 5.00 5.12 5.17 5.24 5.28 5.32 
Brunei  - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Cambodia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Indonesia 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 
Lao PDR 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Malaysia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Philippines 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Singapore 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Thailand 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Timor 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Vietnam 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 
(World Bank 2014) 
Note: 0=less disclosure to 10=more disclosure. 
 
Prior to 2013, Vietnam had no regulation or law about producing and publishing 
sustainability reports or CSR reports. Since 2013, International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) in collaboration with the State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC), the 
Vietnamese stock exchanges, and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
(ACCA) launched the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for Vietnamese listed 
firms, based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework, to help Vietnamese 




standard disclosure indicators required for firms to produce sustainability reports. 
These guidelines also help  firms measure, manage, and report on the environmental 
and social impacts of importance to stakeholders (SSC and IFC 2013).  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the overall institutional setting in Vietnam and highlights the 
key elements of the context applicable to this study. It begun with a brief description 
of the Vietnamese economy, explained how SOEs emerged and how the state has 
retained a larger share of ownership in them, and then gave an overview of the stock 
market in Vietnam, the creation of HOSE in the Southern region and HNX in the 
Northern region. It also compared the market capital of the stock exchanges with 
comparable stock exchanges in the region, and identified it as a low market capital 
stock market. The chapter then discussed how the transition from a state-dominated 
to a market-dominated economy influenced the accounting measurement and 
reporting system. It noted the introduction of Vietnamese Accounting Standards, and 
the requirement of Vietnamese Company Law for firms to prepare and submit 
financial statements based on accounting standards. It then explained how the code 
of corporate governance for Vietnamese listed firms was presented, followed by a 
description of the internal governance structure of listed firms. It explained the 
influence of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on issuing the Code of 
corporate governance for Vietnamese listed firms from the Ministry of Finance. It 
finally outlined the guidance given for disclosing information on stock exchanges 
and the internal governance structure of listed firms in Vietnam. Chapter 4 provided 
a theoretical perspective as a basis for understanding the link between board 





4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS  
4.1  Introduction 
Since the phenomenon of board diversity comprises understanding simultaneous 
implications of several attributes about corporate governance, a single theoretical 
approach is unlikely to provide an adequate explanation. In this context, theoretical 
pluralism is suggested here as a logical progress in corporate governance research. 
Agency theory has been widely used to explain various phenomena relating to 
corporate governance, but Eisenhardt (1989) argues that other theoretical 
perspectives can facilitate and capture the complexity of the phenomenon. Daily et 
al. (2003) show  that using multiple theories as frameworks to explain events about 
corporate governance is essential because it is the multiple attributes about corporate 
governance that enhance the functioning of organizations. Because each theory has 
its own boundary beyond which explanations are not possible from that given theory, 
a multi-theoretical approach will help to overcome the limitations imposed by a 
single theory to understand and explain how boards of directors work (Fiedler and 
Deegan 2007). 
 
Several theories that can explain the effect of board diversity on earnings quality, and 
the effect of board diversity on CSD, are discussed in this chapter. Published 
literature suggests that agency theory and resource dependence theory are 
particularly useful ways of testing and explaining the effect of board diversity on 
earnings quality and on CSD. Literature also shows that the agency and stakeholder 
theories are effective to test and explain the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD. Therefore, agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder 
theory are the structural theoretical frameworks for this thesis.  Section 4.2 reviews 
agency theory. Section 4.3 reviews resource dependence theory. Section 4.4 provides 
an overview of stakeholder theory. Section 4.5 provides a theoretical framework to 
explain the effect of board diversity on earnings quality. Section 4.6 presents a 
theoretical framework to explain how board diversity affects CSD. In Section 4.7, a 
theoretical framework for the relationship between earnings quality and CSD is 




4.2 Agency theory 
The issues regarding the roles of board members have been discussed extensively in 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This theory mainly deals with the 
contractual relationship between the agents (managers) and the principal 
(shareholders) under which shareholders delegate responsibilities to the manager to 
run their business. This relationship should be managed properly so that agents may 
act in the best interest of the principal. Agency theory argues that when both parties 
are expected to maximise their utility, there is good reason to believe that the agent 
may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the principal‟s interest.  
Managers may act in their own interests to maximise their personal wealth because 
they have personal goals that compete with those of shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) model this condition as an agency relationship where the inability 
of the principal to directly observe the agent‟s action could lead to moral hazard, thus 
increasing agency costs. 
 
Jensen (1993) suggests that moral hazard is caused by various complexities that 
make it difficult to monitor managers‟ actions, and this monitoring increases agency 
costs. Furthermore, the agents may also be influenced by factors such as financial 
rewards, labour market opportunities, and their relationship with parties who are not 
aligned to the owners‟ interests (Shapiro 2005). This leads to an increase in the 
conflict of interest between the principals and their agents.  
 
However, principals can protect their interests by establishing appropriate incentives 
for the agents and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit managers‟ 
activities that do not align with their interests. Principals have devised and 
contributed to various mechanisms to establish principals‟ interests on managers. 
These devices and mechanisms create costs for monitoring and contracting into 
various agreements (Shapiro 2005). These mechanisms are intended to change 
agents‟ behaviour in order to appear of good character. Although principals must 
incur monitoring costs, sound corporate governance is considered to be a vital means 
in reducing agency conflict, especially when it accommodates the interests of 




It emphasises the responsibilities of managers as the agents of owners and the roles 
of boards as the representatives of owners (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Improved 
monitoring of decisions and activities of managers by the boards will result in a 
greater protection of principals who are shareholders of firms (Ragothaman and 
Gollakota 2009). In some firms the principals have expanded the responsibilities of 
managers beyond profit maximisation, not only to improve these firms‟ financial 
performance but also to improve non-financial performance such as social and 
environmental (McCarthy and Puffer 2008). It then becomes the responsibility of 
boards, as representatives of firm owners, to enact this overall value creation through 
managers and then monitor it (Andres and Vallelado 2008). 
 
Since one obligation of boards is to ensure that management prioritises the interests 
of shareholders, agency theory has suggested that a more diverse board monitors 
managers better because board diversity increases heterogeneity, and this 
heterogeneity variously increases board independence (Carter et al. 2010). Thus, 
board diversity creates more capacities to monitor management and reduces agency 
conflicts, which is positively related to firm performance (Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera 2008). 
 
4.3 Resource dependence theory  
Although independent directors is an established proxy for monitoring functions, 
Abeysekera (2012) concludes that relying on them  can create a knowledge deficit by 
not understanding the internal workings of a firm. Nevertheless they, along with 
other directors, are resources because of the diverse skills they bring into the decision 
making function. Resource dependence theory is about a firm depends on the 
external environment for resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). According to 
resource dependence theory, firms are interdependent with their environment or with 
other firms for their continuing operations. Since firms are not self-directed or self-
sufficient (Pugh and Hickson 1997; Daft 2004), they depend on external resources 
for survival. These resources include money, materials, personnel, information, and 
technology. The degree of interdependence varies, depending on the availability of 




control those resources develop a monopolistic behaviour (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Pugh and Hickson 1997). 
 
Resource dependence theory proposes that a board of directors is a mechanism for 
managing the external dependencies for resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and 
whose role is to plan for uncertainties so they can be met as expected (Pfeffer 1972; 
Williamson 1984). Pfeffer (1972) stated that the composition of a board can reflect 
the extent to which a firm can meet challenges relating to resources imposed by the 
external environment. According to resource dependence theory, directors act as a 
link  between the firm and the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
 
Resource dependence theory also views board members as assets to a firm‟s 
performance. Ferreira (2011) and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) have shown 
that these assets are their skills and knowledge. The various heterogeneities of board 
members are more likely to bring diverse perspectives and experience in reaching 
solutions to challenges about resources imposed from the external environment to the 
firm.  
 
Additionally, the resource dependence approach highlights that diverse boards have 
access to a broader resource pool, which strengthens a firm‟s network with its 
external environment and gives it access to new connections and resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978; Daily et al. 2003; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Ferreira 
2011). The increased number of professional contacts provides channels for co-
operation and support from external firms, and enables a firm to manage its relations 
with third parties more effectively (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera 2008). Ferreira (2011) adds that increasing the number of financial 
and political connections is particularly valuable because it can help firms access 
government investment funds, deal with regulators or win government procurement 
contracts. Therefore, resource dependence theory inherently explains the benefit of 
board diversity for firms‟ governance and management, which possible increases 





4.4 Stakeholder theory 
Researchers use stakeholder theory to explain why firms disclose social information 
(Taylor and Shan 2007; Choi et al. 2013; Lu and Abeysekera 2014). Freeman‟s 
(1984) work on the concept of stakeholders has provided a solid foundation to define 
and build stakeholder models, frameworks, and theories. Freeman (1984) defined 
stakeholders as „any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation‟s objectives‟ (p.46). 
 
Stakeholders are typically analysed into primary and secondary stakeholders. 
Clarkson (1995) defines a primary stakeholder group as „one without whose 
continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern‟ (p.106), 
with the primary group including „shareholders and investors, employees, customers 
and suppliers, together with what is defined as the public stakeholder group: the 
governments and communities that provide infrastructures and markets, whose laws 
and regulations must be obeyed, and to whom taxes and obligations may be due‟ 
(p.106). A firm depends extensively on its primary stakeholder groups. If any 
primary stakeholder group, such as customers or suppliers, becomes  dissatisfied and 
withdraws from the corporate system, either in part or as a whole, it can seriously 
damage its continued survival (Clarkson 1995).  
 
Secondary groups are defined as „those who influence or affect, or are influenced or 
affected by the corporation, but they are not engaged in transactions with the 
corporation and are not essential for its survival‟ (Clarkson 1995, p.107). The media 
and a wide range of special interest groups such as lobbyists, environmental firms, 
and NGO‟s, are considered to be secondary stakeholders. They have the ability to 
mobilise public opinion in favour of, or in opposition to, a firm‟s performance. 
Despite the fact that firms do not depend on secondary stakeholders for their 
survival, they can cause significant damage to a firm and as such, are still a force to 
be dealt with (Clarkson 1995). 
 
Stakeholder theory consists of ethical and managerial branches (Deegan 2002). The 
ethical branch recommends how firms should treat their stakeholders; this view 




1995), but it plays no direct role in predicting managerial behaviour. By contrast, the 
managerial branch highlights the need to manage certain stakeholder groups that are 
deemed to be „powerful‟ because they can control the resources which are necessary 
to the firm‟s operations (Ullmann 1985).  Hence, stakeholder theory essentially 
explains the motivation for corporate disclosure, which a firm‟s earnings quality is 
associated with its corporate disclosure practices that consider the needs and 
expectations of the stakeholders. 
 
4.5 The theoretical framework for the effect of board diversity on earnings 
quality 
Figure 4.1 presents a theory based framework that links board diversity in 
governance with its likely influence on earnings quality. Board diversity is presented 
as both fiduciary (left-hand side) and advisory (right-hand side) in nature. Both roles 
may affect the quality of earnings in different ways. 
 
Figure 4.1. Theoretical underpinnings of board diversity and earnings quality 
(Modified from Labelle et al. 2010; Ben-Amar et al. 2013) 
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From the fiduciary perspective, a board of directors have to be less dependent on 
each other and also specialists in monitoring shareholders‟ interests. This is not only 
stipulated in the current regulation but is also a generally accepted governance 
principles about the composition of the board and its audit committee. From a 
theoretical perspective, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 
1983) predicts that management interests differ from, and are even in conflict with 
shareholders. According to agency theory, diversity-of-boards can be used to 
establish better monitoring and control mechanisms. It is based on the assumption 
that directors with their own sets of rationalities can contribute different styles of 
controlling and monitoring management that are appropriate to a firm. Each firm can 
have its collective rationality style, and those styles can be different between firms. 
The diverse fiduciary perspectives resulting from board members can help to develop 
a sound controlling and monitoring mechanism. Therefore, it is argued here that the 
diversity-of-boards directly contributes to increasing the earnings quality of firms. 
 
From the advisory perspective of governance (right hand side of Figure 4.1), board 
effectiveness requires a diversity of knowledge, competencies, and organisational 
values to guide and contribute to organisational learning and strategic decision 
making. The emphasis here is on counselling and mentoring management, and not on 
statutory characteristics such as the diversity of interests or the financial literacy of 
the directors. The idea that board diversity affects firm performance has roots in 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Resource dependence 
theorists have argued specifically that a combination of diverse stakeholder 
perspectives in board decision-making improves firms‟ ability to obtain resources 
that are critical to their functioning (Pfeffer 1973; Davis and Cobb 2010). Diversity 
is necessary so that board members can ask knowledgeable questions needed to 
shape the managerial decision making process and organisational culture. According 
to Reidenbach and Robin (1991), the moral development of a firm is determined by 
its culture. By questioning, criticising, advising, and counselling, diversity-in-board 
enhances the degree of moral or ethical development of a firm (Labelle et al. 2010), 
and thus is likely to improve its earnings quality so that shareholders can use its 
quality attributes (such as sustainable earnings, predictable earnings, and closeness to 





4.6 The theoretical framework for the effect of board diversity on corporate 
social disclosure 
Resource dependence theory and agency theory are two organisational theories that 
underpin how board diversity influences CSD (Bear et al. 2010). Figure 4.2 presents 
a theory-based framework that links board diversity in governance with CSD. Board 
diversity is presented as both fiduciary (left-hand side) and advisory (right-hand side) 
in nature. Both roles may affect the CSD in a different manner. 
Figure 4.2. Theoretical underpinnings of board diversity and corporate social disclosure 
(Modified from Labelle et al. 2010; Ben-Amar et al. 2013) 
 
 
From the fiduciary perspective, agency theory provides a rationale for a board‟s 
critical function of monitoring management on behalf of shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). This monitoring role ensures that the interest of managers aligns with 
shareholders (including minority shareholders), and is the main proposition of 
agency theory (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). According to agency theory, the 
board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance by controlling 
over management in order to protect the interests of all shareholders. From such 
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perspective, the main goal of fiduciary governance is to minimise agency costs, 
which may also affect CSD. Since monitoring is a fiduciary function of the board, 
how effectively a board monitors managerial interests against shareholder interests 
can differ between boards depending on the various attributes that give rise to its 
structure. These attributes differ between boards rather than within a board. 
 
From the advisory perspective of governance (right hand side of Figure 4.2), the idea 
that diversity within board members directly affects CSD has roots in resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Resource dependence theorists 
argued that a firm‟s socially improved relationships with its constituencies may bring 
economic benefits and is probably the central tenet in managers‟ quest for socially 
responsible activities. Resource dependence theory offers a rationale for the board‟s 
function of providing critical resources to a firm, including legitimacy, advice, and 
counsel (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Additionally, society nowadays demands that 
the economic development of firms be concomitant with their moral development 
(Labelle et al. 2010). The moral development of a firm can be classified according to 
the degree to which its social responsibility is recognised and blended with its 
economic mission. Diverse board resources offer a firm support in understanding and 
responding to its environment (Boyd 1990) that can help it better manage CSD issues 
and practices. 
 
4.7 The theoretical framework for the relationship between earnings quality 
and corporate social disclosure 
Agency theory is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the 
interests of a firm‟s owners (shareholders) and its management (Fama and Jensen 
1983), so in response, firms may use different techniques such as compensation plans 
or voluntary disclosures to reduce this conflict of interest.  Accounting information is 
made by an agent to communicate the financial position, performance, and change in 
financial position to shareholders, but a less than full and faithful disclosure can lead 
to information asymmetry and a moral hazard. According to agency theory, 
managers can opportunistically use corporate resources to pursue goals that enhance 
their own utility in ways that are unlikely to provide significant returns to 




resources but also social and environmental resources. Accordingly, Friedman (1970) 
argues that firms that take part in corporate social responsibility practices, including 
CSD, only want to benefit from the reputation and publicity they receive, with the 
sole objective to maximise their manager‟s own profitable gains. Because managerial 
decisions have a direct impact on all the stakeholders groups, managers can be 
viewed as not only the agents of shareholders but also the agents of other 
stakeholders (Jones 1995). Studies conducted using agency theory have found that 
corporate social responsibility disclosure, including CSD, can be used by managers 
as a tool to enhance their careers or achieve their personal objectives (McWilliams et 
al. 2006; Petrovits 2006; Prior et al. 2008). Managers may be able to profit 
personally by measuring corporate social responsibility (deMaCarty 2009) and 
creating an impression that the firm has been transparent about corporate social 
activities to gain stakeholder support (Kim et al. 2012). 
 
In contrast to agency theory, some researchers have suggested, based on stakeholder 
theory (Freeman 1984), that corporate social responsibility disclosure is a long term 
perspective of economic gain that may not be financially measurable in the short 
term, but it may provide a valuable asset for future profitability and eventually the 
support of society for the firm‟s existence (Davis 1960; Carroll 1999; Choi et al. 
2013). Davis (1960) suggests that the social responsibilities of business people 
should be commensurate with their social power. When social responsibility and 
power are relatively equal, the avoidance of social responsibility gradually erodes 
social power. Accordingly, Choi et al. (2013) propose that a firm‟s earnings quality 
should be commensurate with its corporate social responsibility activities that meet 
the needs of the stakeholders.  
 
Stakeholder theory posits that the capacity of firms to generate sustainable wealth is 
determined by firms relating to different but relevant groups of stakeholders 
(Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Post et al. 2002). This means that by 
disclosing information on environmental and social resources, the firm can interact 
with and benefit from the stakeholders, and disclosing could be a way of firms 
meeting stakeholders‟ demands. Thus, firms may gain the support of different 




strategy from those stakeholders, and ultimately survive in the marketplace (Gray et 
al. 1995). This perspective aims to align different stakeholders‟ interests, because a 
firm is understood as composed of interdependent outcomes such as a successful 
business so it needs a healthy society, and a healthy society benefits from healthy 
businesses (Porter and Kramer 2006). Figure 4.3 recapitulates the theory-based 
framework that links between earnings quality and CSD.  
 




4.8 Conclusion   
This Chapter explained the theoretical platform of the research carried out and 
documented in this study. First, it provided an overview of each theory used in this 
research, i.e. agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory. 
Second, agency theory and resource dependence theory were discussed as the 
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corporate social disclosure. With regard to the effect of board diversity on earnings 
quality, it pointed out that boards had a fiduciary dimension and an advisory 
dimension. The fiduciary dimension was tested using agency theory and the advisory 
dimension was tested by using resource dependence theory. Regarding the effect of 
board diversity on CSD, it also pointed out boards had two dimensions. The fiduciary 
dimension was tested using agency theory and the advisory dimension was tested 
using resource dependence theory. Third, agency theory and stakeholder theory were 
discussed to explain the association between earnings quality and CSD. It pointed out 
earnings quality could influence either more or less CSD. The possibility of more 
CSD was tested using stakeholder theory, and the possibility of less social disclosure 
was tested using agency theory. Chapter 5 develops hypotheses and describes the 




5  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops hypotheses and designs research methods that will be used to 
test the hypotheses. The hypotheses and research methods used in this research are 
basically derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and supported by the 
theoretical frameworks documented in Chapter 4. The discussion in Section 5.2 
constructs testable hypotheses. They relate to the impact of diversity-of-boards and 
diversity-in-boards on earnings quality; the impact of diversity-of-boards and 
diversity-in-boards on CSD; the relationship between earnings quality and CSD; the 
moderating impact of state ownership and foreign ownership on the relationship 
between earnings quality and CSD. Section 5.3 discusses the source of the data and 
sample selection, variable definitions and calculations, and empirical modelling.  
Section 5.4 summarises this chapter.  
 
5.2 Hypothesis development 
This section develops specific hypotheses relating to three broad research questions. 
The first part of this section (Section 5.2.1) addresses the effect of board diversity on 
earnings quality. The second part (Section 5.2.2) addresses the effect of board 
diversity on CSD. The third part (Section 5.2.3) addresses the effect of earnings 
quality on CSD, and the moderating effect of the ownership structure on this 
relationship.  
 
5.2.1 The effect of board diversity on earnings quality 
As discussed in the literature review chapter (see Section 2.6 in Chapter 2), a large 
body of literature has examined the effect of various structural attributes of the board 
of directors (that is, relating to the diversity-of-boards) on earnings quality (e.g. 
Klein 2002; Park and Shin 2004; Rahman and Ali 2006). As noted therein, most 
studies have focused on specific attributes of the board of directors on earnings 
quality, rather than the effect of the combined attributes. These specific attributes 
underpin the directors, ownership and control of the firm. The diversity-of-boards in 
this research is an index-driven variable based on four structural attributes of the 




executive directors owning more than 5 per cent of a firm‟s equity (blockholders), 
(iii) representative directors‟ ownership, and (iv) promoters. Combining the 
structural characteristics of a board of directors relating to diversity between boards 
into a composite measure results in a comprehensive picture of their simultaneous 
influence on various organisational outcomes (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and 
Turgut 2013). Prior studies identify the structural characteristics of a board of 
directors as the attributes needed for „best practices‟ in governance, which helps to 
ensure that managers represent the board of directors better. Based on the 
propositions of agency theory, the structural attributes of the board of directors are 
designed to control agency conflict by demanding more conservatism, so directors 
are then likely to know early about any future losses. Such early information allows 
directors to control managers‟ opportunistic behaviour. Based on this discussion, the 
first hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H1:  Diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality. 
 
The diversity-in-boards in this study is an index-driven variable based on four 
demographic attributes of the board of directors‟ members: (i) director gender, (ii) 
director age, (iii) director educational qualifications, and (iv) director nationality. 
Prior studies have investigated their individual effects but rarely their combined 
effect on firm performance (Erhardt et al. 2003; Kang et al. 2007; Post et al. 2011). 
Studies in the US have begun to examine the effect of individual attributes (mainly 
the gender attribute) relating to the diversity-in-boards on earnings quality. These 
studies find a statistically significant and positive effect of gender diversity on 
earnings quality (Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Srinidhi et 
al. 2011).  
 
Directors‟ heterogeneous attributes are likely to bring in different perspectives for 
discussion and making decisions.  The proposition of resource dependence theory 
suggests that increased questioning, criticising, advising, and counselling, associated 
with diversity-in-board,  can enhance the degree of moral or ethical development of a 
firm (Labelle et al. 2010). Since quality can be thought as a qualitative response by 




Based on the preceding discussion from the existing literature and resource 
dependence theory, a second hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H2: Diversity-in-boards improves earnings quality. 
 
5.2.2 The effect of board diversity on corporate social disclosure 
The structural attributes of a board of directors can play an important role in 
corporate governance practices (Haniffa and Cooke 2002) because they manage 
information disclosed in annual reports (Gibbins et al. 1990; Haniffa and Cooke 
2005). Using the proposition of agency theory, the structural attributes of a board of 
directors can provide the necessary checks and balances needed to enhance board 
effectiveness and act as a sound mechanism to diffuse agency conflicts between 
managers and owners  (Fama and Jensen 1983). Thus, the structural attributes of a 
board of directors helps to ensure that firms‟ goals are strongly aligned with the 
stakeholders‟ interests (Haniffa and Cooke 2005). A better alignment with the 
stakeholders‟ interests, which should be manifested in increased transparency, may 
result in a greater expectation of comprehensive and high-quality dissemination of 
social information.  Hence, the following hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H3: The higher diversity-of-boards, the higher CSD. 
 
Prior studies mostly find a positive association between the proportion of women in 
the boardroom and social performance or social disclosure (Ibrahim and Angelidis 
1994; Williams 2003; Webb 2004; Galbreath 2011; Boulouta 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 
2013). Hafsi and Turgut (2013) find a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between diversity-in-boards and social performance. From the 
perspective of resource dependence theory, board diversity is a resource that helps a 
firm understand and respond to its organisational environment (Boyd 1990). That 
understanding can help it to address CSD issues and adopt appropriate disclosure 
practices. In line with prior findings and resource dependence theory, this research 
argues that diversity-in-boards exhibits better CSD practices that are relevant to 
stakeholders. The following hypothesis is therefore stated. 




5.2.3 The relationship between earnings quality and corporate social disclosure 
There are two competing views about the relationship between earnings quality and 
corporate social responsibility, of which CSD is an integral part. These two 
competing views underpin the motivation of firms as to whether firms disclose 
genuinely to meet the needs of stakeholders, or opportunistically to benefit the 
personal interests of the managers. In terms of agency theory, some studies have 
found that managers might engage in corporate social responsibility practices to 
protect their private benefits rather than the interest of the firm and its stakeholders, 
by distorting earnings information (Chih et al. 2008; Prior et al. 2008; Salewski and 
Zülch 2014). Kim et al. (2012) document that corporate social responsibility may be 
adopted by firms in order to create an impression of transparency among the 
stakeholders and so legitimise their activities and gain stakeholder support, when in 
fact they are engaging in accounting-based and real earnings management. In either 
case the corporate social responsibility is being driven by opportunistic behaviour, 
whether to attain personal or firm objectives. 
 
In contrast, transparent financial reporting indicates that information provided to a 
firm‟s stakeholders is more relevant to their decision making (Kim et al. 2012). In 
this regard, provided that earnings quality is closely connected to social disclosure 
practices, both of them aim to meet the needs of the stakeholders (Choi et al. 2013). 
Stakeholder theory regards social disclosure as a successful medium for managing 
stakeholder relationships (Freeman 1984; Roberts 1992). In support of the long-term 
perspective hypothesis, empirical evidence shows that firms reporting high earnings 
quality also have better corporate social responsibility, including CSD (Chih et al. 
2008; Laksmana and Yang 2009; Choi and Pae 2011; Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim 
et al. 2012; Alsaadi et al. 2013; Choi et al. 2013; Scholtens and Kang 2013). 
 
To test the dominance of these opposing views, the following two competing 
hypotheses are proposed. 
H5A. Based on managers’ opportunistic incentives, there is a negative relationship 
between CSD and earnings quality. 
H5B. Based on the long-run perspective, there is a positive relationship between 




Vietnamese listed firms have a high state ownership, which is a unique institutional 
environment in Vietnam, because most of them originated from SOEs. The average 
state ownership of listed firms in the sample is 27.61 per cent. Taking an exploratory 
attitude, this study also considers the impact of ownership structure on CSD – 
earnings quality relationship of Vietnamese listed firms. State managers have less 
pressure to manipulate earnings because they look for returns guaranteed by state 
support in the fund and the market. If a state owned firm does not meet its guaranteed 
return, the state will probably provide additional funds (Ding et al. 2007; Jiang and 
Habib 2009; Wang and Yung 2011). As a result, firms with higher state ownership 
also have fewer incentives to make more disclosure (Jiang and Habib 2009). Another 
reason is that firms with higher state  ownership are discouraged from making more 
disclosure because of political constraints (Ghazali and Weetman 2006). On this 
basis there can be a negative interaction between state ownership and earnings 
quality in determining a firm‟s CSD. This discussion follows with hypothesis six 
which is stated as follows.  
H6. More state ownership weakens the relationship between earnings quality and 
CSD. 
 
Unlike state ownership, firms with higher foreign ownership are required to increase 
informative disclosures, including CSD, in order to raise and retain foreign 
investment (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Boubakri et al. 2007). Strengthening the 
supply of capital from foreign investors is crucial to the development of many 
emerging capital markets (Mangena and Tauringana 2007; Bokpin and Isshaq 2009). 
Firms with greater foreign ownership are considered to have better monitoring and 
are thus expected to reduce the ability of insiders to manipulate earnings for private 
purposes (Doidge 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009). Foreign ownership also has a positive 
and significant relationship with the level of information transparency and over the 
long term, can stimulate the growth of a firm, the capital markets, and a country as a 
whole (Ho et al. 2013). 
 
In the Vietnamese context, the government has taken steps to increase foreign 
ownership by reducing restrictions on foreign investment. The maximum limitation 




finally to 49 per cent in 2005, for listed firms, but not for banks. Most foreign owners 
come from developed countries with stronger financial regulatory systems, so they 
are probably aware of the importance of financial and non-financial information 
when making investment decisions. Therefore, to test that proposition, the following 
hypothesis is stated. 
H7. More foreign ownership strengthens the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD.  
 
5.3 Research methods 
In order to examine (1) the influence of board diversity on earnings quality; (2) the 
influence of board diversity on CSD; (3) the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD, and the effect of ownership structure on this relationship, this study takes the 
following steps that are outlined as follows. Section 5.3.1 discusses data collection 
and the population from which the sample is selected. Section 5.3.2 specifies the 
different measurements of board diversity. Section 5.3.3 examines measurements of 
earnings quality. Section 5.3.4 constructs the measurement for CSD. Final section (in 
Section 5.3.5), develops empirical models for testing the hypotheses.  
 
5.3.1 Sample selection and data collection  
The sampling frame in this study is listed firms in Vietnam. The sample consisted of 
all the Vietnamese firms listed on both the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) 
and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), apart from those in banks and other financial 
industries. Banks and financial institutions are excluded because their financial 
statements are prepared in a different regulatory environment, and the information 
reported on those financial statements also follows a different format.  
 
The financial statement data items were hand-collected from HOSE‟s website 
(www.hsx.vn) and HNX‟s website (www.hnx.vn) for the seven fiscal years from 
2005 to 2011 because there were no electronic databases of financial, statistical, and 
market information on Vietnamese listed firms. To be included in the sample, each 
firm must have an income statement, a balance sheet, and a cash flow statement for 
all those fiscal years. This is a perfectly balanced panel with each firm having the 




operations in 2005. Since this study examines all the listed firms in both stock 
exchanges, 2005 was set as the beginning year. The deadline to disclose the audited 
financial statements for the financial year of 2011 was 10
th
 April 2012 (Circular 
09/2010/TT–BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on Vietnamese Stock 
Exchanges), which was the latest data available at the time this study was conducted. 
 
Individual earnings attributes were measured using 5 -year rolling windows
16
 from 
2006 to 2010 to generate the 2010 earnings attribute measures of the sample, similar 
to Francis et al. (2008a). The five-year rolling window is used to maximise the 
number of possible firm-year observations and to be consistent with other regression 
based rolling window metrics. Accruals quality is one of four earnings attribute 
measures in this study. Due to estimating this measure requires lagged and forward 
data, it generated the 2010 earnings attributes measures of the sample by using the 
financial statement data items for 7 years from the fiscal years 2005 to 2011. The raw 
data for calculating board diversity indices were hand-collected from the 2010 annual 
reports and firm websites. Table 5.1 presents the final sample selected for this thesis. 
 
Table 5.1. Final sample set used in the thesis  
Description  Number of non-
financial listed 
firms 
Total non-financial firms listed on Vietnamese stock 
exchange having financial statements for the seven fiscal 
years from 2005 to 2011, including: 
 164 
Non-financial firms listed on HOSE  97 
Non-financial firms listed on HNX  67 
Total available firms to measure earnings quality  164 
Excluded firms:   
Non-financial firms listed on HOSE missing board of 
directors data 
5  
Non-financial firms listed on HNX missing board of 9  
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 Gaio and Raposo (2011) used a 6-year rolling windows instead of a 14-year rolling windows to 





Total available firms to calculate board diversity indices  150 
Excluded firms:   
Non-financial firms listed on HOSE with unavailable 
online annual reports in 2010 
2  
Non-financial firms listed on HNX with unavailable 
online annual reports in 2010 
15  
Total available firms with annual reports in 2010 for 
corporate social disclosure analysis 
 133 
 
The initial sample consists of 164 non-financial firms listed on the Vietnamese stock 
exchange for at least the seven fiscal years from 2005 to 2011 which includes 97 
firms listed on HOSE and 67 listed on HNX. Of those 164 firms, 14 firms do not 
provide board of directors‟ data in annual reports or on firm websites, so they are not 
included in the sample. The final sample used to examine the effect of board 
diversity on earnings quality is then reduced 150 listed firms. Also because 17 firms 
have no annual reports available online, the final sample for CSD analysis consists of 
133 listed firms, including 90 in HOSE and 43 in HNX firms.  
 
5.3.2 Measures of board diversity 
Four board diversity indices are constructed in this thesis to comprehensively 
measure board diversity. They are an unweighted diversity-of-boards index 
(UW_DoB), an unweighted diversity-in-boards index (UW_DiB), a weighted 
diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB), and a weighted diversity-in-boards index 
(W_DiB). 
 
The unweighted board diversity indices (UW_DoB and UW_DiB) are constructed 
based on the guidance provided by Hafsi and Turgut (2013) where they examine the 
impact of these two board diversity indices on social performance of listed firms in 
the S&P 500 Index. The index combines several attributes of the board of directors 





Since assigning equal importance to each attribute is hypothetical (Ben-Amar et al. 
2013), this study constructs two more weighted board diversity indices (W_DoB and 
W_DiB). The weights are based on the responses received from a survey 
questionnaire answered by listed firms‟ executives on the relative importance of 
these attributes in determining their importance to earnings quality and CSD. 
 
5.3.2.1 Unweighted diversity-of-boards index  
As noted earlier, this study includes four structural attributes of the board of directors 
to construct the diversity-of-boards indices. These are measured as shown in Table 
5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Description of the board diversity indices and their composition. 
Variables Measurement 
Included variables in diversity-of-boards indices 
CEO/chairperson separation 0 if the chairperson also serves as the CEO and 1 
otherwise 
Non-executive directors 
owning more than 5% of a 
firm‟s equity (blockholders). 
1 if there is at least one non-executive director who 
also serves as a blockholder and 0 otherwise 
Representative directors‟ 
ownership 
The percentage of state ownership represented by 
directors 
Promoters The number of inside directors also serves as 
representative directors for government, divided by 
total number of directors on the board of directors 
Included variables in diversity-in-boards indices 
Director gender Using modified Blau‟s index with a classification of 
male and female directors 
Director age Using modified Blau‟s index with a classification of 
five subgroupings: under 36 years, 36–45, 46–55, 
56–65, and over 65 years
17
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 Director age is classified into six sub-groupings: under 36 years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66–75 and 
over 76 years, following Mahadeo et al. (2012). This classification is chosen because Mahadeo et al. 
(2012) study also examines an emerging economy (Mauritius). However, there are no directors over 






Using modified Blau‟s index with a classification of 
four subgroupings: PhD, master‟s, bachelor‟s, and 
others 
Director nationality Using modified Blau‟s index with a classification of 
foreign and domestic directors 
 
This study constructs UW_DoB using the inter-sample distance-measurement 
method (Deza and Deza 2009; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). This measurement represents 
dissimilarity among firm boards using the structural attributes of the board of 
directors as a basis, which shows the extent to which all four structural attributes of 
the board of directors in a given firm board are dissimilar from those in other firm 
boards in the sample.  
 
Three main steps are used to ascertain the extent to which a board is dissimilar from 
the remaining boards. First, a matrix is developed by measuring the dissimilarity 
between a given firm and other firms about each structural attributes of the board of 
directors. Second, the extent of dissimilarity between a given firm and other firms 
about all structural attributes (i.e., four attributes in this study) of the board of 
directors is measured. Third, the average dissimilarity between a given firm and the 
remaining firms in the sample is taken. It becomes the UW_DoB of the given firm.  
 
The structural attributes of boards in this study contains binary and ratio scale data 
types. Han and Kamber (2006) have shown how to measure inter sample differences 
with different data types, so this approach is used to quantify the inter sample 
differences. This technique combines the different attributes into a single 
dissimilarity matrix by bringing all the attributes onto a common scale with 
differences that range from 0 to 1. Each attribute in a given firm is measured and 
compared to the same attribute with the remaining firms in the sample. If it is 
different, then that attribute is different, and receives a score of more than zero, 
otherwise it is zero. Each attribute in a given firm is compared that way. A higher 
scale represents higher diversity-of-boards. The details of this method and an 





The dissimilarity between a given firm and another firm is measured using a 






















where d(i, j) is a distance function (metric) used to express the (dis)similarity 
between two objects i and j (i.e. firm i and firm j); i and j are two p-dimensional data 
points where p is represented as the number of structural attributes of the firm board 
examined in this study. These two data points are represented as (xi1, xi2, …, xip) and 
(xj1, xj2, …, xjp) respectively. The indicator = 1 with the assumption that 
attributes f have equal weights to the relative contribution of each attribute f to the 
distance function. 
 
The contribution made by an attribute f to the dissimilarity function between firm i 
and firm j (i.e., ) is computed. However, that computation is unique to each data 
type. Because attributes are measured using different data types,  is calculated 
using different formulas based on the data type of the attribute, as follows: 
a) If attribute f is binary or categorical: = 0 if xif = xjf, or otherwise = 1; 
b) If attribute f is interval scale: where h runs over all 
non-missing objects for attribute f; 
c) If attribute f is ordinal: compute ranks rif and , and treat zif as 
interval-scaled (rif ∈ [1,…,Mf]); 
d) If attribute f is ratio scale: either perform logarithmic transformation and treat 
the transformed data as interval scale; or treat f as continuous ordinal data, compute 
rif and zif, and then treat zif as interval scale; or treat ratio scale attributes like interval 
scale attributes. 
 
The contribution of dissimilarity for all the different attributes (i.e., ) is 





































The average distance (dissimilarity) to all the other boards is taken as follows (the 
number of firms in the sample at the denominator (the below) of the formula is 
deducted one because this study compares a firm with other firms without the firm 
being compared with itself because such a comparison is meaningless): 
 








  (2) 
where n is the number of firm boards; D(i) is the average distance (dissimilarity) of 
firm board i to all other boards in the sample, namely UW_DoB of each firm board. 
 
A calculation sample of unweighted diversity-of-boards index: 
The following is an illustration of such a calculation where it is assumed there are 
four firms in the sample. The four structural attributes are as identified in this study. 
Since some attributes are binary, and others are ratio data types, they are converted 
into a normalised score based on the data type of the attribute with a value on a 
common scale from 0 to 1. An example of an unweighted diversity-of-boards index 
(UW_DoB)‟s calculation with four firms‟ data is in Table 5.3 and the subsequent 
context. 
 
Table 5.3. An example of an unweighted diversity-of-boards index‟s calculation with 
four firms‟ data 






(ratio scale ) 
% Promoters 
(ratio scale ) 
Non-executive 
directors owning > 
5% of a firm‟s 
equity 
(binary) 
Firm Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0.5726 0.6 0 
3 0 0 0.25 0 
4 0 0.1217 0.4 1 
The dissimilarity function between firm i and firm j (i.e., ) for each attribute f is 
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Binary scale data types (Attribute 1 and attribute 4) 
Because attributes 1 and 4 are binary,  becomes 0 if the attributes of firm board i 
and firm board j match, and 1 if the attributes differ. This study gained  for 
attribute 1 (i.e. 
(1)
,i jd ) in the dissimilarity matrix as follows. 
 
This study gained  for attribute 4 (i.e. 
(4)
,i jd ) in the dissimilarity matrix as follows: 
 
 
Ratio scale data types (Attribute 2 and attribute 3) 
This illustration computes  for attributes 2 and 3 (which are ratio scales). In this 
scenario, the data of each attribute is treated like an interval scale (see b) for the 
formula). To compute  for attribute 2 (i.e. 
(2)
,i jd ), this study let maxhxh = 0.5726 
and minhxh = 0. The following dissimilarity matrix is then obtained for attribute 2 
(i.e. 
(2)
,i jd ): 
 
 
The figures shown in column 1 of the matrix for attribute 2 above (that is 0, 1, 0, 












































The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 1: 
 (because there is no dissimilarity between firm 1 and itself). 
 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 2: 
 
 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 3: 
 
 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 4: 
 
 
Attribute 3 is also a ratio scale. As with calculating attribute 2, the  for attribute 3 
(i.e. 
(3)
,i jd ) in the dissimilarity matrix is as follows (details of calculating individual 
figures are not shown here): 
 
 
The dissimilarity matrices for the four attributes are computed using formula (1). For 
example, the dissimilarity between firm 1 and firm 4 (d(1,4)), for the combined four 
attributes, is obtained as follows (all four attributes are assumed to have equal 
weights, hence the indicator is 1): 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1,4 1,4 1,4 1,41* 1* 1* 1* 1*0 1*0.21 1*0.67 1*1
(1,4) 0.47
4 4
d d d d
d
     
    
 
Similarly, the resulting dissimilarity matrix obtained for the data described by the 















































Finally, the diversity-of-boards index of each firm board is calculated based on 
formula (2), which is the average difference of a given firm with all other firms when 
the dissimilarity distance is measured.  
 
For example, the UW_DoB of firm board 1 is: 
. 
 
Similarly, by using the above computations, the UW_DoB of firm board two, three, 
and four are 0.73, 0.37, and 0.54, respectively. These results indicate that firm board 
2 is the most diverse  (dissimilarity), while firm board 3 is the least diverse  
(dissimilarity). 
 
5.3.2.2 Unweighted diversity-in-boards indices  
Table 5.2 describes the measurement of four demographic attributes of the board of 
directors. Because the intent here is to measure how diverse demographic attributes 
are within a board (gender, age, educational qualifications and nationality), each of 
these attributes is first measured using Blau‟s index (1977). Blau‟s index has been 
suggested as an optimal measure of diversity to capture dissimilarities (i.e., 
variations) within a group of people (Harrison and Klein 2007). 
 
Blau‟s index is calculated by the following formula. 
  21 ( )kp  (3) 
where the variety can take k = 1, …, K possible categories, and p represents the 
proportion of members of the board of directors in the k
th
 category. When Blau‟s 
index gains a large value, diversity-in-boards increases. However, in order to obtain a 
standardised range from zero to unity for all demographic diversity attributes, the 
method introduced by Agresti and Agresti (1978) is used. Their method multiplies 
0 0
(1,2) 0 0.75 0
(1,3) (2,3) 0 0.10 0.65 0
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(1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) 0 0.75 0.1 0.47
( 1) 0.44
4 1 4 1
d d d d
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Blau‟s index by K/(K-1) and refers to it as a modified Blau‟s index. Then, to 
construct UW_DiB, the sample is split into terciles for each attribute to rank the 
levels of diversity (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). These groups then 
take values of 0 for the first tercile, 1 for the second, and 2 for the third. Finally, 
UW_DiB is the sum of all the ranked attributes that are involved in the demographic 
diversity within a board for each firm, such that higher value represents a higher 
diversity-in-boards. 
 
5.3.2.3 Weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted diversity-in-boards indices  
This study constructs a weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) and weighted 
diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB) similar to UW_DoB and UW_DiB, but each 
attribute of the board of directors is weighted based on executives‟ perceptions on 
their relative importance (Dess and Davis 1984; Van der Walt et al. 2006). 
Specifically, the survey examined executives‟ perceptions of the relevance of the 
board of directors‟ attributes on earnings quality and on CSD of Vietnamese listed 
firms
18
. The corporate executives of Vietnamese listed firms understand 
experientially how keen the board of directors towards enhancing the quality of 
earnings and CSD. Hence, the survey asked executives to assign a value to each 
attribute of the board of directors towards impacting on earnings quality and on CSD 
of their firm. Each attribute is assigned a value ranging from 0 (unimportant) to 10 
(most important). Having a wider scale maximises the variances in responses 
obtained from the executives can lead to more reliable findings (Hartley and Betts 
2010). The questionnaire was sent to 150 executives of all the firms in the sample. A 
total of 80 usable replies were received, which represented a response rate of 53.33%. 
Oppenheim (1966) suggests that one practical way to detect a non-response bias is to 
compare the responses of early respondents with the late respondents. A non-
response bias was tested using t-tests and revealed there was no significant difference 
in the responses provided by the first 30 early respondents and the 30 late 
respondents. This suggests there is little significant non-response bias and thus the 
results of the questionnaire survey can be generalised. 
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This study calculates 
( )f
ij in Equation (1) with each attribute to construct a weighted 













 (4)  
where 
( )f
ij is the indicator of attributes f weighted; p is the number of attributes f; 
and MEANRATING is the mean importance rating of each attribute f based on 
executives‟ perceptions in the survey. Equation (1) is then used with 
( )f
ij  modified 
to measure W_DoB of each firm board. 
 
The measurement of a weighted diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB), is based on the 
importance of each attribute measured as the mean score from the questionnaire 
survey, so W_DiB is calculated as the sum of all the four ranked attributes and each 
ranked attribute is multiplied by the mean value of importance rating obtained from 
the survey. A higher value represents higher diversity-in-boards.  
 
5.3.3 Measures of earnings quality 
The literature widely uses two types of earnings quality measures: accounting-based 
measures and market-based measures. A fundamental assumption underlying the 
market-based measure is that markets efficiently include accounting information in 
making decisions about firms. This study chooses accounting-based measures 
because the Vietnamese market is new and semi-efficient (Truong et al. 2008; Phan 
and Zhou 2014). Additionally, accounting-based measures can directly reflect 
earnings quality. Managers are likely to manipulate accounting-based measures, but 
it is much harder to manipulate market-based measures (Prior et al. 2008). Moreover, 
accounting-based measures have been used far more extensively in earnings quality 
research (Francis et al. 2005). 
 
This study constructs a standardised aggregate earnings quality score as a proxy for 
earnings quality in the main analyses
19
, based on four accounting measures which 
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 For validity purposes, this study also used four individual earnings attribute measures (accruals 
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings smoothness) instead of the 
standardized aggregate  earnings quality score in the robustness tests (see in details in Section 6.6.3 of 




have been used in prior studies (Francis et al. 2004; Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006). 
They are accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings 
smoothness. Prior studies have used a standardised aggregate score as a proxy for 
earnings quality or earnings management (Leuz et al. 2003; Gaio and Raposo 2011). 
Additionally, factor analysis suggests that a single standardised aggregate measure of 
earnings quality which represents four earnings attribute measures in this study is 
valid (more details of factor analysis are in Section 6.4 of Chapter 6).  
 
Each of the above firm-specific earnings quality measures is estimated by rolling 
over a five-year window, and using the auto-regression approach. Because the 
accruals quality measure requires lagged and forward data, a firm is included in the 
year t sample if the data is available for seven years from year t-5 to t+1.  
 
The industry approach to measure accruals quality is not used because the business 
activities of most Vietnamese listed firms are conducted in multiple industry sectors, 
and at present, there are no norms for distinct industry classifications of listed firms 
in Vietnam (Nguyen 2012). Additionally, using a firm as a measure of its own 
benchmark earnings quality mitigates concerns surrounding the use of industry 
measures because it can give rise to noise in the earnings quality measure due to 
differences such as firm size, profitability, or leverage, among firms in a given 
industry sector (Francis et al. 2004). 
 
5.3.3.1 Accruals quality 
Accruals quality is a measure of earnings quality that measures the extent to which 
earnings relate to cash flows from operations. A stronger relationship indicates better 
earnings quality. Accruals quality can be measured in several ways but here it is 
based on the widely used Dechow and Dichev (2002) statistical calculation 
technique. This technique measures accruals quality by relating total current accruals 
to cash flows from operations. Accruals quality in this model is measured from the 
following regression: 
 
    
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,j tTCA = firm j‟s total current accruals in year t 
   , , , ,( )j t j t j t j tCA CL Cash STDEBT ; , 1j tAssets = firm j‟s total assets in year t-1; 
,j tCFO = firm j‟s cash flow from operations in year t;  ,j tCA = firm j‟s change in 
current assets between year t-1 and year t;  ,j tCL = firm j‟s change in current 
liabilities between year t-1 and year t;  ,j tCash = firm j‟s change in cash between 
year t-1 and year t; and  ,j tSTDEBT = firm j‟s change in debt in current liabilities 
between year t-1 and year t. 
 
The measure of accruals quality is based on the standard deviation of estimated 
residuals     ,ˆj t from Equation (5). It explains the extent to which total current (or 
working capital) accruals map into operating cash flows of the past, current, and 
future years. Large (small) value of accruals quality measure corresponds to low 
(high) accruals quality and low (high) earnings quality. 
 
5.3.3.2 Earnings persistence  
Earnings persistence is the extent to which current period earnings reflect future 
period earnings. Persistent earnings are recurring or sustainable, and therefore are 
more desirable than transitory earnings. Kormendi and Lipe (1987) use the firm level 
regressions of current earnings on the previous year‟s earnings to estimate the slope 
coefficient of earnings persistence. This study follows Francis et al. (2004) and 
measure earnings persistence as the negative of the slope coefficient estimate1 , 
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Where Earnj,t = firm‟s j net income before extraordinary items in year t. Large values 
of 1  (i.e., less negative) imply low earnings persistence and low earnings quality.  
 
5.3.3.3 Earnings predictability  
Earnings predictability is the ability of earnings to predict itself (Lipe 1990). It is 




higher repetition represents higher earnings quality. Both Lipe (1990) and Francis et 
al. (2004) measure earnings predictability as a dispersion of the error variance in the 
earnings persistence model, measured as the square root of the estimated error 
variance from the earnings persistence equation. In this study, earnings predictability 
is calculated using the square root of the error variance from Equation (2) as follows: 
 
 
   2, ,ˆPr j t j ted
 (7) 
where 




j t = estimated 
error variance of firm j in year t, calculated from equation (2). Large (small) values 
of Pred imply low (high) earnings predictability and low (high) earnings quality. 
 
5.3.3.4 Earnings smoothness 
This study forms the view that earnings smoothness is a desirable attribute from the 
point of view that managers use their private information about future income, which 
is not known to the public, to smooth out transitory fluctuations and hence achieve a 
more representative and useful reported earnings number (Chaney and Lewis 1995; 
Demski 1998; Francis et al. 2004; Gaio and Raposo 2011). Although smoothness has 
been measured in several ways, all of which are likely to be highly correlated 
(Francis et al. 2008a). This study adopts the measure of smoothness used by Francis 
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 (8)  
where 
,j tSmooth = firm j‟s earnings smoothness in year t;  = firm j‟s standard 
deviation; 
,j tEarn = firm j‟s net income before extraordinary items in year t; and 
,j tCFO = firm j‟s operating cash flows in year t. Large (small) values of Smooth 
indicate low (high) earnings smoothness and low (high) earnings quality. 
 
5.3.3.5 The standardised aggregate earnings quality measure  
To mitigate the effects of potential measurement errors in the individual accounting 




Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009; Gaio and Raposo 2011), this study lumps the four 
earnings attributes measures into a standardised aggregate earnings quality score. 
Because the larger the value of the individual earnings quality measure, the lower the 
earnings quality, this study first ranks the four individual earnings quality values in 
descending order so that a higher ranked value now represents higher earnings 
quality. Then, the standardised aggregate earnings quality score of a firm is 
computed by averaging the firm rankings for the four individual earnings quality 
measures. 
 
5.3.4 Measures of corporate social disclosure 
The CSD in this study is measured as a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index 
that integrates the disclosure quantity and two aspects of the disclosure quality. The 
disclosure quality aspects are the disclosure item quality and the disclosure type 
quality of CSD, as perceived by stakeholders from the questionnaire survey. 
 
Content analysis is used to measure CSD because it has been used extensively in the 
field of corporate social responsibility (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005). The  relevant information in annual reports are used  to  examine  the  
CSD  practices of Vietnamese listed firms because Corporate Social Responsibility  
reports or sustainability reports did not exist in the year of the analysis. Annual 
reports are the central source of corporate communications to investors and other 
stakeholders, and are widely used by firms for various social disclosures (Campbell 
2000; Abeysekera 2012).  
 
The researcher was initially trained by another researcher experienced in content 
analysis to code content in annual reports. A set of basic coding rules was 
constructed to ensure reliability and validity, and the researcher coded all the annual 
reports in the sample. Following this, the experienced researcher also checked the 
coding of annual reports randomly to ensure the coding between the two researchers 
was consistent. Furthermore, coding was repeated by the researcher after two weeks 
(Haji 2013) in order to avoid the possibility that the first and the second scoring 





This study uses the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 3.1 index, the social indicators 
in particular, to measure CSD practices in Vietnam. GRI 3.1 is the latest version at 
the time of this study and is a universally accepted guideline for reporting on the 
economic, social, and environmental dimensions of a company. Currently, the GRI is 
the most widely used framework to assess and measure Sustainability Reporting, 
including CSD (Hopkins 2012). In 2013, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
in collaboration with the State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC), the 
Vietnamese stock exchanges, and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
(ACCA) have also launched a handbook on sustainability reporting to guide listed 
firms in Vietnam on sustainability reporting standard practice. This guide encourages 
the use of the GRI framework and helps firms to understand and disclose their 
economic, environmental and social information, and takes a first steps towards 
meeting their sustainable development goals. Furthermore, a content analysis based 
on the GRI guidelines not only gives an insight into the reporting practices of listed 
firms in Vietnam, it also helps to measure the progress being made towards such 
disclosure practices. 
 
The social indicators in the GRI 3.1 index identify key performance aspects 
surrounding labour practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. They 
consist of four aspects, including 15 items of labour practices and decent work 
indicators (LA1 to LA15), 11 items of human rights indicators (HR1 to HR11), 10 
society indicators (SO1 to SO10), and 9 product responsibility indicators (PR1 to 
PR9) (see Appendix A for more details). The GRI framework items are used for CSD 
in this study because those reporting items have been standardised across the firms, 
and objectives, regardless of their geographical location (Adams 2002). 
 
5.3.4.1 Measuring the disclosure quantity  
In order to measure the disclosure quantity, this study examines the different items in 
the checklist using binary scores. This is consistent with CSD studies in emerging 
capital markets (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Haji 2013; Khan et al. 2013). The 
disclosure of an item within the checklist in the annual reports is scored (1), while 





5.3.4.2 Disclosure item quality and disclosure type quality‟ measures of CSD 
Using the binary approach to measure disclosure quantity has been criticised because 
it assumes that all items are equally important (Barako et al. 2006). A few studies 
have attempted to measure the quality of CSD, but most of them have subjectively 
assessed the importance of the resource items disclosed. Lu and Abeysekera (2014) 
approach the quality of CSD as a combination of both the perceived importance of 
reporting items and the perceived importance of the types of disclosure adopted. The 
types of disclosure are narrative, monetary quantification (i.e. the amount of money), 
numerical quantification (i.e. the number or statistics), both monetary and numerical. 
This approach is adopted in this study. Lu and Abeysekera (2014) is the only known 
published study that combines the disclosure quality by the importance of reporting 
items and the importance of different disclosure types. They ascertain the importance 
of disclosure items from stakeholders (i.e. disclosure item quality) and the 
importance of disclosure types from stakeholders (i.e. disclosure type quality). This 
study extends Lu and Abeysekera‟s (2014) study by obtaining perceptions from 652 
stakeholders about the importance of reporting items,  rather than the 12 stakeholders 
used in that study. Moreover, this study focuses on CSD whereas Lu and Abeysekera 
focus on social and environmental disclosure. 
 
This study sent questionnaires to various stakeholders based on their interests in 
disclosure items, which is similar to Potluri et al. (2010) and Lu and Abeysekera 
(2014). The quality of CSD is measured here to examine the perceptions of 
employees (labour stakeholders), customers (product stakeholders), local 
communities (society stakeholders), and lawyers and regulators (human rights 
stakeholders) about the CSD of Vietnamese listed firms in the annual reports. 
Because each stakeholder group has specific interests, four types of questionnaires 
are used to collect the perceptions of these four stakeholder groups. 
 
The two aspects of disclosure quality (i.e., disclosure type quality and disclosure item 
quality) (Lu and Abeysekera 2014) are adopted by surveying stakeholders to obtain 
their perceptions of disclosure type preference (i.e., narrative, monetary 
quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) (Guthrie and 




indicators of GRI 3.1). For the type of items, if the same item is disclosed more than 
once with different types, an average score is computed to allow each item to 
contribute once to the overall results. 
 
Since Vietnamese is the corporate language in the sample firms, the questionnaires 
were written in English and Vietnamese.  The questionnaires were delivered by hand 
to the target groups
20
. This checklist was critically reviewed by 50 randomly chosen 
social stakeholders in Vietnam to verify each of the social disclosure items in GRI 
version 3.1 to the Vietnamese reporting environment. The social stakeholders include 
employees (labour stakeholders) who respond to the questionnaire for aspects of 
labour practices and decent work; the customers (product stakeholders) who respond 
to the questionnaire for aspects of product responsibility; members of local 
communities (society stakeholders) who respond to the questionnaire for aspects of 
society; and lawyers and regulators (human rights stakeholders) who respond to the 
questionnaire for aspects of human rights. These groups of users were selected based 
on their likely differences of interests in the social issues and they were also 
consistent with the expectations of the GRI 3.1 as follows. The product responsibility 
indicators address the aspects of a reporting organisation‟s products and services that 
directly affect customers. The society indicators focus attention on the impact that 
organisations have on local communities. Labour practices and decent work 
indicators act as a dialogue between the company and its employees, and the degree 
to which employees are organised in representative bodies. Human rights indicators 
require organisations to report on the extent to which processes have been 
implemented, on incidents of human rights violations, and on changes in the 
stakeholders‟ ability to enjoy and exercise their human rights during the reporting 
period. Lawyers and regulators are involved in this aspect.  
 
The questionnaire has a scale of 0 (unimportant) to 10 (the most important), making 
it an 11-point scale. This increases the variance of responses obtained and makes the 
results more reliable (Dawes 2002; Hartley and Betts 2010). In addition, this scale is 
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familiar to respondents in Vietnam because the Vietnamese academic grading system 
is based on a 10-point grading scale with 10 being the highest and 0 being the lowest. 
The stakeholder-specific groups were requested to rate each item from 0 to 10 based 
on their perceptions of how important the item was to the respondents and how the 
items should be disclosed. They were also asked for their perceptions on the 
importance of four disclosure types (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, 
numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) for each item based on a 
rating scale from 0 to 10. 
 
Some minor adjustments and clarifications were made to the questionnaire based on 
the results of the pilot test, as well as on the comments and suggestions made by the 
pilot test‟s respondents. This pilot test ensures that the wording, format, length and 
sequencing are appropriate and this is to increase the validity of the data (Md Habib-
Uz-Zaman et al. 2009). 
 
The weight for a particular item is calculated by summing the integer values assigned 
to the item and then dividing the total by the number of individuals who responded to 
the item. Similarly, the level of importance for each type (i.e. narrative, monetary 
quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) of a 
particular item is calculated by summing the integer values assigned to each 
particular type of disclosure for each item and then dividing the total by the number 
of individuals who respond to this type. A mean score is used to summarise the 
response scores within a specific stakeholder group. More details of the calculations 
are presented in the Section 5.3.4.3 below. 
 
5.3.4.3 The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index 
The CSD in this research is a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index and is 
















where CSDj = a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index of firm j; Quantityi = the 




firm j; ItemQualityi = the weight of the item i disclosed; TypeQualityi = the weight 
for the type (i.e. narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification or both 
monetary and numerical) of the item i disclosed; n = the number of items in the 
checklist; max(SCORE) = the maximum score of three disclosure dimensions for a 
given firm: disclosure quantity score * disclosure type quality score *disclosure item 
quality score. 
 
A calculation sample of the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index: 
Following is an illustration of a CSD index calculation made in this study for one 
firm (Firm A) in the sample. Table 5.4 reports the results of content analysis from the 
annual report of Firm A, which includes the disclosure quantity and types for each 
item (i.e. narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary 
and numerical) of four social disclosure aspects (i.e. labour, human rights, society, 
product). 
 
Tables 5.5 – 5.8 show the ratings awarded by the employees to the various resource 
items regarding the labour aspect (questionnaire 1), by lawyers and regulators to the 
human rights aspect (questionnaire 2), by local communities to the society aspect 
(questionnaire 3), by customers to the product aspect (questionnaire 4). Based on 
Equation (9), the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index of Firm A is 
calculated as follows:  
 









Table 5.4. Content analysis from firm A‟s the 2010 annual report 
























LA1 1 Numerical HR1 0 - SO1 1 Monetary PR1 1 Narrative 
LA2 1 Numerical HR2 0 - SO9 1 Narrative PR2 0 - 
LA3 0 - HR3 1 Narrative SO10 1 Numerical PR3 1 Narrative 
LA15 0 - HR4 1 Numerical SO2 0 - PR4 0 - 
LA4 1 Narrative HR5 0 - SO3 0 - PR5 1 Narrative 
LA5 1 Narrative HR6 0 - SO4 0 - PR6 1 Narrative 
LA6 1 Numerical HR7 0 - SO5 0 - PR7 0 - 
LA7 1 Narrative HR8 0 - SO6 0 - PR8 0 - 
LA8 1 Both monetary and numerical HR9 0 - SO7 1 Narrative PR9 0 - 
LA9 1 Narrative HR10 0 - SO8 1 Monetary 
   
LA10 1 Both monetary and numerical HR11 0 - 
      
LA11 1 Both monetary and numerical 
         
LA12 1 Narrative 
         
LA13 1 Numerical 
         
LA14 1 Monetary 
         






Table 5.5. The ratings awarded by the employees on survey (questionnaire for 
employees) 
Items of labour 
aspects 
Mean weight of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
LA1 7.47 6.53 6.75 6.92 7.51 
LA2 7.38 6.28 6.00 7.17 7.06 
LA3 7.29 6.49 6.31 7.02 6.97 
LA15 7.28 6.22 5.99 7.19 6.92 
LA4 7.28 6.34 5.99 7.09 6.84 
LA5 7.27 6.54 6.37 7.06 6.88 
LA6 7.18 6.15 7.00 7.19 7.68 
LA7 7.15 6.03 5.85 6.92 6.69 
LA8 7.11 6.65 6.10 7.10 7.12 
LA9 7.05 6.20 6.02 6.94 6.90 
LA10 6.97 5.77 5.85 7.04 7.27 
LA11 6.78 5.84 6.35 6.74 7.16 
LA12 6.7 5.73 5.69 6.88 6.90 
LA13 6.47 5.94 5.60 6.69 6.34 
LA14 6.44 5.97 5.27 6.53 6.26 
 
Table 5.6. The ratings awarded by lawyers and regulators on survey (questionnaire 
for lawyers and regulators) 
Items of human 
rights aspects 
Mean weight of 
items disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
HR1 8.19 5.27 5.90 7.90 6.64 
HR2 7.98 5.19 6.00 7.52 7.36 
HR3 7.9 5.28 5.25 7.64 6.78 
HR4 7.89 5.43 6.07 7.89 7.21 
HR5 7.28 4.91 5.23 6.99 6.32 
HR6 7.19 5.26 5.62 6.79 6.61 
HR7 7.18 4.62 5.64 7.03 6.82 
HR8 6.93 5.53 5.83 6.96 6.53 
HR9 6.71 4.87 5.17 6.45 6.41 
HR10 6.69 4.71 6.01 7.05 7.68 





Table 5.7. The ratings assigned by local communities on survey (questionnaire for the members of 
local communities) 
Items of society 
aspects 
Mean weight of 
items disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
SO1 7.92 4.91 6.35 6.50 7.58 
SO9 7.81 5.49 6.98 6.99 7.90 
SO10 7.67 4.61 6.53 6.04 7.97 
SO2 7.52 5.06 5.87 6.22 7.43 
SO3 7.41 5.11 6.10 6.55 7.55 
SO4 7.35 5.45 6.12 6.36 7.38 
SO5 7.26 4.79 5.58 6.09 7.32 
SO6 7.24 5.06 5.74 6.57 7.34 
SO7 6.94 4.88 6.21 6.09 7.33 
SO8 6.22 4.88 5.46 5.73 6.44 
 
Table 5.8. The ratings awarded by customers on survey (questionnaire for customers) 
Items of product 
aspects 
Mean weight of 
items disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
PR1 8.08 5.22 6.14 6.58 7.68 
PR2 8.07 6.30 6.17 7.08 7.76 
PR3 7.8 5.61 6.56 6.70 8.09 
PR4 7.77 5.97 6.02 6.64 7.11 
PR5 7.71 5.88 5.43 6.09 6.74 
PR6 7.64 5.56 5.62 6.49 7.35 
PR7 6.98 6.05 5.68 5.60 5.89 
PR8 6.94 5.57 5.63 6.21 6.53 






Table 5.9. The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index‟s calculation of firm A for four aspects of CSD (labour practices, human rights, 









































LA1 1 7.47 6.92 51.69 HR1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO1 1 7.92 6.35 50.29 PR1 1 8.08 5.22 42.18 
LA2 1 7.38 7.17 52.91 HR2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO9 1 7.81 5.49 42.88 PR2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA3 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 HR3 1 7.90 5.28 41.71 SO10 1 7.67 6.04 46.33 PR3 1 7.80 5.61 43.76 
LA15 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 HR4 1 7.89 7.89 62.25 SO2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 PR4 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA4 1 7.28 6.34 46.16 HR5 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO3 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 PR5 1 7.71 5.88 45.33 
LA5 1 7.27 6.54 47.55 HR6 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO4 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 PR6 1 7.64 5.56 42.48 
LA6 1 7.18 7.19 51.62 HR7 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO5 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 PR7 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA7 1 7.15 6.03 43.11 HR8 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO6 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 PR8 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA8 1 7.11 7.12 50.62 HR9 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO7 1 6.94 4.88 33.87 PR9 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA9 1 7.05 6.20 43.71 HR10 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 SO8 1 6.22 5.46 33.96 
    
LA10 1 6.97 7.27 50.67 HR11 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
         
LA11 1 6.78 7.16 48.54 
              
LA12 1 6.70 5.73 38.39 
               
LA13 1 6.47 6.69 43.28 
               
LA14 1 6.44 5.27 33.94 













5.3.5 Control variables 
To test the effect of board diversity on earnings quality discussed in the previous 
sections, it is important to control variables that could be associated with earnings 
quality and/or board diversity. This study controls several variables that are 
described as „innate determinants‟ in prior research related to earnings quality 
outputs (Francis et al. 2005). These control variables are referred to as innate 
determinants because they are less likely to change in the short run. They include 
firm size (SIZE), length of operating cycle (LOG.OC), cash flow variability 
(STD.CFO), sales variability (STD.SALES), and incidence of net loss realisations 
(LOSS). All the variables are measured over rolling five-year periods, which is 
consistent with the measures of earnings quality. SIZE is computed as log of the 
firm‟s average total assets. LOG.OC is measured as the log of the sum of the firm‟s 
days account receivable and days inventory. STD.CFO is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the firm‟s cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets. 
STD.SALES is measured as the standard deviation of the firm‟s sales revenues, 
scaled by total assets, and LOSS is computed as the number of years where the firm 
reported a loss over the previous five years. Because the government still holds a 
large proportion of ownership in many Vietnamese listed firms (Vu et al. 2011) and 
studies using the sample in China (Ding et al. 2007; Wang and Yung 2011) show that 
state ownership is related to earnings quality, this thesis also uses the state ownership 
(STATE), measured by the percentage of shareholding owned by the state, as a 
control variable in this study.  
 
As with the effect of board diversity on CSD and the effect of the earnings quality on 
CSD, this study controls for firm characteristics such as return on assets (ROA), 
auditors (AUDIT), state ownership (STATE), foreign ownership (FOREIGN) and 
stock exchange location (STOCK_EX) which have been shown to influence CSD in 
previous studies (e.g., Purushothaman et al. 2000; Cormier et al. 2011; Vu et al. 
2011; Vu 2012). Studies document that financial performance is related to CSD (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Lu and Abeysekera 2014). This study measures financial 
performance using ROA calculated as net profit over the total assets of firm (Vu et 
al. 2011; Haji 2013; Zhang et al. 2013), and it also replaces ROA with return on 
equity (ROE) to measure the financial performance and analyses results to ensure the 




dummy variable, with 1 if the auditing firm is one of the „Big Four‟ and 0 otherwise. 
It is on the basis that highly reputable audit firms, such as the „Big Four‟ auditing 
firms, are likely to improve their perceived audit quality by encouraging their clients 
to participate in disclosing more information (Craswell and Taylor 1992; Ahmad et 
al. 2003).  
 
The government of Vietnam owns a significant amount of shares in listed firms, 
especially some strategic industries (Vu et al. 2011), and the  influence of state 
ownership on CSD has been widely discussed in the literature (Amran and Devi 
2008; Vu et al. 2011; Haji 2013), hence STATE is also a control variable in this 
study, measured by the percentage of shareholding owned by the state (Vu et al. 
2011; Haji 2013). Prior studies also note that foreign ownership is related to 
voluntary disclosure, including CSD (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Vu et al. 2011), so 
FOREIGN is the other control variable, measured by the percentage of shareholding 
owned by foreign investors. Vu (2012) finds that the stock exchange location of each 
firm is an explanatory factor for Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices. In 
particular, firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange are reported to engage in 
significantly more voluntary disclosure practices than firms listed on the Hanoi stock 
exchange. Therefore, STOCK_EX is used as a control variable in this study; with 1 if 
the firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange and 0 for firms listed on the 
Hanoi stock exchange. 
 
Prior studies show that female directors are active in contributing to social issues, 
and are more likely to sponsor more charities and have stronger relationships with 
surrounding communities, shareholders, and other stakeholder groups (Siciliano 
1996; Williams 2003; Bernardi and Threadgill 2010). Furthermore, recent literature 
shows that female directors are associated with higher earnings quality (Srinidhi et 
al. 2011; Gul et al. 2013). Hence, this study also uses female directors (FEMALE), 
measured by the percentage of female members on the board of directors as a control 






5.3.6 Empirical tests of hypotheses  
This section explains the empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in Section 5.2. 
First, section 5.3.6.1 describes the tests relating to the hypothesis on the effect of 
board diversity on earnings quality. Second, section 5.3.6.2 explains the tests 
concerning the hypotheses relating to the effect of board diversity and CSD. Finally, 
section 5.3.6.3 outlines the tests related to the hypotheses on the association between 
earnings quality and CSD. 
 
5.3.6.1 Board diversity and earnings quality 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 propose that earnings quality is positively associated with 
diversity-of-boards, and diversity-in-boards, respectively . Therefore, to test these 
hypotheses, the following regression models of earnings quality are estimated for all 
firms in the sample for year t. These models are run on the full sample of 150 
Vietnamese listed non-financial firms in 2010: 
                0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6. . .i i i i i i i i iEQ DoB SIZE LOGOC STDCFO STD SALES LOSS STATE
  
(10) 
                0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6. . .i i i i i i i i iEQ DiB SIZE LOGOC STDCFO STD SALES LOSS STATE
  
(11) 
where:   
EQi = firm i‟s the standardised aggregate earnings quality score, calculated as the 
average rank across the four individual measures (accruals quality, earnings 
persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness);  
DoBi = firm i‟s indices (unweighted and weighted) of diversity-of-boards;  
DiBi = firm i‟s indies (unweighted and weighted) of diversity-in-boards; 
SIZEi = log of the firm i‟s total asset; 
LOG.OCi = log of the sum of the firm i‟s days accounts receivable and days 
inventory; 
STD.CFOi = the standard deviation of the firm i‟s cash flows from operations, 
scaled by total asset; 
STD.SALESi = the standard deviation of the firm i‟s sales revenues, scaled by 
total asset; 
LOSSi = the firm i‟s incidence of net loss realisations; 




5.3.6.2 Board diversity and CSD  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 propose that an increase in CSD is positively associated with 
diversity-of-boards, and diversity-in-boards, respectively. Therefore, the regression 
models are run on the full sample of 133 Vietnamese listed non-financial firms in 
2010 as follows: 
 
              0 1 1 2 3 4 5 _i i i i i i i iCSD DoB ROA AUDIT STATE FOREIGN STOCK EX
 
(12)




CSDi = firm i‟s a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; 
DoBi = firm i‟s the index of diversity-of-boards;  
DIBi = firm i‟s the index of diversity-in-boards; 
ROAi = firm i‟s net profit over the total assets; 
AUDITi = 1 if firm i‟s auditor is a Big 4 and 0 if otherwise; 
STATEi = the firm i‟s the percentage of shareholding owned by the state; 
FOREIGNi = the firm i‟s the percentage of shareholding owned by foreign 
investors; 
STOCK_EXi = 1  if  the  firms listed  on  HOSE  and 0  for  firms  listed  on  
HNX. 
 
5.3.6.3 Earnings quality and CSD 
Hypotheses 5A and 5B regard the relationship between CSD and earnings quality, 
using an OLS estimator. The regression function is: 
 




FEMALEi = firm i‟s the percentage of female members in the board of directors; 
All other variables are as defined in sections 5.3.6.1 and 5.3.6.2. 
 
To test Hypotheses 6 and 7 regarding the effects of state and foreign ownership on 




      
   
      
   
0 1 2 3 1 2 3
4 5 6_
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i
CSD EQ EQ xSTATE EQ xFOREIGN ROA AUDIT STATE
FOREIGN STOCK EX FEMALE
 (15) 
Where: all other variables are as defined in sections 5.3.6.1, 5.3.6.2, and 5.3.6.3. 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This Chapter was begun by introducing research hypotheses. The hypotheses were 
developed to test the influence of board diversity on earnings quality (H1, H2), the 
influence of board diversity on CSD (H3, H4), the influence of earnings quality on 
CSD (H5a, H5b) and the moderating role of the state ownership (H6), and foreign 
ownership (H7).  
 
It then introduced the research methods. The sampling frame of this study was the 
Vietnamese firms listed on HOSE and HNX. The usable sample examined 150 firms 
for analysing earnings quality and 133 firms for analysing CSD in 2010. The chapter 
then explained how two unweighted board diversity indices were developed; in a 
given firm, the unweighted diversity-of-boards index was developed using the inter-
sample distance measurement method, and the unweighted diversity-in-boards index 
was developed using the terciles split method. These two unweighted board indices 
received weightings based on the survey of executive perceptions to develop a 
weighted diversity-of-boards index and a weighted diversity-in-boards index. This 
was followed by an explanation of the accounting-based earnings quality measures 
used to compute the accruals quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness.  
The values of these earnings quality measures were ranked in a descending order and 
the average firm rankings for the four individual earnings quality measures (i.e. the 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score) became the earnings quality of a firm. 
The CSD was measured using a three-dimensional index consisting of a disclosure 
quantity (presence or absence of an item), a disclosure type quality (narrative, 
monetary, numerical, and simultaneously monetary and numerical), and a disclosure 
item quality (items in the social indicators of GRI 3.1). The disclosure qualities were 
measured from responses obtained from the 11-point scale survey questionnaire 
administered to four (labour, product, society, and human rights) separate 





The empirical models used to test the hypotheses were then outlined. The influence 
of board diversity on earnings quality (H1, H2) was tested using OLS regression 
estimators for samples of 150 firms. The influence of board diversity on CSD (H3, 
H4) was tested using OLS regression estimators for samples of 133 firms. The 
influence of earnings quality on CSD (H5A and H5B) was tested using OLS 
regression estimators for samples of 133 firms, and the moderating effect of state 
ownership (H6) and foreign ownership (H7) on earnings quality – CSD relationship 





6 EMPRICIAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES OF THE IMPACT OF BOARD 
DIVERSITY ON EARNINGS QUALITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the empirical results and analyses of the impact of board 
diversity on earnings quality. Section 6.2 presents the results of the questionnaire 
survey from executives who evaluated the importance of each attribute of the board 
of directors towards earnings quality. Section 6.3 statistically describes the variables 
applied in the analyses. Section 6.4 analyses the correlation between relevant 
variables. Section 6.5 reports the results of the multiple regression models. Section 
6.6 presents the results of several additional analyses to support the findings of the 
main tests. Section 6.7 summarises the findings in the impact of board diversity on 
earnings quality.  
 
6.2 Executives’ perspectives about the attributes of the board of directors in 
relation to earnings quality 
To have data for constructing a weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) and 
weighted diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB) in this thesis, a questionnaire survey is 
used to obtain the corporate executives‟ perceptions on the importance of each 
attribute of the board of directors towards earnings quality. First, the participants‟ 
profiles are described according to their gender, age, present post, years of 
experience, years of experience as an executive, whether they are also a member of a 
board of directors, and their highest educational qualification. This is followed by an 
analysis of their perceptions about the effect of the attributes of the board of directors 
examined in this study on earnings quality of Vietnamese listed firms. 
 
6.2.1 Background information on respondents 
Of the 150 questionnaires sent to the executives of all the firms in the sample, 80 
usable responses were returned, representing a 53.33 per cent response rate. The 
questionnaires were delivered in person to the offices of these individuals. According 
to Table 6.1, most of executives who responded to the questionnaire, 69 (86.25 per 
cent), are male. Their average age is 43 years; they have an average of 22 years 
work experience, and 7.6 experience years as an executive. Two thirds of executives 




respondents are university educated, with 60 per cent holding a Master Degree and 
two holding a PhD degree. Table 6.1 shows that the respondents have adequate 
educational backgrounds and enjoy considerable practical experience. These two 
factors meant that their responses are considered judiciously.  
 
Table 6.1. Basic information of respondents 
Gender  Male Female 
 69 11 
 
Age Min Max Mean 
 35 56 43 
 
Present position CEO Deputy CEO Executive Director of Finance 
 18 21 41 
 
Years of experience Min Max Mean 
 14 35 22 
 
Years of experience as an executive Min Max Mean 
 1 23 7.6 
 
Whether the executive also a member of the board of 
directors 
Yes  No  
 53 27 
 
Highest educational qualification Bachelor Master PhD  
 30 48 2 
Source: Data from the questionnaire for executives. 
 
6.2.2 Executives‟ perceptions of the board of directors‟ attributes in relation to 
earnings quality 
Table 6.2 shows a statistical description of the mean score of 80 executives‟ 




8.5 within a possible range of zero and 10. The respondents consider the Promoters 
attribute (i.e., the percentage of executive directors who also serve as representative 
directors on the board) to be the most important attribute needed to maintain a firm‟s 
earnings quality. Its mean score is 8.5. The respondents consider that the structural 
attributes of the board of directors are more important than the demographic 
attributes in relation to earnings quality. Of the demographic attributes, the 
respondents rate director gender as the least important, with a mean of 4.3. 
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for importance rating based on executives‟ 
perspectives about the board of directors‟ attributes in relation to earnings quality. 
Importance rating Max Min Mean SD 
Structural attributes     
CEO/chair separation 10 3 8.2 1.22 
% Representative directors‟ ownership 10 6 7.8 1.08 
% Promoters 10 6 8.5 1.19 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a firm‟s equity 9 3 7.1 1.73 
Demographic attributes 
    
Gender diversity of the board of directors 7 0 4.3 2.35 
Age diversity of the board of directors 8 0 5.6 2.32 
Educational qualifications diversity of the board of directors 8 3 6 1.36 
Nationality diversity of the board of directors 9 5 7.5 1.06 
 
6.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 6.3 presents the mean, standard deviation, and median of the accounting 
variables used to measure four earnings attributes (i.e. accruals quality, earnings 
persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness) in the sample firm 
from 2006-2010. These variables are scaled by lagged total assets, consistent with 
prior studies (Leuz et al. 2003; Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006; Gaio and Raposo 2011). 
The accruals quality measure requires the last-period, current-period, and next-period 
cash flows from the operations. Additionally, each firm-specific earnings quality 
measure is estimated by rolling over a five-year window. Therefore, a firm is 
included in the 2010 year sample to measure the accruals quality if accounting data is 




of the accounting variables in 2007 are mainly the highest whereas those in 2008 are 
mainly the lowest.  
 
Table 6.3. Accounting variables (scaled by lagged total assets) used to calculate each 
earnings attribute 
Year 2006 (N = 150) 2007 (N = 150) 2008 (N = 150) 2009 (N = 150) 2010 (N = 150) 
Variable  Mean St.dev Median Mean St.dev Median Mean St.dev Median Mean St.dev Median Mean St.dev Median 
TCA j,t 0.127 0.346 0.066 0.241 0.469 0.138 0.036 0.195 0.030 0.043 0.166 0.038 0.074 0.129 0.065 
CFO j,t-1 0.117 0.202 0.083 0.123 0.262 0.077 0.077 0.279 0.039 0.091 0.199 0.080 0.106 0.188 0.083 
CFO j,t 0.124 0.359 0.102 0.090 0.455 0.074 0.101 0.229 0.105 0.122 0.235 0.095 0.035 0.190 0.025 
CFO j,t+1 0.069 0.739 0.080 0.160 0.435 0.130 0.145 0.310 0.109 0.041 0.248 0.030 0.057 0.325 0.047 
Earn j,t 0.151 0.237 0.109 0.171 0.159 0.130 0.102 0.123 0.078 0.136 0.138 0.097 0.109 0.113 0.087 
Earn j,t-1 0.091 0.074 0.080 0.100 0.070 0.092 0.097 0.068 0.085 0.084 0.100 0.072 0.107 0.105 0.076 
Where TCA is the total current accruals; CFO is cash flow from operations; Earn is net income before 
extraordinary items. 
 
Table 6.4 describes the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
percentiles, and the median of the variables used to analyse the impact of board 
diversity on earnings quality. The descriptive statistics reveal that the sample mean 
value of earnings quality (EQ) is 75.5. A higher EQ implies a higher level of 
earnings quality. The AQ measure has a mean value of 0.06. As a benchmark, 
Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) report mean values of 0.063 in Denmark (456 firm-
year observations), 0.06 in Finland (491 firm-year observations), 0.061 in France 
(2299 firm-year observations), 0.065 in Singapore (1302 firm-year observations), 
0.061 in South Korea (748 firm-year observations), and 0.061 in Thailand (1357 
firm-year observations) from 1996-2002.  
 
PERSIS, which captures (the negative of) the extent to which an earnings innovation 
remains in the series, had a mean value of -0.44, which is roughly similar to the value 
reported by Francis et al. (2004) for an average of 1,471 firms per year from 1975-
2001 in the U.S., that reports a mean value of -0.482. Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) 
report mean values of -0.521 for firms in  in Australia (1290 firm-year observations) 
and -0.414 in South Africa (278 firm-year observations) between 1996-2002.  
 
PREDICT has a mean value of 0.07.  As  a benchmark, Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) 




(2299 firm-year observations), 0.076 in Mexico (347 firm-year observations), 0.074 
in Singapore (1302 firm-year observations), and 0.074 in Thailand  (1357 firm-year 
observations) between 1996-2002.  
 
Finally, SMOOTH, which captures the variability of income relative to the 
variability of cash flows, has a mean value of 0.49. In comparison, Hunt et al. (2000) 
report a mean ratio of income volatility to cash volatility of 0.51 (11,976 firm-year 
observations) in the 1986-1994 sample. This is consistent with that benchmark value. 
 
Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics
21
 
Variables Mean SD Min Max P25 P50 P75 
Dependent variables 
EQ 75.50 27.65 1.00 126.50 54.75 76.88 96.75 
Four earnings attributes to construct the standardized aggregate earnings quality score 
AQ 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.40 0.02 0.04 0.09 
PERSIS -0.44 0.86 -2.80 4.78 -0.91 -0.49 0.01 
PREDICT 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.40 0.02 0.04 0.08 
SMOOTH 0.49 0.45 0.03 2.65 0.22 0.34 0.62 
Independent variables 
UW_DoB 0.31 0.07 0.23 0.49 0.24 0.29 0.35 
W_DoB 0.31 0.07 0.23 0.51 0.24 0.30 0.37 
UW_DiB 2.91 1.69 0.00 7.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
W_DiB 16.11 9.71 0.00 41.20 8.60 15.90 23.20 
Structural attributes of the board of directors to construct DoB_Index 
CEO/chair seperation 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
% Representative directors‟ ownership 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.18 0.40 
% Promoters 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.20 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of 
a firm‟s equity 
0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demographic attributes of the board of directors measured by the modified Blau’s index to construct 
DiB_Index 
Gender diversity of the board of 
directors 
0.39 0.38 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.49 0.64 
                                                 
21
 Consistent with the prior literature (Cornett et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2008a; Biddle et al. 2009) and 
throughout the analyses in this thesis, the extreme values of the distribution were winsorized to the 1 




Variables Mean SD Min Max P25 P50 P75 
Age diversity of the board of directors 0.64 0.20 0.00 0.92 0.60 0.70 0.80 
Educational qualifications diversity of 
the board of directors 
0.38 0.27 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.43 0.64 
Nationality diversity of the board of 
directors 
0.08 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Control variables 
SIZE 5.69 0.62 4.36 7.24 5.29 5.70 6.07 
STD.CFO 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.77 0.08 0.13 0.20 
STD.SALES 0.38 0.42 0.02 2.33 0.16 0.24 0.40 
LOG.OC 2.15 0.38 1.07 3.37 1.90 2.17 2.38 
LOSS 0.25 0.60 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STATE 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.05 0.28 0.51 
EQ = the standardised aggregate earnings quality score, calculated as the average rank across the four 
individual measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings 
smoothness); AQ, PESIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH = the values of accruals quality, earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness, respectively; UW_DoB = the unweighted index of 
diversity-of-boards; W_DoB = the weighted index of diversity-of-boards; UW_DiB = the unweighted 
index of diversity-in-boards; W_DiB = the weighted index of diversity-in-boards; SIZE = log of the 
average total assets; LOG.OC = log of the sum of the days accounts receivable and days inventory; 
STD.CFO = the standard deviation of the cash flows from operations, scaled by total asset; 
STD.SALES = the standard deviation of the sales revenues, scaled by total asset; LOSS = the 
incidence of net loss realizations; STATE = the percentage of shareholding owned by the state. 
 
Table 6.4 also shows that UW_DoB has a range between 0.23 and 0.49, and W_DoB 
has a range of 0.23 and 0.51, and the mean value for both variables is 0.31. This 
range indicates that the structure of the board of directors among firms in the sample 
is quite similar and there is no much differences between unweighted and weighted 
indices related to diversity-of-boards. The range for UW_DiB is between zero and 7, 
and its mean value is 2.91. The range for W_DiB is between zero and 41.2 and its 
mean value is 16.11. The mean values of UW_DiB and W_DiB indicate that 
diversity-in-boards in the sample is quite low. 
 
The structural attributes of a board of directors to construct the diversity-of-boards 
indices (UW_DoB and W_DoB) are as follows. The representative directors‟ 
ownership and promoters are continuous data and others are categorical data. 
Separation between the CEO/chair  is measured by taking 0 if the chairperson also 
serves as the CEO and 1 otherwise; the presence of non-executive directors owning 




there is at least one non-executive director who also serves as a blockholder and 0 
otherwise; representative directors‟ ownership is measured as the percentage of state 
ownership represented by directors; and promoters are measured as the number of 
inside directors who also serves as representative directors for government, divided 
by the total number of directors on the board of directors. 91 (61%) of the 150 firms 
in the sample has a separation between the CEO/chair, while only 21 (14%) of the 
150 firms has at least one non-executive director who also serves as a blockholder.  
 
Table 6.4 also shows that the percentage of state ownership represented by directors 
ranged between 0 and 0.79, with an average of 0.22. The percentage of inside 
directors who also serve as representative directors for government ranges between 0 
and 0.86, with a mean of 0.13. These two attributes indicate that many Vietnamese 
listed firms are still controlled and managed by the state (government). The 
demographic attributes of a board of directors measured by the modified Blau‟s 
index (1977) and is then developed using the terciles split method to construct the 
diversity-in-boards indices. Gender is classified as either male and female directors, 
age is classified into five sub-groupings: under 36 years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and 
over 65 years, educational qualifications are classified into four sub-groupings: PhD, 
master‟s degree, bachelor‟s degree, and others, and nationalities are classified as 
either foreign or domestic directors. As shown in Table 6.4, age diversity has the 
highest average of (0.64) compared to gender (0.39), education diversity (0.38), and 
nationality diversity (0.08). The nationality diversity has an extremely low average 
value, with only eighteen (18) of the 150 listed firms having at least one director with 
another nationality on the board of directors accounting for 12 per cent of the sample. 
This is because the 49 per cent maximum foreign ownership ceiling specified 
in Vietnamese law for listed firms may limit the number of foreign directors on the 
board of directors.  
 
The control variables used are firm size (SIZE), length of operating cycle (LOG.OC), 
cash flow variability (STD.CFO), sales variability (STD.SALES), incidence of net 
loss realisations (LOSS), and state ownership (STATE). The mean value of SIZE in 
the sample is 5.69, which is similar to the 5.68 reported by Vu et al. (2011) for a 
sample of 45 Vietnamese listed firms in 2008, or 5.08 reported by Suntraruk (2013) 




lower than the 18.70 reported by Rusmin (2010) for a sample of 301 listed firms in 
Singapore in 2003, or 21.06 reported by Wang and Yung (2011) for a sample of 557 
domestically listed Chinese firms from 1998-2006. This result indicates that the 
mean size of Vietnamese listed firms is low compared to other listed firms in China 
and Singapore. STD.CFO, the standard deviation of a firm‟s cash flows from 
operations scaled by total assets over five years, has a mean value of 0.16. The 
standard deviation of a firm‟s sales scaled by the total assets (STD.SALES) has a 
mean value of 0.38 for the five year period, which indicates that on average, 
STD.SALES has more spread than STD.CFO over five years. The log of the sum of 
a firm‟s days accounts receivable and days inventory over 5 years is LOG.OC 
(measured as the log of the sum of the firm‟s days accounts receivable and days 
inventory over five years) and it has a mean value of 2.15, which is equivalent to 
about 212 days. The incidence of losses (LOSS) over five years shows that an 
average of 75 per cent of the firms has no losses over the past five years because 
according to Vietnamese law, the most important criterion for de-listing a listed firm 
is a reported net loss for three consecutive years. Despite substantial efforts to 
privatise, the average state ownership (STATE) in the Vietnamese sample is 27.61 
per cent, with the highest state ownership is 79.07 per cent. 
 
6.4 Correlation analysis 
Table 6.5 reports the pairwise correlation for all variables examined in this study. 
Interestingly, UW_DoB and W_DoB are significantly and positively correlated (r = 
0.987). Similarly, UW_DiB is significantly and positively correlated to W_DiB (r = 
0.986). These results suggest that weighted board diversity indices built based on 
executives‟ perceptions is similar to the unweighted board diversity indices. 
Although no prior studies build weighted and unweighted board diversity indices to 
make a comparison with this thesis, other studies that construct both weighted and 
unweighted disclosure indices in corporate disclosure research have also found no 
significant difference between these two approaches (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; 
Barako et al. 2006; Haji 2013). Table 6.5 also shows that the two measures of 
UW_DoB and W_DoB are positively correlated with EQ, as expected, while 





There are some statistically significant correlations between the dependent variable 
(EQ) and the control variables (Table 6.5). The EQ is significantly and negatively 
correlated with the incidence of net loss realizations over 5 years (LOSS) at r = -0.20. 
Significant positive correlations exist between EQ and the firm‟s operating cycle 
(LOG.OC) at r = 0.224 and the state ownership (STATE) at r = 0.164. Due to the 
direct relationship between the value of the standardised aggregate EQ scores (EQ) 
and the level of earnings quality, this suggests that the larger the firm‟s operating 
cycle over five years and larger state ownership are correlated with a higher EQ, 
while firms with more incidence of losses over the five year period of the study, are 
correlated with lower earnings quality. The other control variables (SIZE, STD.CFO, 




Table 6.5. Correlation matrix 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 AQ 1.000 
                      
2 PERSIS 0.394 1.000 
                     
3 PREDICT 0.666 0.390 1.000 
                    
4 SMOOTH 0.618 0.317 0.771 1.000 
                   
5 EQ -0.520 -0.422 -0.585 -0.566 1.000 
                  
6 UW_DoB -0.120 -0.160 -0.144 -0.191 0.151 1.000 
                 
7 W_DoB -0.123 -0.176 -0.156 -0.194 0.167 0.987 1.000 
                
8 UW_DiB 0.120 -0.013 0.044 -0.010 -0.134 -0.058 -0.100 1.000 
               
9 W_DiB 0.113 -0.018 0.036 -0.014 -0.132 -0.069 -0.110 0.986 1.000 
              
10 Non_duality 0.034 0.180 0.025 0.045 -0.004 -0.256 -0.284 -0.045 -0.024 1.000 
             
11 RDirectorOwn -0.071 -0.108 -0.135 -0.025 0.021 0.260 0.342 -0.208 -0.216 0.184 1.000 
            
12 Promoters -0.079 -0.075 -0.160 -0.128 0.164 0.475 0.591 -0.332 -0.320 -0.008 0.640 1.000 
           
13 IDBs -0.066 -0.012 -0.046 -0.121 0.049 0.707 0.585 0.114 0.105 0.050 -0.186 -0.135 1.000 
          
14 GenderDiver 0.155 0.036 0.073 0.124 -0.146 0.048 0.017 0.503 0.395 -0.224 -0.135 -0.261 0.119 1.000 
         
15 AgeDiver -0.133 -0.087 -0.202 -0.295 0.027 -0.076 -0.098 0.483 0.465 0.022 -0.138 -0.150 0.046 -0.003 1.000 
        
16 DegreeDiver 0.046 0.045 0.077 -0.012 -0.095 -0.035 -0.067 0.614 0.632 0.037 -0.113 -0.209 0.109 0.016 0.222 1.000 
       
17 NationDiver 0.093 0.017 0.000 0.063 -0.132 -0.039 -0.055 0.355 0.467 0.003 -0.176 -0.116 0.042 0.059 -0.075 0.074 1.000 
      
18 SIZE 0.028 -0.075 0.044 -0.028 -0.002 0.160 0.194 0.147 0.193 0.114 0.155 0.217 -0.029 -0.090 -0.092 0.259 0.217 1.000 
     
19 STD.CFO 0.112 0.060 0.169 -0.200 0.003 -0.038 -0.032 -0.019 -0.026 -0.077 -0.054 0.015 -0.053 -0.009 0.067 -0.005 -0.014 -0.064 1.000 
    
20 STD.SALES 0.009 -0.060 -0.033 -0.141 0.026 -0.136 -0.128 0.026 0.024 -0.051 -0.084 -0.072 -0.131 0.038 0.040 -0.069 -0.041 -0.025 0.278 1.000 
   
21 OPCYCLE -0.187 -0.140 -0.102 -0.063 0.224 0.011 -0.012 0.118 0.115 -0.059 -0.153 -0.130 0.100 -0.002 0.105 0.155 -0.037 0.108 -0.164 -0.439 1.000 
  
22 LOSS -0.020 0.034 0.130 0.039 -0.200 -0.113 -0.117 0.115 0.103 -0.033 -0.128 -0.168 -0.070 0.079 0.121 0.025 0.031 0.017 0.022 -0.040 -0.033 1.000 
 
23 STATE -0.148 0.001 -0.221 -0.161 0.164 0.027 0.109 -0.390 -0.403 0.111 0.613 0.504 -0.328 -0.196 -0.183 -0.184 -0.301 -0.087 0.039 -0.040 -0.125 -0.130 1.000 
*Bold text indicates significance at the 10% level or better. Please see below Table 6.4 for description of each variable. 
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Four individual earnings attribute measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and 
SMOOTH) are highly correlated with coefficients of more than 0.3, which suggests  
reasonable factorability (Hair 1998). Additionally, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
of sampling adequacy is 0.76 for the overall test and more than 0.7 for each earnings 
attribute measure (Table 6.6), above the commonly recommended value of more than 
0.5 (Hair 1998). The Bartlett‟s test of sphericity is significant (χ
2
 (6) = 257.77, p < 
0.000). The results of the factor analysis are presented in the factor pattern loadings 
matrix in Table 6.6. By adopting the „eigenvalue-greater-than one rule‟ (Hair 1998), 
the number of factors is reduced to one because there is only one factor with an 
eigenvalue of 2.62 (Table 6.6). This factor analysis suggests that a single factor 
represents these four earnings attribute measures, and they accounted for 65.53 per 
cent of the total variance, above the criterion of 60 per cent (Hair 1998). Hence, it is 
proper to combine the four earnings attributes measures into a single standardised 
aggregate measure of earnings quality. This approach is similar to Leuz et al. (2003) 
who use factor analysis to clarify the combination of four individual earnings 
management measures into a standardised aggregate earnings management score. 
 
Table 6.6. Result of the factor analysis 
Variable 




AQ 0.83   0.84 
PERSIS 0.87   0.59 
PREDICT 0.70   0.90 
SMOOTH 0.72   0.87 




  2.62 
Variance explained by 
each factor (%)  
  65.53 
 
6.5 Regression results 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression models is checked and the 
maximum VIF is 1.37, which is less than 10 for all the regression models, so there is 
no multicollinearity in the empirical models in this study (Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
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To avoid the problem of heteroskedasticity (when a variance of the observed value of 
the dependent variable is not constant around the regression line; the error variance is 
not constant), an OLS regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
(White 1980) is used to test the impact of board diversity indices (UW_DoB; 
W_DoB; UW_DiB; and W_DiB) on the standardised aggregate earnings quality 
score (EQ).  
 
Table 6.7 provides the results for the tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2, using the 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score (i.e., EQ) as the dependent variable; 
and UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB, W_DiB alternately as the independent variables 
(Models 10 and 11 in Section 5.3.6.1 of Chapter 5). The table shows that the 
coefficient estimate of both UW_DoB and W_DoB are positive and significant (p-
values of 0.055 and 0.040 respectively). Because higher standardised aggregate 
earnings quality scores imply higher earnings quality, this result suggests that 
diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality, confirming Hypothesis 1 (i.e. 
diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality). Meanwhile, both UW_DiB and 
W_DiB are not significantly related to EQ (p-values of 0.256 and 0.274 
respectively), which rejects Hypothesis 2 (i.e. diversity-in-boards improves earnings 
quality). 
 
Table 6.7. Board diversity (unweighted and weighted indices) and earnings quality 
 
Dependent Variable EQ EQ EQ EQ 
UW_DoB 59.67* 
   
 
(0.055) 
   
W_DoB  67.77**   
  (0.040)   
UW_DiB   -1.63  
   (0.256)  
W_DiB    -0.28 
    (0.274) 
SIZE -1.76 -2.174 -0.08 0.10 
 
(0.603) (0.521) (0.981) (0.978) 
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STD.CFO 0.82 0.72 1.18 1.11 
 
(0.966) (0.970) (0.951) (0.954) 
STD.SALES 12.77** 12.831** 11.27** 11.20** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.034) 
LOG.OC 24.20*** 24.45*** 23.84*** 23.72*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -6.37* -6.351* -6.95* -7.03** 
 
(0.083) (0.082) (0.051) (0.048) 
STATE 23.48** 21.67** 19.15* 19.12* 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.081) (0.086) 
Constant 5.22 4.963 21.54 20.52 
 
(0.839) (0.846) (0.383) (0.407) 
R
2
 0.161 0.164 0.146 0.145 
Adjusted R
2
 0.120 0.123 0.104 0.103 
F statistic 4.02*** 4.10*** 4.11*** 4.08*** 
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.14 1.15 1.18 1.18 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 
6.4 for description of each variable. 
 
The coefficients of control variables in Table 6.7 also have meaning. The significant 
and negative coefficient of LOSS suggests that firms with more negative income 
during five years are associated with lower earnings quality, which is consistent with 
prior studies (Srinidhi et al. 2011; Wang and Yung 2011). STD.SALES and LOG.OC 
show positive and significant coefficients, while SIZE and STD.CFO are not 
significant. The coefficients of STATE are significantly positive with EQ, indicating 
that state ownership plays a significant role in improving earnings quality. The 
effects of STATE on EQ in columns one and two of Table 6.7 are significantly 
higher than in columns three and four of that table (p-values of 0.015 and 0.024 
compared to 0.081 and 0.086). This finding is consistent with the findings of Wang 
and Yung (2011), who investigate the impact of state ownership on earnings 
management of Chinese listed firms. Wang and Yung (2011) contend that state 
managers are under less pressure to manipulate earnings because their incentive 
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structure from the state-owned firms does not require them to maximise earnings, but 
rather requires that firms provide guaranteed returns to the state, and if that is not 
possible, then the state is likely to provide additional funds to the firms (Ding et al. 
2007; Jiang and Habib 2009). 
 
There are several possible reasons for the finding of no relationships between 
diversity-in-boards and earnings quality. First, as shown in previous studies (Ye et al. 
2010; Hili and Affes 2012), the demographic diversity (gender diversity) has no 
effect on earnings quality. Additionally, based on resource dependence theory, the 
demographic differences between board members within a board (diversity-in-
boards) are seen as a key resource that influences the strategy-making process 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Ben-Amar et al. 2013), so diversity-in-boards may only 
indirectly influence earnings quality. In contrast, diversity-of-boards is connected to 
structural factors, which represents recommended governance „best practices‟. 
Diversity-of-boards helps to ensure that managers duly represent the strategic 
processes agreed by the board of directors, and protect all shareholders‟ interests 
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore, diversity-of-boards improves 
earnings quality. 
 
6.6 Additional analysis and robustness tests 
6.6.1 Nonlinearity and board diversity 
Ben-Amar et al. (2013) document a U-shaped relationship between the demographic 
diversity of the board of directors and merger and acquisition performance. 
Therefore, this research adds the quadratic terms of UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB 
and W_DiB into models 10 and 11 in Section 5.3.6.1 of Chapter 5 in Table 6.7 to test 
whether there is a U-shaped relationship between board diversity (both diversity-of-
boards and diversity-in-boards) and earnings quality.  
 
The results reported in Table 6.8 indicate that diversity-of-boards indices (both 
unweighted and weighted) and their quadratic terms are not statistically related to the 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score. This suggests that a linear 
specification is adequate in capturing the relationship between diversity-of-boards 
and earnings quality in this study. In contrast, the diversity-in-boards indices (both 
unweighted and weighted) and their quadratic terms are statistically significant (p-
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values of 0.017 and 0.040 for UW_DiB and UW_DiB
2
 respectively, and 0.023 and 
0.043 for W_DiB and W_DiB
2
 respectively). The coefficients of diversity-in-boards 
indices (both unweighted and weighted) are significantly negative and the 
coefficients of their quadratic terms are significantly positive, which implies there is 
a U-shaped relationship between UW_DiB and earnings quality. Overall, the results 
in Table 6.8 show that the relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings 
quality is non-linear, with a U-shaped curve, which indicates that moderate levels of 
diversity-in-boards have a decreasing influence on earnings quality, but the lower 
and higher levels of diversity-in-boards have an increasing influence on earnings 
quality. These results are consistent with those of Ben-Amar et al. (2013), who 
examined the relationship between the board of directors‟ diversity configurations 
and merger and acquisition performance and find that demographic diversity has a 
clear and non-linear effect with a U-shaped curve on merger and acquisition 
performance, but statutory diversity has no statistically significant influence. 
 
Table 6.8. Nonlinear relationship between board diversity and earnings quality 
 
 
EQ EQ EQ EQ 
UW_DoB 172.65    
 
(0.558)    
UW_DoB
2 
-164.72    
 (0.699)    
W_DoB  1.26   
  (0.997)   
W_DoB
2 
 98.36   
  (0.818)   
UW_DiB   -8.97**  
   (0.017)  
UW_DiB
2 
  1.18**  
   (0.040)  
W_DiB    -1.44** 
 
   (0.023) 
W_DiB
2 




   (0.043) 
SIZE -1.75 -2.29 -0.18 -0.06 
 
(0.606) (0.505) (0.960) (0.987) 
STD.CFO 0.91 0.64 4.71 4.46 
 
(0.962) (0.973) (0.807) (0.817) 
STD.SALES 12.64** 12.90** 11.39** 11.05** 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.033) (0.038) 
LOG.OC 24.23*** 24.50*** 23.55*** 23.55*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -6.42* -6.34* -6.82* -6.78* 
 
(0.084) (0.081) (0.059) (0.061) 
STATE 22.73** 21.67** 19.06* 19.33* 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.080) (0.080) 
Constant -12.96 16.19 30.13 28.22 
 
(0.819) (0.782) (0.224) (0.258) 
R
2
 0.162 0.164 0.167 0.163 
Adjusted R
2
 0.115 0.117 0.119 0.115 
F statistic 3.50*** 3.80*** 4.18*** 4.06*** 
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 
10%. Please see below Table 6.4 for description of each variable. 
 
Given the estimated values for the UW_DiB and UW_DiB
2
 coefficients, the turning 
point of the relationship between diversity-in-boards (an unweighted index) and 
earnings quality is:
22
 Minimisation point = - coefficient of UW_DiB/2*coefficient of 
UW_DiB
2
 = - (-8.97)/2 × 1.18 ≈ 4. 
 
Figure 6.1 represents the estimated relationship, a U-shaped curve, between 
diversity-in-boards (an unweighted index) and earnings quality for an average firm. 
                                                 
22
 Because almost identical results are obtained by using either the unweighted or weighted index, for 
brevity, this research only presents results using the unweighted index of diversity-in-boards. Other 




These results suggest that the initial increase in the diversity-in-boards on the board 
of directors decreases firms‟ earnings quality. This is probably because the benefits 
of demographic diversity are counterbalanced by problems related to integration 
difficulties (Ben-Amar et al. 2013). However, when UW_DiB is beyond 4, and there 
is a further increase in diversity-in-board from thereon, it improves firms‟ earnings 
quality.  
 




The intercept in Figure 6.1 is calculated following prior studies (Utama 1997; Koh 
2003). First, the coefficients of the explanatory variables as reported in Table 6.8 
(except for the two variables, UW_DiB and UW_DiB
2
) are multiplied by their 
respective mean values. These products are then summed and added to the regression 
intercept (reported in Table 6.8) to arrive at the intercept in Figure 6.1. Therefore, 
Figure 6.1 shows the behaviour of earnings quality response as the diversity-in-
boards index related to „average‟ firm changes. 
 
6.6.2 Measuring the standardised aggregate earnings quality score excluding the 
accruals quality measure 
Dechow and Dichev‟s (2002) accruals model is used as a measure of earnings 
attribute in this study, but according to Wysocki (2006), Dechow and Dichev‟s 

























finds that current cash flows are simultaneously significantly and negatively related 
to current accruals. Gaio and Raposo (2011) use Dechow and Dichev‟s accruals 
model, and also mention this issue as a limitation of their earnings quality measure. 
To test the validity of the results whether the accruals quality measure using Dechow 
and Dichev‟s (2002) model significantly impacts on the standardised aggregate 
earnings quality score in the present study, this study measures the standardised 
aggregate earnings quality score by excluding the accruals quality measure. The 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score is computed by averaging the firm 
rankings for the three individual earnings quality measures (i.e., earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness). The results are presented in Table 
6.9. 
 
Table 6.9. Board diversity and earnings quality: excluding the accruals quality 


















UW_DoB 81.02**    216.40    
 
(0.014)    (0.506)    
UW_DoB2     -197.37    
     (0.678)    
W_DoB  91.17***    26.49   
 
 (0.009)    (0.936)   
W_DoB2      95.65   
 
     (0.845)   
UW_DiB   -1.04    -8.32*  
 
  (0.508)    (0.056)  
UW_DiB2       1.17*  
       (0.066)  
W_DiB    -0.18    -1.28* 
 
   (0.524)    (0.083) 
W_DiB2        0.03* 
 
       (0.093) 
SIZE 0.22 -0.32 2.15 2.27 0.23 -0.44 2.06 2.12 
 
(0.953) (0.930) (0.585) (0.570) (0.951) (0.906) (0.597) (0.593) 
STD.CFO 21.92 21.80 22.44 22.39 22.03 21.71 25.94 25.56 
 
(0.296) (0.291) (0.304) (0.305) (0.294) (0.294) (0.236) (0.242) 
STD.SALES 14.85** 14.91*** 12.54** 12.50** 14.70** 14.98*** 12.67** 12.36** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.031) (0.031) (0.011) (0.009) (0.031) (0.036) 




(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
LOSS -9.63*** -9.62*** -10.66*** -10.71*** -9.69*** -9.60*** -10.53*** -10.47*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
STATE 21.53** 19.09** 18.87* 18.85* 20.63** 19.10** 18.78* 19.05* 
 
(0.024) (0.046) (0.091) (0.096) (0.032) (0.046) (0.088) (0.088) 
Constant -7.55 -7.71 13.43 12.78 -29.33 3.21 21.95 20.06 
 (0.787) (0.781) (0.631) (0.649) (0.618) (0.959) (0.439) (0.483) 
R2 0.179 0.183 0.144 0.144 0.180 0.183 0.162 0.157 
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 
6.4 for description of each variable. 
 
The results in Table 6.9 are similar to those in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. Interestingly, the 
impact of diversity-of-boards on earnings quality in Table 6.9 is more significant 
than that in Table 6.7 (p-values of 0.014 and 0.009 for UW_DoB and W_DoB 
respectively in Table 6.9, compared to 0.055 and 0.040 for UW_DoB and W_DoB 
respectively in Table 6.7). Meanwhile, the nonlinear impact of diversity-in-boards on 
earnings quality in Table 6.9 is less significant than that in Table 6.8 (p < 0.095 vs. p 
< 0.045). The R-square figures in the diversity-of-boards models in Table 6.9 are 
higher than those in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, increasing by approximately two per cent, 
whereas the R-square figures in the diversity-in-boards models in Table 6.9 are not 
significantly different from our results in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. 
 
6.6.3 The impact of board diversity on the individual earnings attributes 
To check the robustness of the positive relationship between diversity-of-boards and 
earnings quality, and the non-linear relationship between diversity-in-boards and 
earnings quality, the similar regression models as in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 are run by 
replacing the standardised aggregate earnings quality score with four individual 
earnings attribute variables (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH) respectively. 
Given that almost identical results are obtained using either the unweighted or 
weighted index, and for brevity, this study only reports the results using weighted 
indices of board diversity only.  
 
Panel A of Table 6.10 reports the results of the regression analyses using each 
earnings attribute measure (i.e., AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH) as the 
dependent variable and W_DoB as the independent variable. The results show that 
W_DoB is significantly related to all four earnings attribute measures. The 
 
133 
coefficient estimates of W_DoB are negative and significant at the 0.10 level or 
better in these regressions where AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH alternately 
are the dependent variables.  
 
The ϕ1 from Equation 2 in chapter 5 that measures earnings persistence (PERSIS) is 
multiplied by -1, so that the direction of values are consistent with the other three 
earnings attribute measures (i.e. AQ, PREDICT, and SMOOTH). The larger the 
value of the individual earnings attributes that is measured, the lower the earnings 
quality. The results in Panel A of Table 6.10 indicate that diversity-of-boards 
improves earnings quality (considered individually). This is similar to the main 
findings from the impact of diversity-of-boards on the standardised aggregate 
earnings quality score. 
 
As reported in Panel B of Table 6.10, the coefficients of W_DiB are still not 
significant, which confirms the initial evidence that diversity-in-boards is not related 
to earnings quality. Interestingly, Panel C of Table 6.10 shows that there is a non-
linear relationship between diversity-in-boards and accruals quality as well as 
between diversity-in-boards and earnings predictability. W_DiB and its quadratic 
terms are statistically significant (p-values of 0.023 and 0.093 in the regression with 
AQ as a dependent variable, and 0.093 and 0.039 in the regression with PREDICT as 
a dependent variable). The coefficients of W_DiB are positive and statistically 
significant; whereas the coefficients of their quadratic terms are negative and 
significant. The larger the values of AQ and PREDICT, the lower the earnings 
quality. These results are therefore consistent with a U-shaped curve between 
diversity-in-boards and earnings quality, similar to the earlier finding in Section 6.6.1 
when examining the standardised aggregate earnings quality score as a dependent 




Table 6.10. Board diversity and individual earnings attribute measures  
  Panel A: Diversity-of-boards and individual EQ measures Panel B: Diversity-in-boards and individual EQ measures Panel C: Nonlinearity and diversity-in-boards 
  AQ PERSIS PREDICT SMOOTH AQ PERSIS PREDICT SMOOTH AQ PERSIS PREDICT SMOOTH 
W_DoB -0.133* -2.463** -0.173** -1.473*** 
        
 
(0.077) (0.020) (0.032) (0.001) 
        W_DiB 
    
0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.0034** -0.0160 0.0034* 0.0102 
     




        
-0.0001* 0.0005 -0.0001** -0.0004 
         
(0.093) (0.462) (0.039) (0.263) 
SIZE 0.010 -0.020 0.014 0.006 0.004 -0.080 0.010 -0.021 0.0047 -0.0822 0.0106 -0.0194 
 
(0.186) (0.864) (0.215) (0.927) (0.609) (0.467) (0.372) (0.729) (0.579) (0.486) (0.340) (0.751) 
STD.CFO 0.059 0.559 0.137** -1.083*** 0.092 0.541 0.183* -1.096*** 0.0841 0.5891 0.1709* -1.1348*** 
 
(0.155) (0.379) (0.046) (0.000) (0.203) (0.327) (0.068) (0.001) (0.228) (0.366) (0.078) (0.000) 
STD.SALES -0.022 -0.423** -0.030** -0.217** -0.032 -0.353 -0.042 -0.171** -0.0314 -0.3550* -0.0419 -0.1695** 
 
(0.110) (0.032) (0.049) (0.012) (0.182) (0.116) (0.144) (0.040) (0.183) (0.073) (0.145) (0.043) 
LOG.OC -0.048*** -0.504** -0.033* -0.231** -0.061** -0.460* -0.048 -0.197* -0.0611** -0.4623** -0.0476 -0.1951** 
 
(0.003) (0.017) (0.078) (0.022) (0.022) (0.059) (0.143) (0.046) (0.022) (0.032) (0.144) (0.049) 
LOSS -0.007 -0.013 0.017* 0.009 -0.010 0.021 0.015 0.032 -0.0103 0.0243 0.0137 0.0295 
 
(0.375) (0.914) (0.058) (0.856) (0.313) (0.821) (0.215) (0.483) (0.295) (0.839) (0.254) (0.528) 
STATE -0.050** -0.071 -0.079*** -0.305* -0.064 -0.132 -0.128** -0.404** -0.0649 -0.1293 -0.1286** -0.4061** 
 
(0.041) (0.827) (0.009) (0.052) (0.191) (0.746) (0.040) (0.034) (0.189) (0.717) (0.039) (0.033) 
Constant 0.160** 1.616* 0.120 1.742*** 0.176* 1.072 0.150 1.425*** 0.1583* 1.1816 0.1232 1.3345*** 
 
(0.031) (0.055) (0.104) (0.000) (0.075) (0.240) (0.213) (0.001) (0.086) (0.159) (0.281) (0.004) 
R
2
 0.099 0.083 0.168 0.193 0.099 0.047 0.126 0.150 0.109 0.051 0.141 0.159 
Adjusted R
2
 0.055 0.038 0.127 0.153 0.055 0.000 0.083 0.108 0.058 -0.003 0.093 0.111 
F statistic 2.37 1.84 4.56 6.50 2.37 1.01 3.47 4.92 2.08 0.95 2.90 4.46 
p-value 0.025 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.430 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.481 0.005 0.000 




6.6.4 Alternative regression specifications 
This thesis measures diversity-in-boards indices through the terciles split method 
which split the sample into terciles for each demographic attribute of the board of 
directors to rank diversity levels (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). 
Each demographic attribute takes values of 0 for the first tercile, 1 for the second, 
and 2 for the third. For a robustness check, this thesis measures diversity-in-boards 
indices using median and quartile values alternately to rank firms‟ diversity levels. 
Specifically, the median split method categorises each demographic attribute into 
two groups, taking 1 for every value above the median, otherwise 0. The quartile 
split method categorises each demographic attribute into four groups, taking 0 for the 
first quartile (below 25%), 1 for the second quartile (between 25.1% and 50%), 2 for 
the third quartile (between 51% and 75%), and 3 for the fourth quartile (above 75%). 
The results are similar to the main findings (Table 6.11); there is a non-linear 
relationship with a U-shaped between diversity-in-boards and earnings quality. 
 





EQ EQ EQ EQ 














UW_DiB (quartile split method) 
  
-1.049 -10.064** 




 (quartile split method) 
   
0.533** 
    
(0.039) 
SIZE -0.482 -1.046 -0.134 -0.282 
 
(0.889) (0.759) (0.970) (0.936) 
STD.CFO 1.550 4.385 1.464 4.625 
 
(0.936) (0.821) (0.939) (0.809) 
STD.SALES 10.952** 11.025** 10.727** 11.350** 
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) 
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 Because almost identical results are obtained by using either unweighted or weighted index to 
measure board diversity, for brevity, this study only presents results using unweighted indices of 




LOG.OC 23.369*** 23.134*** 23.511*** 23.294*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -7.164** -7.189** -6.941** -7.090** 
 
(0.041) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) 
STATE 21.223** 20.718* 19.116* 18.889* 
 
(0.050) (0.052) (0.085) (0.088) 
Constant 27.792 153.056** 26.363 61.880** 
 
(0.311) (0.015) (0.287) (0.038) 
R
2
 0.1402 0.1650 0.1446 0.1636 
F statistic 3.9*** 4*** 4.09*** 4.12*** 
p-value 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 
6.4 for description of each variable. 
 
In addition, related to the measure of the standardized aggregate earnings quality 
score, this study ranks firms on a scale from zero to 100, according to each of the 
four individual measures of earnings quality (i.e. AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and 
SMOOTH) to compute the standardised aggregate earnings quality score for each 
firm by averaging its rankings for the four individual measures (Gaio and Raposo 
2011). The regression model is tested using these standardised aggregate earnings 
quality scores and it yields similar results. A further analysis is conducted using the 
state ownership variable, and reveals that the primary findings from the main model 
are robust when the dummy variable of state ownership is cut off at 30% (Wang and 
Yung 2011) and 50% (classified as SOEs in Vietnam), where the values below them 
become zero and otherwise one. 
 
6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter provided evidence for the impact of board diversity on earnings quality 
by testing the two Hypotheses (H1 and H2).  Overall, the results provided evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 1 where, as proposed in Chapter 5, diversity-of-boards 
improves earnings quality. As shown in Table 6.7, Hypothesis 2 (i.e. diversity-in-
boards improves earnings quality) was rejected because the diversity-in-boards 
indices (both unweighted and weighted) did not have a significant linear impact on 




between diversity-in-boards and the aggregate earnings quality was non-linear, with 
a U-shaped curve (Table 6.8). Additionally, there was no significant difference in the 
relationship between board diversity and earnings quality using weighted and 
unweighted approaches to construct board diversity indices. This study also 
confirmed that UW_DoB and W_DoB, as well as UW_DiB and W_DiB, had similar 
influence on earnings quality.  
 
With the control variables, four out of six might be additional drivers determining the 
earnings quality of Vietnamese listed firms. Specifically, the length of the operating 
cycle, sales variability, incidence of net loss realisations, and state ownership had 
significant impacts on the quality of earnings of the firms sampled in this thesis. 
 
The first additional analysis included assessing the sensitivity of the primary results 
to a standardised aggregate earnings quality score that was based solely on 
persistence, predictability, smoothness, and did not include accruals quality. It then 
tested the influence of board diversity on earnings quality. The evidence supported 
the primary findings which confirmed H1 and rejected H2. Specifically, the results 
supported the primary findings that diversity-of-boards positively impacted on 
earnings quality, while the relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings 
quality was non-linear.  
 
The second additional analysis included using individual earnings attributes: accruals 
quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness, to represent earnings quality. 
These individual earnings quality attributes were explored in relation to board 
diversity indices and control variables, and the evidence supported the primary 
findings. Furthermore, it was found that the relationships between diversity-in-boards 
and accruals quality, as well as between diversity-in-boards and earnings 
predictability are non-linear.  
 
The third additional analysis used median and quartile values to measure diversity-
in-boards indices (both unweighted and weighted) and tested their influence on 
standardised aggregate earnings quality. The fourth additional analysis ranked firms 




and then examined the influence of board diversity on this standardised aggregate 
earnings quality. The fifth additional analysis applied a dummy variable of state 
ownership of 30% and 50% cut-off points to test the influence of board diversity on 
earnings quality based on the revised state ownership variable. The results from all 
these additional analyses supported the primary findings that diversity-of-boards 
positively impacted on earnings quality, while the relationship between diversity-in-





7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES OF THE IMPACT OF BOARD 
DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the empirical results and analyses of the impact of board 
diversity on corporate social disclosure (CSD). Section 7.2 presents the results of the 
questionnaire survey from executives of listed firms who evaluate the importance of 
each attribute of the board of directors in relation to CSD. Section 7.3 presents the 
results of another questionnaire survey from four stakeholder groups who evaluate  
the importance of each corporate social disclosure item (i.e., items in the social 
indicators of GRI 3.1) and each type (i.e. narrative, monetary quantification, 
numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) of corporate social 
disclosure. Section 7.4 describes the statistics of the variables used in this chapter. 
Section 7.5 is the correlation analysis. Section 7.6 reports the results of the multiple 
regression models. Section 7.7 provides the results of several additional analyses to 
identify the robustness of the earlier tests. Section 7.8 summarises the overall 
findings on the impact of board diversity on CSD. 
 
7.2 Executives’ perspectives of the attributes of the board of directors in 
relation to corporate social disclosure 
The questionnaire conducted in this section explores the views and perceptions of the 
executives of listed firms regarding the importance of each attribute of the board of 
directors in relation to CSD. The participants‟ profiles were provided in Section 6.2.1 
of Chapter Six, namely the background information of the respondents. To avoid 
repetition, only executives‟ perceptions regarding their evaluation of the board of 
directors‟ attributes in relation to CSD is provided here. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the score distribution of 80 executives‟ perceptions regarding the 
attributes of board diversity. The mean scores vary between 5.13 and 7.93, with the 
lowest being zero and the highest being10. With regards to diversity-in-boards, two 
demographic attributes, namely the nationality and educational qualifications 
diversity of board members, have the highest mean scores of 7.93 and 7.60 




have the lowest mean scores of 5.13 and 5.87, respectively. Although not having the 
highest scores, the executives evaluate the structural attributes of the board of 
directors as more important than the demographic attributes in making CSD. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for the importance rating based on executives‟ 
perspectives about the board of directors‟ attributes in relation to CSD. 
Importance rating Max Min Mean SD 
Structural attributes 
CEO/chair separation 10 5 7.53 1.73 
% Representative directors‟ ownership 9 5 7.13 1.25 
% Promoters 10 3 6.47 1.85 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a firm‟s equity 9 0 6.33 2.44 
Demographic attributes 
Gender diversity of the board of directors 8 0 5.13 2.36 
Age diversity of the board of directors 8 0 5.87 2.29 
Educational qualifications diversity of the board of directors 10 5 7.60 1.35 
Nationality diversity of the board of directors 10 5 7.93 1.33 
 
7.3 Stakeholders’ perceptions on the relevance of corporate social disclosure  
This section reports the results of four types of questionnaires for four different 
social aspects (i.e., labour, human rights, society, and product) to which four 
stakeholder-specific groups respond (employees, lawyers and regulators, local 
communities, and customers, respectively). The questionnaire aims at exploring how 
stakeholders evaluate the importance of social reporting items and how they should 
be disclosed.  
 
The questionnaires were delivered to 1,080 stakeholders in person, of which 771 of 
them were returned, giving an initial response rate of 71.39%. However, 119 surveys 
were deemed unusable because the respondents failed to complete the full survey, so 
the effective response rate is 60.37% or 652 usable surveys. Oppenheim (1966) 
suggests that one practical way to detect a non-response bias is to compare the 
responses of early respondents with the late respondents. A non-response bias is 
tested in this thesis using t-tests and reveals there is no significant difference in the 




respondents. This suggests there is little significant non-response bias and thus the 
results of the questionnaire survey can be generalised. Table 7.2 shows the number of 
questionnaires that were distributed, the completed response rate for each group, and 
the overall response rate.  
 
Table 7.2. Target groups and response rates 




Response rate (%) 
Local communities 
(society aspects) 
350 243 69.43 
Customers  
(product aspects) 
270 158 58.52 
Employees  
(labour aspects) 




190 87 45.79 
Total 1080 652 60.37 
 
Table 7.3, Panel A, shows the ratings awarded by employees to the labour aspect 
(LA), with the highest mean score being 7.47 (LA11) and lowest being 6.44 (LA13), 
from a maximum possible score of 10. When the disclosure types for the 15 reporting 
items for the labour aspect are analysed, the employees‟ respondents rated the 
highest scores for items with numerical disclosures (60% or 9 items), i.e. LA2 (7.17), 
LA3 (7.02), LA15 (7.19), LA4 (7.09), LA5 (7.06), LA7 (6.92), LA9 (6.94), LA13 
(6.69), and LA14 (6.53), and for reporting items with both monetary and numerical 
disclosures (40% or 6 items), i.e. LA1 (7.51), LA6 (7.68), LA8 (7.12), LA10 (7.27), 
LA11 (7.16), and LA12 (6.90). Meanwhile, the lowest scores are the items with 
monetary disclosures (73.33% or 11 items) , i.e. LA2 (6.00), LA3 (6.31), LA15 
(5.99), LA4 (5.99), LA5 (6.37), LA7 (5.85), LA8 (6.10), LA9 (6.02), LA12 (5.69), 
LA13 (5.60), and LA14 (5.27), and the items with narrative disclosures (26.67% or 4 





Table 7.3, Panel B, provides the ratings awarded by lawyers and regulators to the 
human rights aspect (HR), with the highest mean score being 8.19  (HR7) and lowest 
being 6.38 (HR2). Related to the disclosure types, out of 11 items in the human 
rights aspect, lawyers and regulators assigned the highest scores for items with 
numerical disclosures (81.82% or 9 items), i.e. HR1 (7.90), HR2 (7.52), HR3 (7.64), 
HR4 (7.89), HR5 (6.99), HR6 (6.79), HR7 (7.03), HR8 (6.96), and HR9 (6.45), and 
for items with both monetary and numerical disclosures (18.18% or 2 items), i.e. 
HR10 (7.68) and HR11 (6.97). The items with narrative disclosures (90.91% or 10 
items), i.e. HR1 (5.27), HR2 (5.19), HR4 (5.43), HR5 (4.91), HR6 (5.26), HR7 
(4.62), HR8 (5.53), HR9 (4.87), HR10 (4.71), and HR11 (4.55), and the items with 
monetary disclosures (9.09% or 1 item), i.e. HR3 (5.25), received the lowest scores.  
 
Table 7.3, Panel C, presents the ratings assigned by the members of local 
communities with regard to the society aspect (SO).  The highest mean score for the 
reporting items is 7.92 (SO2) and lowest is 6.22 (SO5). Related to the disclosure 
types, interestingly, out of 10 items in the society aspect, local communities assigned 
the highest scores for all 10 items for both monetary and numerical disclosures, i.e. 
SO1 (7.58), SO9 (7.90), SO10 (7.97), SO2 (7.43), SO3 (7.55), SO4 (7.38), SO5 
(7.32), SO6 (7.34), SO7 (7.33) and SO8 (6.44). They assigned the lowest mean 
scores to all 10 items with narrative disclosures, i.e. SO1 (4.91), SO9 (5.49), SO10 
(4.61), SO2 (5.06), SO3 (5.11), SO4 (5.45), SO5 (4.79), SO6 (5.06), SO7 (4.88) and 
SO8 (4.88).  
 
Table 7.3, Panel D, shows the ratings awarded by customers with regard to the 
product aspect (PR). The highest mean score for the reporting items is 8.08 (PR1) 
and the lowest is 6.62 (PR2). Related to the disclosure types, out of 9 items in the 
product aspect, customers assigned highest scores for the items with both monetary 
and numerical disclosures (88.89% or 8 items) , i.e. PR1 (7.68), PR2 (7.76), PR3 
(8.09), PR4 (7.11), PR5 (6.74), PR6 (7.35), PR8 (6.53), and PR9 (6.13) and one item 
with narrative disclosures (11.11%), i.e. PR7 (6.05). They assigned the lowest scores 
to the items with narrative disclosures (55.56% or 5 items), i.e. PR1 (5.22), PR3 




items), i.e. PR2 (6.17), PR5 (5.43), PR9 (5.28), and one item with numerical 
disclosures (11.11%), i.e. PR7 (5.60). 
 
Overall, the respondents assigned importance to disclosure types (i.e., narrative, 
monetary quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) that 
varied with each item they reported on. Prior studies measure the quality of 
disclosure based on a detailed scoring scheme and argued that quantitative disclosure 
types are more important than qualitative disclosure types, and therefore quantitative 
disclosure types should be assigned with a higher weighting (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; 
Saleh et al. 2010; Haji 2013). However, this survey shows that monetary disclosure 
type (quantitative information) is assigned to the lowest scores in the labour aspect. 
As shown in Table 7.3, the number of firms disclosing items regarding the human 
rights aspects is the lowest, which is consistent with Lu and Abeysekera‟s (2014) 
study on listed firms in China, because these aspects are socially sensitive in 
Vietnam and there are less social support mechanisms and poorly implemented 
frameworks to protect workers‟ human rights (Azizul Islam and Jain 2013). In 
addition, related to the disclosure type of CSD of Vietnamese listed firms in the 
sample, Table 7.3 also shows that firms in the sample mainly present CSD in a 
narrative form, which is also consistent with prior studies (Elijido-Ten 2009; Haji 





Table 7.3. List of 45 items with the mean importance weighted by four stakeholder-specific groups for both disclosure items and types, in their 
order of relative importance of items
*
.  
Panel A List of 15 items of labour aspects and the mean importance weighted by employees for both disclosure items and types 




Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
LA11: Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support 
the continued employability of employees and assist them in managing 
career endings.  
7.47 6.53 6.75 6.92 7.51 86 
  (75) (1) (7) (3)  
LA7: Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, 
and total number of work-related fatalities, by region and by gender. 
7.38 6.28 6.00 7.17 7.06 14 
  (7) (0) (7) (0)  
LA8: Education, training, counseling, prevention, and risk-control 
programs in place to assist workforce members, their families, or 
community members regarding serious diseases. 
7.29 6.49 6.31 7.02 6.97 52 
  (50) (0) (1) (1)  
LA4: Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. 
7.28 6.22 5.99 7.19 6.92 26 
  (26) (0) (0) (0)  
LA5: Minimum notice period(s) regarding operational changes, including 
whether it is specified in collective agreements. 
7.28 6.34 5.99 7.09 6.84 4 
  (4) (0) (0) (0)  
LA9: Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade 
unions. 
7.27 6.54 6.37 7.06 6.88 28 
  (28) (0) (0) (0)  
LA3: Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to 
temporary or parttime employees, by significant locations of operation. 








Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
  (7) (0) (0) (0)  
LA2: Total number and rate of new employee hires and employee 
turnover by age group, gender, and region. 
7.15 6.03 5.85 6.92 6.69 38 
  (5) (0) (33) (0)  
LA12: Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career 
development reviews, by gender. 
7.11 6.65 6.10 7.10 7.12 57 
  (57) (0) (0) (0)  
LA10: Average hours of training per year per employee by gender, and 
by employee category. 
7.05 6.20 6.02 6.94 6.90 89 
  (80) (2) (4) (3)  
LA1: Total workforce by employment type, employment contract, and 
region, broken down by gender. 
6.97 5.77 5.85 7.04 7.27 124 
  (0) (0) (124) (0)  
LA14: Ratio of basic salary and remuneration of women to men by 
employee category, by significant locations of operation. 
6.78 5.84 6.35 6.74 7.16 54 
  (6) (48) (0) (0)  
LA15: Return to work and retention rates after parental leave, by gender. 6.7 5.73 5.69 6.88 6.90 8 
  (5) (0) (3) (0)  
LA6: Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint 
management–worker health and safety committees that help monitor and 
advise on occupational health and safety programs. 
6.47 5.94 5.60 6.69 6.34 15 
  (14) (0) (1) (0)  
LA13: Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees 
per employee category according to gender, age group, minority group 
membership, and other indicators of diversity. 
6.44 5.97 5.27 6.53 6.26 133 
  (0) (0) (133) (0)  
*




Panel B List of 11 items with of human right aspects and the mean importance weighted by lawyers and regulators for both disclosure items and 
types  




Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
HR7: Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of child labour, and measures taken to 
contribute to the effective abolition of child labour. 
8.19 5.27 5.90 7.90 6.64 2 
  (1) (0) (1) (0)  
HR11: Number of grievances related to human rights filed, addressed 
and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms. 
7.98 5.19 6.00 7.52 7.36 4 
  (3) (0) (1) (0)  
HR4: Total number of incidents of discrimination and corrective actions 
taken. 
7.9 5.28 5.25 7.64 6.78 9 
  (6) (0) (3) (0)  
HR6: Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of forced or compulsory labour, and 
measures to contribute to the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour. 
7.89 5.43 6.07 7.89 7.21 1 
  (1) (0) (0) (0)  
HR5: Operations and significant suppliers identified in which the right 
to exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining may be 
violated or at significant risk, and actions taken to support these rights. 
7.28 4.91 5.23 6.99 6.32 5 
  (2) (0) (3) (0)  
HK9: Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of 
indigenous people and actions taken. 
7.19 5.26 5.62 6.79 6.61 3 
  (3) (0) (0) (0)  
HR3: Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures 
concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations, 








Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
including the percentage of employees trained. 
  (10) (0) (0) (0)  
HR8: Percentage of security personnel trained in the organization‟s 
policies or procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are 
relevant to operations. 
6.93 5.53 5.83 6.96 6.53 1 
  (1) (0) (0) (0)  
HR10: Percentage and total number of operations that have been 
subject to human rights reviews and/or impact assessments. 
6.71 4.87 5.17 6.45 6.41 5 
  (4) (0) (1) (0)  
HR1: Percentage and total number of significant investment agreements 
and contracts that include clauses incorporating human rights concerns, 
or that have undergone human rights screening. 
6.69 4.71 6.01 7.05 7.68 6 
  (6) (0) (0) (0)  
HR2: Percentage of significant suppliers, contractors, and other 
business partners that have undergone human rights screening, and 
actions taken. 
6.38 4.55 5.30 6.75 6.97 1 
  (1) (0) (0) (0)  
*
The number of firms disclosing each type of disclosure is in parentheses. 
 
Panel C List of 10 items of society aspects and the mean importance weighted by local communities for both disclosure item and type 




Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item 












Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item 





SO2: Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks 
related to corruption. 
7.92 4.91 6.35 6.50 7.58 1 
  (1) (0) (0) (0)  
SO8: Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-
monetary sanctions for non- compliance with laws and regulations. 
7.81 5.49 6.98 6.99 7.90 11 
  (0) (9) (1) (1)  
SO1: Percentage of operations with implemented local community 
engagement, impact assessments, and development programs. 
7.67 4.61 6.53 6.04 7.97 60 
  (24) (16) (6) (14)  
SO10: Prevention and mitigation measures implemented in operations 
with significant potential or actual negative impacts on local 
communities. 
7.52 5.06 5.87 6.22 7.43 25 
  (24) (0) (1) (0)  
SO4: Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. 7.41 5.11 6.10 6.55 7.55 3 
  (3) (0) (0) (0)  
SO7: Total number of legal actions for anti- competitive behaviour, 
anti-trust, and monopoly practices and their outcomes. 
7.35 5.45 6.12 6.36 7.38 23 
  (23) (0) (0) (0)  
SO9: Operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on 
local communities. 
7.26 4.79 5.58 6.09 7.32 7 
  (7) (0) (0) (0)  
SO3: Percentage of employees trained in organization‟s anti-corruption 
policies and procedures. 
7.24 5.06 5.74 6.57 7.34 0 
  (0) (0) (0) (0)  








Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item 





parties, politicians, and related institutions by country. 
  (1) (0) (0) (0)  
SO5: Public policy positions and participation in public policy 
development and lobbying. 
6.22 4.88 5.46 5.73 6.44 0 
  (0) (0) (0) (0)  
*
The number of firms disclosing each type of disclosure is in parentheses. 
 
Panel D List of 9 items of product aspects and the mean importance weighted by customers for both disclosure item and type 




Mean weight of each type of disclosure Number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
PR1: Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of products 
and services are assessed for improvement, and percentage of 
significant products and services categories subject to such procedures. 
8.08 5.22 6.14 6.58 7.68 83 
  (83) (0) (0) (0)  
PR5: Practices related to customer satisfaction, including results of 
surveys measuring customer satisfaction. 
8.07 6.30 6.17 7.08 7.76 42 
  (40) (0) (2) (0)  
PR9: Monetary value of significant fines for non-compliance with laws 
and regulations concerning the provision and use of products and 
services. 
7.8 5.61 6.56 6.70 8.09 7 
  (0) (7) (0) (0)  








Mean weight of each type of disclosure Number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
customer privacy and losses of customer data. 
  (0) (0) (0) (0)  
PR3: Type of product and service information required by procedures 
and percentage of significant products and services subject to such 
information requirements. 
7.71 5.88 5.43 6.09 6.74 133 
  (101) (0) (28) (4)  
PR7: Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning health and safety impacts of products and 
services during their life cycle, by type of outcomes. 
7.64 5.56 5.62 6.49 7.35 16 
  (11) (0) (5) (0)  
PR6: Programs for adherence to laws, standards, and voluntary codes 
related to marketing communications, including advertising, promotion, 
and sponsorship. 
6.98 6.05 5.68 5.60 5.89 133 
  (133) (0) (0) (0)  
PR2: Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning product and service information and 
labelling, by type of outcomes. 
6.94 5.57 5.63 6.21 6.53 6 
  (4) (0) (2) (0)  
PR2: Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning marketing communications, including 
advertising, promotion, and sponsorship by type of outcomes. 
6.62 5.59 5.28 5.57 6.13 0 
  (0) (0) (0) (0)  
*





7.4 Descriptive statistics  
Table 7.4 describes the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
percentiles, and the median of those variables used to analyse the impact of board 
diversity on CSD in the sample of 133 Vietnamese listed firms. The score of CSD 
(CSD_INDEX) ranges from 3 per cent to 23 per cent with a mean of 10 per cent, 
which reveals that the score of CSD of listed firms in the sample are low. This is 
because CSD practices are relatively new in Vietnam (Vu et al. 2011). Our result is 
consistent with Vu et al. (2011)‟s examination of the quantity of voluntary disclosure, 
including social disclosure in Vietnam. The mean score of CSD_INDEX (0.1) in this 
study is also lower than in China (0.2) as documented by Lu and Abeysekera (2014), 
probably because their study uses a sample of 100 socially responsible Chinese listed 
firms identified by a social responsibility ranking list, and socially responsible firms 
are more likely to increase their social disclosure. This mean score of CSD_INDEX 
is also lower than in Malaysia (0.147), as reported by Haji (2013) for a sample of 85 
listed firms in 2009, probably because firms‟ social disclosure practices are more 
established in Malaysia. Four different social aspects, i.e., labour (LAD_INDEX), 
society (SOD_INDEX), product (PRD_INDEX), and human rights (HRD_INDEX), 
have mean scores of 0.17, 0.04, 0.16, and 0.01, respectively.  The mean scores of 
PRD_INDEX and HRD_INDEX in this study are similar to China with 0.16 and 
0.037, respectively, but the LAD_INDEX and SOD_INDEX are lower than those in 
China (0.24 and 0.356, respectively) as reported by Lu and Abeysekera (2014). 
 
Although the sample is reduced from 150 to 133 listed firms (due to unavailable 
online annual reports of 17 firms), the descriptive statistics of UW_DoB and 
UW_DiB are similar to those in section 6.3 of Chapter 6. W_DoB has a range of 0.24 
to 0.49, with a mean of 0.32 while W_DiB is higher than that in section 6.3 of 
Chapter 6 because executives‟ perceptions on attributes of the board of directors in 
relation to CSD differ from those related to earnings quality. Specifically, W_DiB 
has a range of 0 to 47.19, with a mean of 18.75. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the structural and demographic attributes of a board of 




respectively, are similar to those described in section 6.3 of Chapter 6, so a 
description of these attributes is not repeated here. 
 
The control variables that examine the impact of board diversity on CSD are auditor 
(AUDIT), return on assets (ROA), stock exchange location (STOCK_EX), foreign 
ownership (FOREIGN), and state ownership (STATE). AUDIT is a dummy variable 
that is 1 if the audit firm is one of the Big Four audit firms and 0 otherwise. Only 21 
(16 per cent) of the 133 firms in the sample use the Big Four auditing firm. The mean 
of ROA, measured by net profit over the total assets of firm, is 0.08, which is similar 
to the 0.07 reported by Vu et al. (2011) for a sample of 45 Vietnamese listed firms in 
2008. The stock exchange location (STOCK_EX) is a dummy variable that is 1 if the 
firms are listed on Ho Chi Minh stock exchange and 0 for firms listed on the Hanoi 
stock exchange. The Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange includes 90 (68 per cent) of the 
133 listed firms in the sample. Because of the 49 per cent maximum foreign 
ownership ceiling in Vietnamese listed firms, the average percentage of foreign 
ownership (FOREIGN) in this sample is quite low (12 per cent with a range of zero 
to 49 per cent). The average percentage of state ownership (STATE) is 27 per cent 
(with a range of zero to 79.07 per cent). This concentrated state ownership was 
discussed in section 6.3 of Chapter 6.  
 
Table 7.4. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min Max P25 P50 P75 
Dependent variables 
       
CSD_INDEX 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.12 
Dependent variables – Additional analysis 
    
LAD_INDEX 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.41 0.12 0.18 0.22 
SOD_INDEX 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.04 0.07 
PRD_INDEX 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.20 
HRD_INDEX 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Independent variables 
       
UW_DoB 0.31 0.07 0.23 0.49 0.24 0.30 0.35 
W_DoB 0.32 0.07 0.24 0.49 0.25 0.31 0.36 
UW_DiB 2.91 1.71 0.00 7.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
W_DiB 18.75 11.27 0.00 47.19 10.26 18.60 26.94 




CEO/chair separation 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
% Representative directors‟ 
ownership 
0.22 0.23 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.19 0.40 
% Promoters 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.20 
Non-executive directors owning > 
5% of a firm‟s equity 
0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demographic attributes of the board of directors measured by the modified Blau’s index to construct 
DiB_Index 
Gender diversity of the board of 
directors 
0.38 0.38 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.49 0.64 
Age diversity of the board of 
directors 
0.64 0.20 0.00 0.92 0.59 0.70 0.80 
Educational qualifications 
diversity of the board of directors 
0.41 0.26 0.00 0.93 0.29 0.43 0.64 
Nationality diversity of the board 
of directors 
0.08 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Control variables 
       
AUDIT 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.08 0.08 -0.17 0.39 0.03 0.07 0.11 
STOCK_EX 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FOREIGN 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.05 0.17 
STATE 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.28 0.50 
This table shows the summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The final sample consists 
of 133 firms listed on the Hochiminh and Hanoi stock exchanges for the 2010 sample. CSD_INDEX = 
the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; LAD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-
dimensional labour aspect disclosure index; SOD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-
dimensional society aspect disclosure index; PRD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-
dimensional product responsibility aspect disclosure index; HRD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, 
three-dimensional human rights aspect disclosure index; UW_DoB = the unweighted index of 
diversity-of-boards; W_DoB = the weighted index of diversity-of-boards; UW_DiB = the unweighted 
index of diversity-in-boards; W_DiB = the weighted index of diversity-in-boards; AUDIT = 1 if 
firm‟s auditor is a Big 4 and 0 if otherwise; ROA = net profit over the total assets; STOCK_EX = 1  if  
the  firms listed  on  HOSE  and 0  for  firms  listed  on  HNX; FOREIGN = the percentage of 
shareholding owned by foreign investors; STATE = the percentage of shareholding owned by the 
state. 
 
7.5 Correlation analysis 
Table 7.5 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients between all the combination 
variables. CSD_INDEX and four sub-categories of CSD, i.e. labour (LAD_INDEX), 
society (SOD_INDEX), product (PRD_INDEX), and human rights (HRD_INDEX) 





Similar to the findings reported in section 6.4 of Chapter 6, UW_DoB and W_DoB 
are significantly and positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.997, and  UW_DiB 
is significantly and positively correlated with W_DiB (r = 0.988). This study 
therefore undertakes the task of empirically confirming whether UW_DoB and 
W_DoB, or UW_DiB and W_DiB, have a similar influence on CSD. 
 
As expected, the two measures of UW_DiB and W_DiB are significantly and 
positively correlated with CSD_INDEX with coefficients of 0.264 and 0.258, 




Table 7.5 also shows there are significant correlations between the dependent 
variable (CSD_INDEX) and all control variables, except for the state ownership 
variable (STATE). CSD_INDEX is significantly and positively correlated with 
auditor (AUDIT), return on assets (ROA), stock exchange location (STOCK_EX), 
and foreign ownership (FOREIGN) with coefficients of 0.286, 0.183, 0.344, and 
0.187, respectively. Meanwhile, STATE is not significantly correlated with 
CSD_INDEX. 
 
Table 7.5. Correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 CSD_INDEX 1.000 
             
2 LAD_INDEX 0.905 1.000 
            
3 SOD_INDEX 0.732 0.535 1.000 
           
4 PRD_INDEX 0.730 0.521 0.471 1.000 
          
5 HRD_INDEX 0.570 0.335 0.302 0.344 1.000 
         
6 UW_DoB 0.140 0.074 0.265 0.058 0.084 1.000 
        
7 W_DoB 0.147 0.082 0.270 0.064 0.080 0.997 1.000 
       
8 UW_DiB 0.264 0.218 0.183 0.241 0.167 -0.036 -0.035 1.000 
      
9 W_DiB 0.258 0.208 0.159 0.258 0.175 -0.036 -0.037 0.988 1.000 
     
10 AUDIT 0.286 0.166 0.296 0.256 0.259 0.145 0.152 0.011 0.042 1.000 
    
11 ROA 0.183 0.198 0.161 0.106 0.023 -0.059 -0.051 0.062 0.054 0.045 1.000 
   
12 STOCK_EX 0.344 0.223 0.367 0.347 0.192 0.078 0.077 0.199 0.201 0.167 0.108 1.000 
  
13 FOREIGN 0.187 0.191 0.180 0.144 -0.006 -0.049 -0.051 0.204 0.238 0.221 0.450 0.365 1.000 
 
14 STATE -0.049 -0.028 -0.024 -0.109 -0.003 0.015 0.026 -0.374 -0.371 0.179 0.099 -0.250 -0.179 1.000 
*Bold text indicates significance at the 10% level or better. Please see below Table 7.4 for description 
of each variable. 
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 Although table 7.5 shows that UW_DoB is significantly positively correlated with CSD_INDEX 




7.6 Regression results 
This study checks the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression analysis and 
finds that the maximum VIF is 1.59, which is less than 10 for all the regression 
models, so multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem in the empirical models 
tested in this study (Gujarati and Porter 2009).  
 
To avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity (where observations have variable 
residual values), an OLS regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
(White 1980) is used to test the impact of board diversity indices (UW_DoB; 
W_DoB; UW_DiB; and W_DiB) on CSD (CSD_INDEX). 
 
Table 7.6 provides the results of the tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4 where CSD_INDEX 
is the dependent variable, and UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB, W_DiB are the 
alternate independent variables. The table shows that the coefficient estimates of both 
UW_DoB and W_DoB are not significantly related to CSD_INDEX (p-values of 
0.318 and 0.298 respectively), which rejects Hypothesis 3. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient estimates of both UW_DiB and W_DiB are positive and significant (p-
values of 0.010 and 0.014 respectively), which suggests that firms with greater 
diversity-in-boards have a positive influence higher than CSD, confirming 
Hypothesis 4. The findings in this study are consistent with an earlier study by Hafsi 
and Turgut (2013) who report a positive relationship between diversity-in-boards and 
social performance while no such relationship between diversity-of-boards and social 
performance. Additionally, it has been shown elsewhere that the structural attributes 
of a board of directors such as outside directors (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Hossain 
and Reaz 2007; Michelon and Parbonetti 2012), board leadership structure (Haniffa 
and Cooke 2002; Barako et al. 2006; Michelon and Parbonetti 2012; Khan et al. 
2013), directors ownership (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) do not affect voluntary 
disclosure or social and environmental disclosure. Also, prior studies document there 
is a positive relationship between disclosure (such as social and environmental 
disclosure or voluntary disclosure) and demographic attributes of the board of 
directors such as gender diversity (Bear et al. 2010; Post et al. 2011; Fernandez-





Based on agency theory, diversity-of-boards is identified with structural attributes 
and therefore represents the recommended governance „best practices‟. This helps to 
control managers‟ discretion to ensure better representation of the board of directors 
and protection for all shareholders‟ interests (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). In 
so doing, diversity-of-boards may only have an indirect influence on social 
disclosure (Hafsi and Turgut 2013).  
 
Based on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), members of the 
board of directors is considered to be an important strategic resource for an 
organisation and contributed to CSD. The demographic differences of directors are 
likely to establish and enhance a firm‟s external legitimacy and to improve its 
relationships with relevant stakeholders, and therefore diversity-in-boards has a 
positive impact on CSD. 
 
Table 7.6. Board diversity (unweighted and weighted indices) and CSD  
 
CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX 
UW_DoB 0.057 
   
 
(0.318) 
















   
0.001** 
    
(0.014) 
AUDIT 0.030** 0.030** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) 
ROA 0.101** 0.100** 0.093* 0.097* 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.072) (0.062) 
STOCK_EX 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
FOREIGN -0.017 -0.017 -0.026 -0.029 
 
(0.605) (0.612) (0.400) (0.352) 





(0.568) (0.563) (0.742) (0.786) 
Constant 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
R
2
 0.204 0.205 0.238 0.233 
Adjusted R
2
 0.166 0.167 0.201 0.197 
F statistic 6.29*** 6.33*** 6.82*** 6.76*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.26 1.26 1.31 1.31 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 
7.4 for description of each variable. 
 
The results for the control variables shown in Table 7.6 indicate there is a significant 
positive association (p values < 0.05) between AUDIT and CSD_INDEX which 
suggests that CSD are higher for firms audited by the Big Four audit firms, which is 
consistent with prior studies (Craswell 1992; Inchausti 1997; Uwuigbe and Egbide 
2012). Return on asset (ROA) shows positive and significant coefficients (p values < 
0.10), which suggests that firms that perform better financially are  associated with 
more CSD, which is consistent with the literature (Khan et al. 2013; Lu and 
Abeysekera 2014; Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Interestingly, STOCK_EX is positively 
and significantly (p values < 0.01) associated with CSD_INDEX, which indicates 
that firms listed on HOSE are reported to engage in significantly higher CSD than 
firms listed on HNX. This is consistent with Vu (2012) who examines the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure for Vietnamese listed firms. Vu (2012) explains 
there are four reasons for this result. First, Ho Chi Minh City has more Western 
influence, so it still appears to be more „open‟ than its capital Hanoi. Second, there is 
a five year gap between HOSE and HNX, and therefore HOSE‟s regulatory and 
enforcement mechanisms may be more organised than HNX‟s. Third, being the first 
and leading stock exchange in Vietnam, firms listed on HOSE may have been 
influenced by more international exposure than firms listed on HNX. This pressure 
may drive listed firms on HOSE to provide more comprehensive information. Fourth, 
the public, investors and the listed firms themselves may generally perceive listed 




firms on HOSE may tend to communicate more information in order to prevent their 
shares from being undervalued and to distinguish them from listed firms on HNX. 
 
FOREIGN and STATE are not significantly related to CSD, as in prior studies 
(Halme and Huse 1997; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Naser et al. 2006; Xiao and Yuan 
2007; Lu and Abeysekera 2014). These results can be explained that the relatively 
low levels of foreign shareholdings of Vietnamese listed firms due to the 49 per cent 
maximum foreign ownership ceiling that limits foreign investors from influencing 
the reporting behaviour of those firms (Vu et al. 2011). Related to STATE, this 
analysis may reflect the nature of business in a country like Vietnam where the 
shares of most firms are owned by the government. If the government owns shares of 
most firms listed on the stock exchanges, these firms will have little incentive to 
voluntarily disclose information, including CSD, because firms‟ predominant 
objective will meet the requirements set by the government rather than showing 
stakeholders they are responsible corporate citizens (Naser et al. 2006). The 
government can use its power by requesting information directly from firm 
management, so the possibility of forcing management to voluntarily disclose social 
information in the annual report would be remote.  
 
7.7 Additional analysis and robustness tests 
7.7.1 Board diversity and corporate social disclosure across four social aspects 
To provide further insight, this study further analyses the relationships between 
board diversity and CSD across four social aspects in the GRI 3.1 framework. They 
are labour practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. As is shown 
in Table 7.7, information related to labour practices (LAD_INDEX) and product 
responsibility (PRD_INDEX) items is disclosed the most, with a mean value of 0.17 
and 0.16, respectively. A minimum score of 0 for society (SOD_INDEX) and human 
rights (HRD_INDEX) aspects suggests that some firms do not disclose any 
information about their society and human rights aspects, in fact, of the 133 firms in 
the sample, only 18 firms (13.5%) disclose the human rights aspect, 74 firms (55.6%) 
disclose the society aspect while all firms (133 firms or 100%) in the sample disclose 





Following Firth (1979), omitting firms which definitely do not have any items to 
disclose, this thesis only examines the impact of board diversity on society aspect 
disclosure for 74 listed firms which disclose the society aspect and the impact of 
board diversity on labour aspect disclosure and on product responsibility aspect 
disclosure for 133 listed firms (full sample). Because only 18 firms, which disclose 
the human rights aspect, do not provide an adequate sample size for regression 
modelling, the human rights disclosure aspect is not analysed here. The regression is 
repeated by replacing CSD_INDEX in the models reported in Table 7.4 with the 
score of each of three aspects, i.e. labour practices (LAD_INDEX), product 





Table 7.7 shows that the regression results are consistent with the results of 
CSD_INDEX reported in Table 7.6. The results for the disclosure of labour practices 
(LAD_INDEX), product responsibility (PRD_INDEX), and society (SOD_INDEX), 
indicate that diversity-of-boards (W_DoB) does not significantly influence the 
defined aspects of social disclosure. The diversity-in-boards (W_DiB) significantly 
(p values < 0.05) and positively influences the defined aspects of social disclosure.  
 
Related to control variables, there is a significant positive association (p values < 
0.05) between auditor (AUDIT) and the disclosure of the product responsibility 
aspect (PRD_INDEX) which suggests that the big four audit firms have a positive 
influence on such disclosure. However, auditor (AUDIT) has no statistically 
significant relationship with the disclosure of the labour practices aspect 
(LAD_INDEX) and society aspect (SOD_INDEX), possibly because customers, 
especially overseas customers, pay more attention to auditors of firms from which 
they intend to purchase products or services than employees and local communities. 
Return on asset (ROA) shows a positive and significant coefficient (p values < 0.1) 
with the labour practices aspect (LAD_INDEX) disclosure, but ROA is not 
significantly related to the product responsibility aspect (PRD_INDEX) disclosure 
and the society aspect (SOD_INDEX) disclosure. These results suggest that firms 
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 Because almost identical results are obtained by using either the unweighted or weighted index to 
measure board diversity, for brevity, this study only presents the results using weighted indices of 




with sound financial performance make more of the labour practices aspect 
(LAD_INDEX) disclosure, even though ROA is not associated with the product 
responsibility aspect disclosure. This finding is consistent with Prior et al. (2008). 
Stock exchange location (STOCK_EX) is positively and significantly associated with 
LAD_INDEX, PRD_INDEX, and SOD_INDEX, consistent with the results in Table 
7.6. This indicates that firms listed on HOSE are more likely to disclose more about 
labour practices, product responsibility, and society aspects than firms listed on 
HNX. 
 
Table 7.7. Board diversity and CSD across three social aspects 
 



























AUDIT 0.026 0.025 0.035** 0.034** 0.010 0.009 
 
(0.178) (0.157) (0.013) (0.022) (0.430) (0.478) 
ROA 0.164* 0.159* 0.077 0.074 0.130 0.128 
 
(0.070) (0.078) (0.143) (0.161) (0.137) (0.103) 
STOCK_EX 0.028* 0.027* 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
FOREIGN 0.016 -0.001 -0.033 -0.043 -0.023 -0.036 
 
(0.778) (0.992) (0.352) (0.244) (0.590) (0.368) 
STATE -0.008 0.015 -0.026 -0.009 -0.003 0.018 
 
(0.807) (0.641) (0.255) (0.703) (0.918) (0.519) 
Constant 0.112*** 0.107*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.016 0.015 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.555) (0.400) 
R
2
 0.101 0.123 0.176 0.208 0.137 0.212 
Adjusted R
2
 0.058 0.081 0.137 0.170 0.059 0.142 
F statistic 2.48** 2.95*** 5.64*** 7.18*** 3.06*** 3.21*** 
p-value 0.027 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.008 
Obs  133 133 133 133 74 74 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 





7.7.2 Alternative regression specifications 
In the primary analysis, this study measures diversity-in-boards indices (both 
weighted and unweighted) through the terciles split method. An additional analysis is 
carried out to ensure that the primary analysis is robust, and this study tests diversity-
in-boards and CSD models by using median and quartile values alternately to 
measure diversity-in-boards indices. These values are used to rank firms‟ levels of 
diversity-in-boards (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013), and those ranks 
become the diversity-in-board observed in firms. Specifically, the median split 
method categorises each demographic attribute into two groups, taking 1 if every 
value is above the median, otherwise 0. The quartile split method categorises each 
demographic attribute into four groups, taking 0 for the first quartile (below 25%), 1 
for the second quartile (between 25.1% and 50%), 2 for the third quartile (between 
51% and 75%), and 3 for the fourth quartile (above 75%). Those results are similar 
and more significant in the median split method (Table 7.8). In addition, the results 
are cross checked using the return on equity (ROE) instead of ROA that measures 
financial performance, and the results do not change (Table 7.8).  
 
Table 7.8. Diversity-in-boards (median and quartile split methods) and CSD  
 
CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX 
UW_DiB (median split method) 0.010*** 
   
 
(0.008) 
   











   
(0.010) 
 
W_DiB (quartile split method) 
   
0.001** 
    
(0.018) 
AUDIT 0.028*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
ROE 0.058** 0.058** 0.053** 0.053** 
 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.046) (0.047) 
STOCK_EX 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN -0.018 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 
 
(0.589) (0.534) (0.540) (0.520) 





(0.664) (0.653) (0.579) (0.626) 
Constant 0.013 0.013 0.034** 0.037** 
 
(0.571) (0.575) (0.036) (0.024) 
R
2
 0.2362 0.2355 0.236 0.2295 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1998 0.1991 0.1996 0.1928 
F statistic 7.01*** 6.99*** 6.63*** 6.53*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.28 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 
7.4 for description of each variable. 
 
7.8 Conclusion  
In summary, this chapter provided evidence for the impact of board diversity on CSD 
by testing the two hypotheses. As shown in Table 7.6, Hypothesis 3 (i.e. the higher 
diversity-of-boards leads to a higher CSD) was rejected because the diversity-of-
boards indices (both unweighted and weighted) did not have a significant impact on 
the CSD index, but the results supported Hypothesis 4, as proposed in Chapter 5 (i.e. 
the greater diversity-in-boards leads to higher CSD). This study also confirmed that 
UW_DoB and W_DoB, as well as UW_DiB and W_DiB, had a similar influence on 
CSD.  
 
Three out of five control variables were found to statistically influence CSD of 
Vietnamese listed firms, that is, the variables (i.e. auditor, return on assets, and stock 
exchange location) had a significant and positive impact on CSD.  
 
Three sub-categories of CSD, i.e. labour practices, society, and product responsibility 
disclosure aspects were also explored in relation to the board diversity indices and 
control variables. The evidence supported the primary findings which rejected 
Hypothesis 3 and confirmed Hypothesis 4.  
 
Further analyses such as using the median and quartile values to measure diversity-
in-boards indices (both unweighted and weighted) were carried out, and then 
extended using ROE instead of the ROA to measure financial performance. The 
results supported the primary findings that diversity-in-boards positively impacted on 





8 RESULTS AND ANALYSES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
EARNINGS QUALITY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the empirical results and analyses of the relationship between 
earnings quality and corporate social disclosure (CSD). It also examines the 
moderating effect of state and foreign ownership on this relationship. Section 8.2 
statistically describes the variables used in this study. Section 8.3 conducts the 
correlation analysis. Section 8.4 reports the results of the multiple regression models. 
Section 8.5 presents the results of several additional analyses for robustness tests. 
Section 8.6 summarises the overall findings in this chapter. 
 
8.2 Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics of the score of CSD (measured as CSD_INDEX) and four 
sub-categories of CSD (measured as LAD_INDEX, SOD_INDEX, PRD_INDEX, 
and HRD_INDEX) were provided in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, so this section does 
not describe these variables here. 
 
Table 8.1 describes the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
percentiles, and median of the variables used to analyse the influence of earnings 
quality on the CSD of Vietnamese listed firms. Because the annual report of 17 firms 
are not available online to measure CSD_INDEX, the sample in this analysis is 
reduced from 150 to 133 listed firms. The descriptive statistics of four earnings 
attributes (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH) are similar to those reported in 
Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 for the sample of 150 firms. However, the standardised 
aggregate earnings quality (EQ) mean value score for the sample of 133 firms is 
lower than the sample of 150 firms (67 vs. 75.5). 
 
The explanation of the descriptive statistics of control variables (i.e. AUDIT, ROA, 
STOCK_EX, FOREIGN, and STATE) was also provided in Section 7.4 of Chapter 
7. Therefore, this section only provides the descriptive statistics of the percentage of 
female members on the board of directors (FEMALE).  The average of FEMALE is 




consistent with Srinidhi et al. (2011), who find that female directors make up about 
14% of board members in a sample of 2,480 firm-year observations in the US over 
2001-2007. 
 
Table 8.1. Descriptive statistics
26
 
Variables Mean SD Min Max P25 P50 P75 
Dependent variable   
   
      
CSD_INDEX 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.12 
Independent variable 
       EQ 67.00 24.74 1.00 112.00 48.50 66.50 86.50 
Control variables 
 
            
STATE 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.28 0.5 
FOREIGN 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.05 0.17 
AUDIT 0.16 0.37 0 1 0 0 0 
ROA 0.08 0.08 -0.17 0.39 0.03 0.07 0.11 
STOCK_EX 0.68 0.47 0 1 0 1 1 
FEMALE 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.14 0.20 
This table shows summary statistics for variables used in this paper. The final sample consists of 133 
firms listed on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges for the 2010 sample. CSD_INDEX = the 
stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; EQ = the standardized aggregate earnings quality 
score, calculated as the average rank across the four individual measures (accruals quality, earnings 
persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness); STATE = the percentage of 
shareholding owned by the state; FOREIGN = the percentage of shareholding owned by foreign 
investors; AUDIT = 1 if firm‟s auditor is a Big 4 and 0 if otherwise; ROA = net profit over the total 
assets; STOCK_EX = 1 if the firms listed on HOSE and 0 for firms listed on HNX; FEMALE = the 
percentage of female members of the board of directors. 
 
8.3 Correlation analysis 
Table 8.2 shows the pairwise correlation between every combination of dependent 
and independent variables. EQ shows no significant correlation with CSD_INDEX. 
There are no excessively high correlation coefficients between predictor variables 
because most of the correlation coefficients are below 46%. Among predictor 
variables, the highest correlation is between ROA and FOREIGN at r = 0.450.    
 
Similar to Table 7.5 in Chapter Seven, there are statistically significant correlations 
between the dependent variable (CSD_INDEX) and all control variables, except for 
                                                 
26
 Consistent with the prior literature (Cornett et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2008a; Biddle et al. 2009) and 
throughout the analyses in this study, the extreme values of the distribution were winsorised to the 1 




the state ownership variable (STATE). CSD_INDEX is also significantly positively 
correlated with the percentage of female members in the board of directors 
(FEMALE) with a coefficient of 0.235. This suggests that firms having a higher 
percentage of female directors on the board are correlated with a higher CSD. 
 
Table 8.2. Correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 CSD_INDEX 1.000 
       
2 EQ -0.031 1.000 
      
3 AUDIT 0.286 -0.062 1.000 
     
4 ROA 0.183 -0.351 0.045 1.000 
    
5 STOCK_EX 0.344 -0.223 0.167 0.108 1.000 
   
6 FOREIGN 0.187 -0.168 0.221 0.450 0.365 1.000 
  
7 STATE -0.049 0.116 0.179 0.099 -0.250 -0.179 1.000 
 
8 FEMALE 0.235 -0.189 -0.040 0.187 0.107 0.168 -0.209 1.000 
*Bold text indicates significance at the 10% level or better. Please see below Table 8.1 for description 
of each variable. 
 
8.4 Regression results 
This study checks for the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression models. 
The maximum VIF is 9.36 and that is from EQ*STATE. Choi et al. (2013) report 
9.56 in their study for VIF of the interaction between earnings management and the 
ownership concentration variable when examine the moderating effect of ownership 
structure on the relationship between earnings quality and corporate social 
responsibility. Because the individual values of VIF are less than 10 for all the 
regression models, multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem for the test 
models in this study (Gujarati and Porter 2009).  
 
To avoid the problem of heteroskedasticity, an OLS regression with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (White 1980) is used to test the effect of 
earnings quality on CSD, and the moderating effect of the ownership structure (i.e 






Table 8.3 provides the results of the tests of Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7, using 
CSD_INDEX as the dependent variable. The independent variables are EQ, 
EQ*FOREIGN, EQ*STATE. Two models are used to examine the relationship 
between the dependent variable and independent variables and the results are 
reported in Table 8.3. Model 1 examines the relationship without interacting 
variables and reveals that the coefficient estimate of the standardised aggregate 
earnings quality (EQ) is positive and significant (α1 = 0.0003, p = 0.079). This 
indicates that firms that report high quality earnings also have high a CSD. This 
result confirms Hypothesis 5B (i.e. there is a positive relationship between earnings 
quality and CSD). 
 
Table 8.3. The relationship between earnings quality and CSD and the moderating 
effect of the ownership structure on this relationship. 
 
CSD_INDEX (1)  CSD_INDEX (2) 
 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
EQ 0.0003* 0.079  0.0008*** 0.007 
EQ x STATE    -0.0015** 0.034 
EQ x FOREIGN    -0.0012 0.295 
STATE -0.0056 0.763  0.0925* 0.063 
FOREIGN -0.0284 0.357  0.0379 0.604 
AUDIT 0.0334*** 0.002  0.0343*** 0.001 
ROA 0.1105** 0.046  0.1055* 0.054 
STOCK_EX 0.0306*** 0.000  0.0326*** 0.000 
FEMALE 0.0643*** 0.010  0.0633*** 0.010 
Constant 0.0429 0.007  0.0080 0.727 
R
2
 0.2507  0.2796 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2088  0.2268 
F statistic 5.98***  5.3*** 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
Mean VIF 1.31  5.15 
The sample consists of 133 firms listed on Hochiminh and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a 
continuous listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for the 2010 sample. The p -values 
are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance 





Model 2, in addition to the variables examined in Model 1, includes the interaction 
variables between STATE and EQ and between FOREIGN and EQ. They are 
included to reveal the moderating effect of state and foreign ownership on the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD. The coefficient of EQ is still positive 
and significant (α1 = 0.0008, p = 0.007), while the coefficient of the interaction 
variable between STATE and EQ is negative (-0.0015) with a p-value of 0.034, which 
confirms Hypothesis 6 (i.e. more state ownership weakens the relationship between 
earnings quality and CSD). This result shows that firms with more state ownership 
decrease the likelihood of firms with high earnings quality reporting high CSD. 
Taking a stand by increasing CSD is an ethical imperative, but state ownership does 
not play a crucial role in promoting that ethical imperative of firms. Additionally, the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term of FOREIGN and EQ is negative (-
0.0012) but insignificant (p value = 0.295), which suggests that foreign ownership 
has no moderating effect on the relationship between earnings quality and CSD; this 
means Hypothesis 7 (i.e. more foreign ownership strengthens the relation between 
earnings quality and CSD) is rejected. This result is consistent with the study of Choi 
et. al. (2013) in Korea, who documents that  foreign investors does not influence the 
relationship between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility. There are 
two possible reasons for this. First, it could be that foreign investors may experience 
difficulties in controlling managerial behaviour because of geographical differences, 
language, and culture (Xiao and Yuan 2007; Choi et al. 2013). Second, the 49 per 
cent maximum foreign ownership ceiling in Vietnamese listed firms can also limit 
the power of foreign investors to influence the reporting behaviour of firms (Vu et al. 
2011).  
 
The results for control variables shown in Table 8.3 indicate there is a significant 
positive association (p values < 0.003) between AUDIT and CSD_INDEX which in 
turn suggests that the quality of CSD are higher for firms audited by the Big Four 
audit firms, and that is consistent with prior studies (Craswell 1992; Inchausti 1997; 
Uwuigbe and Egbide 2012). Return on asset (ROA) has positive and significant 
coefficients, suggesting that firms with better financial performance are likely to 
make more CSD, which is consistent with the existing literature (Khan et al. 2013; 




and significantly (p values < 0.0001) correlated with CSD_INDEX, which indicates 
that firms listed on HOSE are likely to engage in significantly more CSD than firms 
listed on HNX. This is consistent with Vu (2012) who examines determinants of 
voluntary disclosure in Vietnamese listed firms. FEMALE is positively significant (p 
values = 0.01) associated with CSD_INDEX. This is consistent with prior studies 
(Post et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2013). 
 
8.5 Additional analysis and robustness tests 
8.5.1 The standardised aggregate earnings quality score without accruals quality 
Wysocki (2006) expresses concerns about using accruals quality (AQ) as an attribute 
to measure earnings quality because it can drive the results of earnings quality while 
subjugating other attributes. More specifically, Wysocki find that current cash flows 
are simultaneously significantly and negatively related to current accruals. To ensure 
that the results in this study are not simply driven by AQ, all the tests are repeated 
with an alternative earnings quality by averaging the firm rankings for the three 
standardised aggregate individual earnings attributes measures (i.e. earnings 
persistence, earnings predictability and earnings smoothness) only. The results are 
presented in Table 8.4. 
 
Table 8.4. CSD and earnings quality: excluding the accruals quality measure in the 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score. 
  CSD_INDEX (1)   CSD_INDEX (2) 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
EQ_3ATTRI 0.0003** 0.037 
 
0.0007*** 0.009 
EQ_3ATTRI x STATE 
   
-0.0012* 0.077 
EQ_3ATTRI x FOREIGN 
   
-0.0008 0.419 
STATE -0.0058 0.754 
 
0.0717 0.130 
FOREIGN -0.0263 0.390 
 
0.0196 0.770 
AUDIT 0.0326*** 0.002 
 
0.0338*** 0.001 
ROA 0.1095** 0.043 
 
0.1042* 0.053 
STOCK_EX 0.0302*** 0.000 
 
0.0317*** 0.000 
FEMALE 0.0630*** 0.010 
 
0.0627** 0.011 






















Mean VIF 1.28   4.59 
EQ_3ATTRI is firm-specific the standardized aggregate earnings quality score proxy, the average rank 
across three measures (PERSIS, PREDICT and SMOOTH). The sample consists of 133 firms listed on 
Hochiminh and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a continuous listing history over the entire period 
from 2005 to 2011 for the 2010 sample. The p -values are calculated using standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Please see below Table 8.1 for description of each variable. 
 
The results shown in Table 8.4 are similar to those in Table 8.3 and hence support 
Hypothesis 5B (i.e. There is a positive relationship between CSD and earnings 
quality), and this confirms Hypothesis 6 (i.e. more state ownership weakens the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD), but rejects Hypothesis 7 (i.e. more 
foreign ownership strengthens the relationship between earnings quality and CSD). 
The impact of earnings quality on CSD in Model (1) of Table 8.4 is more significant 
than Table 8.3 (p = 0.037 vs. p = 0.079) whereas the interaction term of state 
ownership and earnings quality in Table 8.4 is less significant than in Table 8.3 (p = 
0.077 vs. p = 0.034). Overall, these results show that the findings in this study are not 
simply driven by accruals quality and are generally consistent when using alternative 
proxies for earnings quality. 
 
8.5.2 Earnings quality and labour and society aspects‟ disclosure  
Pham (2011) documents that managers of Vietnamese firms focus much on charity 
performances and employment matters such as a safe and healthy working 
environment in corporate social policies. Choi et al. (2013) also state that these two 
aspects, society and labour, help to counter adverse public opinions and ease the 
strain that firms have with the government and labour unions. Following Choi et al. 
(2013), this study constructs another social disclosure index consisting of two aspects 
only, i.e. society (10 items) and labour (15 items), rather than four aspects (i.e. 
society, labour, human rights and product responsibility) that are included from the 
main model in section 8.4. The disclosure index is constructed using these two 




means the disclosure index included the 25 items of the two aspects (i.e. society and 
labour) only. The results are provided in Table 8.5, and are consistent with the main 
findings in Table 8.3. 
 
Table 8.5. Earnings quality and labour and society aspects‟ disclosure  
  LAD&SOD_INDEX (1)   LAD&SOD_INDEX (2) 
  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
EQ 0.0004* 0.061 
 
0.0012*** 0.005 
EQ x STATE 
   
-0.0019** 0.045 
EQ x FOREIGN 
   
-0.0021 0.165 
STATE 0.0010 0.969 
 
0.1276* 0.061 
FOREIGN -0.0132 0.754 
 
0.1094 0.276 
AUDIT 0.0334** 0.020 
 
0.0341** 0.018 
ROA 0.1525** 0.044 
 
0.1450* 0.053 
STOCK_EX 0.0347*** 0.003 
 
0.0381*** 0.001 
FEMALE 0.0909*** 0.008 
 
0.0909*** 0.007 



















Mean VIF 1.31   5.15 
The dependent variable is society and labour aspects‟ disclosure index. Please see below Table 8.1 for 
description of each variable. 
 
8.5.3 Alternative regression specifications 
Alternative standardised aggregate earnings quality score measure: 
This study also ranks firms on a scale from zero to 100, according to each of the four 
individual measures of earnings quality to compute the standardised aggregate 
earnings quality score for each firm by averaging its rankings for the four individual 
measures (Gaio and Raposo 2011) as an alternative standardised aggregate earnings 






Alternative STATE and FOREIGN variables construction: 
The main results also show that the primary findings are robust when using dummy 
variables of state and foreign ownership. Specifically, STATE takes 1, if the 
percentage of stock owned by government is greater than or equal to the median of 
state ownership, and zero otherwise. Similarly, FOREIGN takes 1, if the percentage 
of stock owned by foreign investors is greater than or equal to the median of foreign 
ownership, and zero otherwise. Wang (2013) uses this approach to classify the 
sample as strong and weak family ownership. Table 8.6 shows that the moderating 
impact of STATE, using the dummy variable, on the relationship between earnings 
quality and CSD is much more significant than in Table 8.3 (EQxSTATE, p = 0.009 
vs. p = 0.034). 
 
Table 8.6. The relationship between earnings quality and CSD and the moderating 
effect of the ownership structure on this relationship. 
  CSD_INDEX (1)   CSD_INDEX (2) 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
EQ 0.0003* 0.080 
 
0.0007*** 0.003 
EQ x STATE 
   
-0.0008*** 0.009 
EQ x FOREIGN 
   
-0.0003 0.415 
STATE -0.0005 0.950 
 
0.0500** 0.016 
FOREIGN -0.0118 0.164 
 
0.0020 0.924 
AUDIT 0.0328*** 0.002 
 
0.0338*** 0.001 
ROA 0.1119** 0.032 
 
0.0973* 0.060 
STOCK_EX 0.0314*** 0.000 
 
0.0334*** 0.000 
FEMALE 0.0628** 0.011 
 
0.0607** 0.013 



















Mean VIF 1.23   4.83 
The sample consists of 133 firms listed on Hochiminh and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a 




are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Please see below Table 8.1 for description of each variable. 
 
8.5.4 Endogeneity 
The main results provide evidence of a positive relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD. One concern here is that the relationship may be endogenous, potentially 
biasing the results. Endogeneity is where an independent variable is not truly 
independent and is correlated with some unobserved factors (the error term). This 
means the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable cannot be 
estimated correctly, leading to a biased estimate of the effect. This stops a causal 
claim being made about the relationship. The design implicitly in this study assumes 
that causality runs from earnings quality to CSD, but the reverse relation is possible.  
 
In order to test for reverse causality, that is, CSD influences earnings quality, this 
study uses the length of the operating cycle (LOG.OC), measured as the log of the 
sum of the firm‟s days accounts receivable and days inventory over five years; and 
the incidence of net loss realisations (LOSS) computed as the number of years over 
five years where the firm reported loss, as instruments for earnings quality in Models 
1 and 2 in Table 8.3. This study assumes that these innate variables do not affect 
CSD (at least directly) but do affect EQ. Francis et al. (2005) also find that two these 
variables as innate factors of a firm do influence earnings quality. 
 
The design of the stated relationship (that is EQ influences CSD_INDEX) implicitly 
assumes that causality runs from earnings quality to CSD and that a reverse 
relationship is possible. Because the sample size used to address the endogeneity 
issue is quite small (133 firms), this study estimates CSD_INDEX and EQ 
regressions using a limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) method to 
address the endogeneity issue. This estimation technique can then uncover the 
endogeneity of earnings quality on CSD. Therefore this study has to identify some 
exogenous parameters that only affect earnings quality, not the CSD. Although the 
two-stage least square technique is typically used to resolve issues of possible 
endogeneity, it is not adopted as the principal technique here because of the limited 
sample size. The LIML generates instrumental variables and then tests whether those 




(i.e. EQ). Instrumental variables help to establish the causal effect. These variables 
are not correlated with the error; and they are correlated with the suspected 
endogenous variable. The null hypothesis in the LIML is that a weak correlation 
between the instrumental variables (LOG.OC and LOSS) and the suspected 
endogenous variable (EQ) which indicates that earnings quality is endogenous.  
 
Table 8.7. First-stage regression summary statistics 
Panel A: Model (1): Earnings quality and CSD 
Variable R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 F Prob > F 
EQ 0.308 0.263 0.148 10.74 0.0001 
Critical Values                              # of endogenous regressors:    1 
    Ho: Instruments are weak           # of excluded instruments:     2 
      10% 15% 20% 25% 
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test 8.68 5.33 4.42 3.92 
 
Panel B: Model (2): The moderating effect of ownership structure on the relationship 
between earnings quality and CSD 
Variable R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 F Prob > F 
EQ 0.797 0.781 0.092 6.17 0.0028 
Critical Values                              # of endogenous regressors:    1 
    Ho: Instruments are weak           # of excluded instruments:     2 
      10% 15% 20% 25% 
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test 8.68 5.33 4.42 3.92 
 
Panel A of Table 8.7 is related to Model (1) and shows that the F statistic is 10.74, 
which is above the normal threshold of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). This indicates 
that Model (1) contains one endogenous regressor (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
Additionally, Stock and Yogo (2005) show that a set of instruments is weak if a 
Wald test at the 5% level can have an actual rejection rate of no more than 10%, 
15%, 20%, or 25%. Therefore, Panel A of Table 8.7 shows that here it can reject the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are weak because the F statistic of 10.74 > 8.68 
(the critical value for a rejection rate of at most 10%). On the basis of this test, Model 
(1) of this study does not have a weak instrument problem. Earnings quality in the 




In contract, Panel B of Table 8.7 shows that Model (2) of this study has a weak-
instrument problem. The F statistic is 6.17, which is below the normal threshold of 
10 (Staiger and Stock 1997), and the F statistic of 6.17 < 8.68 (the critical value for a 
rejection rate of at most 10%) which cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak 
instruments. Therefore, this study relies on the OLS results for Model (2). 
 
To verify the validity of the instruments in Model (1), this study tests the over-
identifying restrictions. The results show that the p-values of Anderson-Rubin‟s 
statistic and Basmann‟s statistic are 0.797 and 0.804, respectively, which indicates 
that the instruments in Model (1) are not correlated with the error of the main 
regression. Therefore the LIML estimators are superior to the OLS estimators in 
Model (1).  
 
This study uses the same set of control variables as in Table 8.3 for the CSD in the 
LIML regression. The results reported in Table 8.8, using the superior LIML 
estimators for Model (1), support the primary finding in this study that earnings 
quality positively impacts on CSD. 
 
Table 8.8. Earnings quality and CSD using LIML regression 
 
EQ STATE FOREIGN AUDIT ROA STOCK_EX FEMALE Constant 
Coeff. 0.0008 -0.0125 -0.0381 0.0356 0.1665 0.0350 0.0719 0.0049 
p-value 0.066 0.521 0.231 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.004 0.886 
Significance * 
  
*** ** *** *** 
 R
2
 = 0.196, Wald statistic = 41.71, p-value = 0.000, N = 133. 
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
8.6 Conclusion  
This chapter provided evidence for the effect of earnings quality on CSD and the 
moderating effect of state and foreign ownership on the relationship between 
earnings quality and CSD, with the three hypotheses tested.  
 
As shown in Table 8.3, Hypothesis 5B (i.e. there is a positive relationship between 
earnings quality and CSD) was confirmed as EQ was found to have a significant and 




rejected Hypothesis 5A (i.e. there is a negative relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD). Therefore, the long-term perspective argument (Hypothesis 5B) 
dominated the managerial opportunism hypothesis (Hypothesis 5A) in the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD. This study also found that the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD was weakened as the percentage of 
shares held by government increased, which confirmed Hypothesis 6 (i.e. more state 
ownership weakens the relationship between earnings quality and CSD). Meanwhile, 
the presence of foreign investors did not influence the association between earnings 
quality and CSD, and therefore Hypothesis 7 (i.e. more foreign ownership 
strengthens the relationship between earnings quality and CSD) was rejected. 
 
Four out of six control variables were found to statistically influence the CSD of 
Vietnamese listed firms. Specifically, big four auditors (AUDIT), return on assets 
(ROA), stock exchange location of Hochiminh City (STOCK_EX), and the 
percentage of female directors (FEMALE), had significant and positive impacts on 
CSD of the firms sampled in this study.  
 
Four additional analyses were carried out as follows: 1) Assessing the sensitivity of 
the primary results to the standardised aggregate earnings quality score that was 
solely based on PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH, and did not include AQ; 2) 
Constructing another disclosure index consisting of two aspects (i.e. society and 
labour), instead of four aspects (i.e. society, labour, human rights and product 
responsibility); 3) Ranking firms on a scale from zero to 100 to measure the 
standardised aggregate   earnings quality; 4) Using dummy variables of state and 
foreign ownership; 5)  Including endogeneity concerns. The results from these 
further analyses supported the primary findings that earnings quality positively 
impacted on CSD. Furthermore, the relationship between earnings quality and CSD 
was weakened as the percentage of shares held by government increases, whereas 






9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The role of directors is identified as a vital factor for sound corporate governance in 
firms; indeed many developed countries have established robust governance 
frameworks to support such a process. Emerging nations such as Vietnam have 
borrowed these frameworks but they have not been tested for contextual relevance 
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Since Vietnam is a country with low investor protection, 
listed firms have to take greater their initiative to build confidence among investors 
to invest in them, which means that the quality of reporting and broader 
accountability is vital to build such confidence. Earnings quality is found to build 
confidence because financial reporting then becomes not just historic but futuristic 
and investors can use this report to forecast the firm‟s future. Showing firms which 
are responsible corporate citizens helps them to build confidence not only with 
investors but also with the government and society at large. These activities are vital 
to Vietnam because it is on an upward trajectory to become an economic powerhouse 
in Asia. 
 
This thesis uses the above background to examine three relationships of Vietnamese 
listed firms:  (1) the effect of board diversity on earnings quality; (2) the effect of 
board diversity on CSD; and (3) the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. 
With board diversity, this study constructs board diversity indices for the 
demographic aspects of directors in the board (diversity-in-boards), and the structural 
aspects of the board constitution (diversity-of-boards). These dimensions are 
considered under two scenarios: one scenario considers that the attributes are equally 
important, (i.e. unweighted diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards indices), and 
another considers the attributes are not equally important (i.e. weighted diversity-of-
boards and diversity-in-boards indices). The relative importance of attributes is 
measured using a questionnaire given to listed firms‟ executives that inquired into 
the relative importance of the attributes of the board of directors. 
 
To measure SD, a three-dimensional disclosure index is constructed to ascertain the 




to combine disclosure quantity with two aspects of the disclosure quality evaluated 
by four stakeholder groups on another survey. Because board diversity has two 
dimensions (i.e. diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards) and contributes to 
improve the earnings quality of firms in two different ways, the two dimensions are 
tested under two theoretical premises. The effect of board diversity on earnings 
quality is examined using agency theory for the diversity-of-boards dimension, and 
resource dependence theory is used for the diversity-in-boards dimension. Similarly, 
the effect of board diversity on CSD was also examined using agency theory for the 
diversity-of-boards dimension and resource dependence theory for the diversity-in-
boards dimension. The relationship between earnings quality and CSD is examined 
using two competing theoretical perspectives; agency theory for firms which take a 
managers‟ opportunistic incentives perspective and stakeholder theory for firms 
which take a long term perspective. This chapter offers concluding remarks to the 
work undertaken this thesis, where the key findings are reported in Chapters of six, 
seven, and eight. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 describes an overview of the thesis. 
The main findings are summarised and presented in Section 9.3. Section 9.4 
highlights the contributions made by the thesis. Section 9.5 discusses several 
limitations of this research; and Section 9.6 highlights a number of avenues for future 
research. 
 
9.1 Overview of thesis  
This thesis through its investigation captures the unique Vietnamese environment, 
especially in relation to board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD. Despite these 
issues being important, including corporate governance, earnings quality, and 
corporate social disclosure, very little research has investigated them in Vietnam, 
until now. As the literature review reveals, board diversity is pivotal in bringing 
diverse perspectives to board discussion that can enhance the quality of board 
decisions. Earnings quality and social disclosure (both quantity and quality) are 
important attributes in building the sustainable trust and confidence of investors. This 
is especially since Vietnam is making a unique transition from a tradition of 




economy. Thus this Vietnamese study provides a unique extension to the extant 
literature of board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD. 
 
The financial statement data items used to calculate earnings quality for the year of 
2010 in this thesis were hand-collected from HOSE‟s website (www.hsx.vn) and 
HNX‟s website (www.hnx.vn) for the seven fiscal years from 2005 to 2011. The 
board of directors‟ data were hand-collected from annual reports and firms‟ websites 
were used to calculate the board diversity indices for the year ending 31
st
 December 
2010. The attributes which were included in the two dimensions of board diversity 
were first considered as if each attribute has equal importance, and they were later 
considered as not equally important based on the importance assigned to them by 80 
executives in a survey conducted with listed firms in the sample.  
 
A sample of 150 non-financial Vietnamese firms is utilised to examine the impact of 
board diversity on earnings quality. The two dimensions of board diversity cover a 
wide range of attributes of the board of directors. The structural attributes are 
represented by the diversity-of-boards index (dissimilarities among firm boards, i.e., 
board structure), and the demographic attributes were represented by the diversity-in-
boards index (dissimilarities among directors within a board, i.e., demographic 
attributes of board members). Earnings quality is a standardised aggregate measure 
compiled from four accounting-based measures of earnings quality: accruals quality, 
earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness. 
 
Content analysis from annual reports is applied to measure a stakeholder-driven, 
three-dimensional CSD index. The social disclosure items that made up the index 
were initially selected from the GRI version 3.1. The CSD index consists of three 
dimensions, with two aspects related to disclosure quality and the remaining aspects 
related to disclosure quantity. The disclosure qualities are about disclosure types and 
disclosure items. They are measured by surveying 652 stakeholders to obtain their 
perceptions on disclosure type preference (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, 
numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) (Guthrie and Parker 1990), 
and their perceptions on the importance of reporting items. Because 17 of the 150 




sample became 133 non-financial Vietnamese firms, so that sample is used to 
examine the impact of board diversity on CSD, and the impact of earnings quality on 
CSD.  
 
Studies have suggested that agency theory and resource dependence theory are 
particularly useful to test and explain the effect of board diversity on earnings quality 
and the effect of board diversity on CSD (Labelle et al. 2010; Ben-Amar et al. 2013; 
Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Studies also suggest that the agency and stakeholder theories 
are useful to test and explain the relationship between earnings quality and CSD 
(Prior et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2013). Those theories become the 
logical theoretical choices for respective analyses. 
 
The next section summarises the key findings of this thesis and highlights the 
implications in a theoretical, methodological, and practical sense. 
 
9.2 Summary of the main results 
9.2.1 The impact of board diversity on earnings quality 
As summarised in Table 9.1, this study find a significant positive association 
between diversity-of-boards (using weighted and unweighted indices) and earnings 
quality (using a standardised aggregate earnings quality score), which is consistent 
with the underpinnings of agency theory. Because the higher standardised aggregate 
earnings quality scores imply higher earnings quality, this result suggests that 
diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality and thus confirms Hypothesis 1 (i.e. 
diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality).  These results are also supported by 
an additional analysis to show the robustness of the findings. This study further 
examines four individual earnings attributes that are used to construct the 
standardised aggregate earnings quality (i.e. accruals quality, persistence, 
predictability, and smoothness), and another analysis is used to compute the 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score without accruals quality. These two 
ways of reconfiguring earnings quality, and their relation to board diversity indices 






Table 9.1. Summary of relationships found in this thesis 
 Board diversity on 
EQ 
 
Board diversity on 
CSD 













































  Positive, linear 
(confirming H5B) 
State ownership as 
a moderator 
  Negative, linear 
(confirming H6) 
Foreign ownership 
as a moderator 
  No relationship 
(rejecting H7) 
 
Diversity-in-boards (both unweighted and weighted indices), however; is found to 




aggregate earnings quality score), and thus Hypothesis 2 (i.e. diversity-in-boards 
improves earnings quality) is rejected. Furthermore, this study find that the 
relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings quality (using the standardized 
aggregate earnings quality score) is non-linear, with a U-shaped curve, which 
indicates that moderate levels of diversity-in-boards have a lesser influence on 
earnings quality, but the lower and higher levels of diversity-in-boards have a more 
influence on earnings quality. The additional analysis that computes the standardised 
aggregate earnings quality score without accruals quality in relation to board 
diversity indices also proves to have the same relationship. Another additional 
analysis includes using individual earnings attributes: accruals quality, persistence, 
predictability, and smoothness, to represent earnings quality. The evidence supports 
the primary findings. 
 
9.2.2 The impact of board diversity on corporate social disclosure 
Unlike the findings regarding the impact of board diversity on earnings quality, 
diversity-of-boards (both unweighted and weighted indices) has no significant impact 
on CSD (using a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index), thus rejecting 
Hypothesis 3 (i.e. a higher diversity-of-boards leads to a higher CSD). Therefore, 
agency theory approach used to examine the impact of diversity-of-boards on CSD in 
this study is not supported. Meanwhile, supporting for resource dependence theory 
regarding a positive relationship between diversity-in-boards and CSD is found by 
this study, which confirms Hypothesis 4 (i.e. higher diversity-in-boards leads to 
higher CSD). In addition, three sub-categories of CSD in this study, i.e. labour 
practices, society, and product responsibility disclosure aspects are also explored in 
relation to the board diversity indices. The evidence supports primary findings which 
reject Hypothesis 3 and confirm Hypothesis 4. 
 
9.2.3 The relationship between earnings quality and corporate social disclosure  
Supporting stakeholder theory, the findings of Hypothesis 5B (i.e. based on the long 
term perspective, there is a positive relationship between earnings quality and CSD) 
show that the earnings quality (using a standardised aggregate earnings quality score) 
has a significant and positive impact on CSD (using a stakeholder-driven, three-




earnings quality (using a standardised aggregate earnings quality score) on CSD 
(using a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index) in this study is not supported, 
and therefore Hypothesis 5A (i.e. based on managers‟ opportunistic incentives, 
where the hypothesis expects a negative relationship between CSD and earnings 
quality) is rejected. This result indicates that the long-term perspective argument 
dominates the relationship between earnings quality and CSD.  
 
This study also finds that the relationship between earnings quality (using a 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score) and CSD (using a stakeholder-driven, 
three-dimensional index) becomes weaker as the percentage of shares held by 
government increases. This confirms Hypothesis 6 (i.e. more state ownership 
weakens the relationship between earnings quality and CSD). Foreign ownership 
does not influence the association between earnings quality and CSD, so Hypothesis 
7 (i.e. more foreign ownership strengthens the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD) is rejected. 
 
These main results are supported in several ways. First, this study examines another 
disclosure index consisting of two aspects (i.e. society and labour), rather than four 
aspects (i.e. society, labour, human rights, and product responsibility), and it 
provides the same results as the main findings. Second, earnings quality is 
constructed as comprising three earnings attributes but without accruals quality. The 
reconstructed earnings quality is then examined using multiple regressions to see 
whether earnings quality influences CSD, and it provides the same results as the 
main findings. Third, to address the endogeneity issue, this study estimates earnings 
quality and CSD regressions using a limited-information maximum likelihood 
method, and the results are consistent with the main findings. 
 
9.3 Implications of this thesis  
The work undertaken in this thesis provides several implications for theory, 





9.3.1 Implications for theory and literature 
Boards of directors serve two important functions: they monitor management on 
behalf of the shareholders (agency theory) and provide resources (resource 
dependency theory) (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Jackling and Johl 2009). The 
findings in this study support the view that no single theory could explain the nexus 
of board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD. By examining the impact of board 
diversity on earnings quality and the impact of board diversity on CSD, these two 
theories are partially supported. The impact of diversity-of-boards on earnings 
quality is supported by agency theory, but it does not support the impact of diversity-
of-boards on CSD. By examining the impact of diversity-in-boards on earnings 
quality, resource dependence theory is not supported by the findings but this theory 
supports the impact of diversity-in-boards on CSD. By examining the relationship 
between earnings quality and CSD, the findings support stakeholder theory but not 
agency theory.  
 
It is believed that this thesis adds to the literature a little known story of board 
diversity, earnings quality and corporate social disclosure of listed firms in  Vietnam,  
a  fast  growing  economy  characterised  by  high  ownership concentration, high 
government intervention, a code-law system, a weak-developed governance 
framework, and low investor protection. The findings allow for a better 
understanding of two dimesions of board diversity (i.e, diversity-of-boards and 
diversity-in-boards) that have different impacts on earnings quality and on CSD. The 
results also add the knowledge the relationship between earnings quality and CSD as 
well as the moderating effect of structure ownership in a country of high ownership 
concentration like Vietnam on this relationship. 
 
9.3.2 Implications for methodology  
Previous studies have mainly focused on the individual attributes of the demographic 
or/and structural attributes of boards when examining their diversity. Those studies 
seldom combine the attributes. Two studies (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 
2013) combine the demographic or structural dimensions of the board of directors to 
a single index as a demographic diversity index and a structural diversity index. They 




such assumptions. It first examines the attributes by assuming that they are all 
equally important (unweighted), and then examines the attributes in the manner that 
firms‟ executives find them to be relatively important (weighted). A questionnaire 
provides executives‟ perceptions on various attributes relating to board diversity to 
determine their importance. A comparison of results between weighted and 
unweighted methods enables the potential impact of the perceived importance of 
attributes relating to the diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards and their 
relationships with earnings quality and with CSD to be investigated. 
 
Additionally, prior mainstream research has also focused on the quantity of 
disclosure measured by a dichotomous score (Ho and Wong 2001; Xiao and Yuan 
2007; Vu 2012). Little empirical evidence measures the quality of disclosure or 
measures both the quantity and quality of disclosure (Haji 2013). This study has 
extended the literature by constructing a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD 
index that integrates the disclosure quantity and two aspects of the disclosure quality 
perceived by four stakeholder groups. Two aspects of the disclosure quality consist 
of disclosure item quality and disclosure type quality. Only a few previous studies 
attempt to measure disclosure item quality but they are mainly assessed by financial 
analysts (Stanga 1976; McNally et al. 1982; Barako et al. 2006). The disclosure type 
quality is assessed using a detailed scoring scheme, including 0, 1, 2, 3, that is 
associated with different disclosure types such as non-disclosure, qualitative 
disclosure, qualitative specific disclosure, and quantitative disclosure, respectively 
(Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Saleh et al. 2010; Haji 2013). This study on the other hand, 
measures disclosure item quality and disclosure type quality of CSD from the 
stakeholders‟ perspectives by conducting a questionnaire survey rather than using 
financial analysts‟ perspectives and a detailed scoring scheme. 
  
9.3.3 Implications for practice  
Based on the survey of different stakeholders, the results of this study will benefit a 
number of groups. Corporate executives, who take charge of preparing CSD, will 
find the results useful in improving how much and what social information is 
disclosed while keeping the stakeholders in mind. Furthermore, most Vietnamese 




until 2013 that the International Finance Corporation (IFC), in collaboration with the 
State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC), the Vietnamese stock exchanges, 
and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) launched the 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for Vietnamese listed firms, based on the GRI 
framework, in an attempt to help Vietnamese listed firms prepare their sustainability 
reports.  This indicates that the regulators in Vietnam have begun to 
pay more attention to corporate social responsibility. Therefore, the results of this 
thesis, which demonstrate the current CSD practices of Vietnamese listed firms and 
stakeholders‟ perceptions to CSD, will benefit regulators in better understanding 
firms‟ CSD practices and stakeholders‟ expectations of improving the current 
guidelines on the CSD of Vietnamese listed firms. 
Despite becoming an important and fast-growing economy, the Vietnamese economy 
is still relatively under-investigated, particularly with regard to its accounting and 
finance aspects (Vu et al. 2011). Sarikas, Vu and Djatej (2009) call for more studies 
of present-day accounting, particularly the reporting practices and corporate 
governance of listed firms in newly established stock markets such as Vietnam. This 
thesis reflects an attempt to fill the gap in the literature by extending the 
understanding of board diversity, earnings quality, and CSD in the Vietnamese 
context. 
 
Vietnam is one of the lowest ranked countries for protecting investors among the 
Southeast Asian countries (World Bank, 2013). The findings of this study will help 
Vietnamese policymakers to review the implications of the current corporate 
governance codes in the context of Vietnam to increase firms‟ reporting transparency 
and accountability to investors. It may also help other emerging nations with a low 
level of investor protection but who are striving to improve corporate governance. 
 
9.4 Limitations of this thesis 
While this study contributes to advance the frontiers of knowledge in several ways, it 
does have a number of limitations. First, the sample used in this study to examine the 
impact of board diversity on earnings quality is only a 150 Vietnamese listed firms. 
The sample that examines the impact of board diversity on CSD, and the relationship 




sample in this study is because there must be 7 years‟ financial data available to 
measure accruals quality, whereas the two Vietnamese stock exchanges, HOSE and 
HNX, were established in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Second, a further concern 
arises when focusing only on the disclosure of annual reports where social 
disclosures could be provided in other ways such as press releases, firm websites, 
promotional leaflets, and other various media. Annual reports are used exclusively in 
this study because they are considered to be the most important documents. Although 
Corporate Social Responsibility reports or sustainability reports did not exist in the 
year of the analysis in this study, there remains a possibility that some social 
disclosure is missed because of the focus on annual reports. Third, pictures, 
regardless of their type, are ignored in scoring the social disclosures in this study 
because they are very subjective (Wilmshurst and Frost 2000). Finally, earnings 
quality in this study is measured by a standardised aggregate earnings quality score 
constructed using four accounting-based earnings attributes (i.e. accruals quality, 
persistence, predictability, and smoothness) in the main findings and individual four 
of these earnings attributes are used to check the robustness of the main findings. 
Accounting-based measures have been used far more extensively in earnings quality 
research (Francis et al. 2005), although prior studies have documented other 
attributes of earnings quality such as market-based earnings attributes, which include 
value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (Francis et al. 2004; Gaio and Raposo 
2011). A fundamental assumption underlying the market-based measure is that 
markets efficiently include accounting information when making decisions about 
firms. These market-based measurements are not covered in this study because the 
Vietnamese market is new and still semi-efficient (Truong et al. 2008; Phan and 
Zhou 2014). The conclusions derived from this study are limited to measures of 
accounting-based earnings attributes.   
 
While these limitations are acknowledged, they do not detract from the strengths of 
this study and the importance of its findings, and they do provide a platform for 





9.5 Further research 
There are several avenues for future research that arise from the limitations 
addressed in the previous section. First, using a larger sample over a longer time-
period can help to better detect the relationships examined in this study of 
Vietnamese listed firms. Second, future studies could explore the roles of other 
disclosure channels to examine the CSD of firms other than their annual reports, such 
as press releases, the media, or the internet. Third, pictures can be examined in 
scoring the corporate social disclosures in future studies to formulate a 
comprehensive picture of CSD practices. Fourth, future studies could test the 
relationships examined in this study using proxies of market-based earnings 
attributes such as value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (Francis et al. 2004; 
Gaio and Raposo 2011). Since researchers have not identified a uniform method to 
measure earnings quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004), testing these relationships 
using other proxies of earnings quality could validate the findings of this study. 
Finally, future studies could use an industry approach to measure earnings quality 
attributes. This approach requires only a sufficient size cross-section of firms in a 
given industry at a point in time, therefore it would reserve more observations than 
auto-regression method in this thesis. 
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Appendix A. Social indicators in the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) 3.1 
Labor Practices and Decent Work Indicators 
Employment LA1 Total workforce by employment type, employment 
contract, and region, broken down by gender. 
LA2 Total number and rate of new employee hires and 
employee turnover by age group, gender, and region. 
LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or parttime employees, by 
significant locations of operation. 




LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. 
LA5 Minimum notice period(s) regarding operational 
changes, including whether it is specified in collective 
agreements. 
Occupational 
health and safety 
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal 
joint management–worker health and safety 
committees that help monitor and advise on 
occupational health and safety programs. 
LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and 
absenteeism, and total number of work-related 
fatalities, by region and by gender. 
LA8 Education, training, counseling, prevention, and risk-
control programs in place to assist workforce 
members, their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases. 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements 
with trade unions. 
Training and 
education 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee by 
gender, and by employee category. 
LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning 
that support the continued employability of employees 
and assist them in managing career endings. 
LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular 
performance and career development reviews, by 
gender. 
Diversity and equal 
opportunity 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of 
employees per employee category according to gender, 
age group, minority group membership, and other 
indicators of diversity. 
Equal remuneration 
for women and 
men 
LA14 Ratio of basic salary and remuneration of women to 









HR1 Percentage and total number of significant investment 
agreements and contracts that include clauses 
incorporating human rights concerns, or that have 
undergone human rights screening. 
HR2 Percentage of significant suppliers, contractors, and 
other business partners that have undergone human 
rights screening, and actions taken. 
HR3 Total hours of employee training on policies and 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are 
relevant to operations, including the percentage of 
employees trained. 
Non-discrimination HR4 Total number of incidents of discrimination and 





HR5 Operations and significant suppliers identified in 
which the right to exercise freedom of association and 
collective bargaining may be violated or at significant 
risk, and actions taken to support these rights. 
Child labor HR6 Operations and significant suppliers identified as 
having significant risk for incidents of child labor, and 
measures taken to contribute to the effective abolition 
of child labor. 
Forced and 
compulsory labor 
HR7 Operations and significant suppliers identified as 
having significant risk for incidents of forced or 
compulsory labor, and measures to contribute to the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. 
Security practices HR8 Percentage of security personnel trained in the 
organization‟s policies or procedures concerning 
aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations. 
Indigenousrights HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving 
rights of indigenous people and actions taken. 
Assessment HR10 Percentage and total number of operations that have 
been subject to human rights reviews and/or impact 
assessments. 
Remediation HR11 Number of grievances related to human rights filed, 
addressed and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms. 
Society Indicators 
Local communities SO1 Percentage of operations with implemented local 
community engagement, impact assessments, and 
development programs. 
SO9 Operations with significant potential or actual negative 
impacts on local communities. 
SO10 Prevention and mitigation measures implemented in 
operations with significant potential or actual negative 




Corruption SO2 Percentage and total number of business units analyzed 
for risks related to corruption. 
SO3 Percentage of employees trained in organization‟s anti-
corruption policies and procedures. 
SO4 Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. 
Publicpolicy SO5 Public policy positions and participation in public 
policy development and lobbying. 
SO6 Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to 




SO7 Total number of legal actions for anti- competitive 
behavior, anti-trust, and monopoly practices and their 
outcomes. 
Compliance SO8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number 
of non-monetary sanctions for non- compliance with 
laws and regulations. 
Product Responsibility Indicators 
Customer health 
and Safety 
PR1 Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of 
products and services are assessed for improvement, 
and percentage of significant products and services 
categories subject to such procedures. 
PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and 
safety impacts of products and services during their 
life cycle, by type of outcomes. 
Product and service 
labeling 
PR3 Type of product and service information required by 
procedures, and percentage of significant products and 
services subject to such information requirements. 
PR4 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning product 
and service information and labeling, by type of 
outcomes. 
PR5 Practices related to customer satisfaction, including 
results of surveys measuring customer satisfaction. 
Marketing 
communications 
PR6 Programs for adherence to laws, standards, and 
voluntary codes related to marketing communications, 
including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship. 
PR7 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning marketing 
communications, including advertising, promotion, 
and sponsorship by type of outcomes. 
Customer privacy PR8 Total number of substantiated complaints regarding 
breaches of customer privacy and losses of customer 
data. 
Compliance PR9 Monetary value of significant fines for non- 
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 Given the limited number of pages allowed in the thesis, questionnaires with the English version are 








As part of my PhD study examining the impact of board diversity on earnings quality 
and on corporate social disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms, the aim of this survey is to 
examine executives‟ perceptions on the relevance of the board of directors‟ attributes 
impacting on earnings quality and on corporate social disclosure alternately of 
Vietnamese listed firms. 
 
Based on your response, I will determine the rating scales to evaluate the relevance of 
each attribute of the board of directors. It will take approximately 5 minutes to complete 
it. Please complete the questionnaire below and send it to me. Your prompt response 
will be highly appreciated. 
 
Your response will be kept confidential and will not be identified with you personally. I 
would be happy to share my findings with you if you are interested. To get a copy of my 
results please call me at  or email me at
 
This study has been reviewed by The Human Research Ethics Committee (Social 
Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. 
For any questions regarding the survey, please do not hesitate to contact me or my 
supervisors, A/Professor Indra Abeysekera at  
and Dr. Shiguang Ma at  or the 
University of Wollongong Ethics Officer at +61 2 4221 4457. 
 
 





1. Gender:          
2. Age:       
3. Present post:      
4. Years of work experience (total, any kind of work):      
5. Years of experience as an executive:        
6. Are you also a member of board of directors?       
7. Highest educational qualification:       
 
PART 2: 
The following is a list of items relating to structural and demographic attributes of the 
board of directors. Please indicate your assessment of the importance of each of these 
attributes impacting on earnings quality and on corporate social disclosure in annual 
reports by choosing the scale number that best describes your feeling. 
Note: 0 (Unimportant) ....................5 (Moderate)..........................10 (Important). 
 
ATTRIBUTES IMPACT ON EARNINGS QUALITY 
IMPACT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE 
STRUCTURAL ATTRIBUTES 












owning > 5% 







diversity    
  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




ATTRIBUTES IMPACT ON EARNINGS QUALITY 
IMPACT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE 













Thank you so much for your valuable time to complete this survey. I wish you are at 
your best and success in your career as well as your life. 
****** 
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
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As part of my PhD study on corporate social disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms, the 
aim of this survey is to examine stakeholders' perceptions on the relevance of corporate 
social disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms. 
 
Basing on your response, I will determine the rating scales to evaluate the relevance of 
each item of corporate social disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms. It will take 
approximately 10 minutes to complete it. Please complete the questionnaire below and 
send it to me. Your prompt response will be highly appreciated. 
 
Your response will be kept confidential and will not be identified with you personally. I 
would be happy to share my findings with you if you are interested. To get a copy of my 
results please call me at  or email me at  
 
This study has been reviewed by The Human Research Ethics Committee (Social 
Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. 
For any questions regarding the survey, please do not hesitate to contact me or my 
supervisors, A/Professor Indra Abeysekera at + ) 
and Dr. Shiguang Ma at  or the 








Appendix D. Questionnaire for employees of Vietnamese listed firms about the labour 
aspect (English version) 
 
The following is a list of items relating to Labour Practices and Decent Work. Please 
indicate your assessment of the importance of Vietnamese listed firms disclosing each 
of these items in their annual reports by choosing the scale number that best describes 
your feeling. 
Note: 0 (Unimportant) .....................5 (Moderate) ...........................10 (Important). 
 
ASPECTS EXAMPLES RATING SCALE 
Employment 
1. Total workforce by 
employment type, contract, 
region and gender. 
“Tables of structure of 
human resource by 
gender, function and 
education level from 
31/12/2006 to 
31/12/2011” (DHG 
Pharma Annual Report 
2011, p85&86). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
2. New employees hires, 
employees turnover by age, 
gender, region. 
“Total personnel as of 
31st Dec 2011 are 2,635 
people. Official 
recruitment in 2011 
includes 182 people” 
(DHG Pharma Annual 
Report 2011, p45). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Narrative  
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 








Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
3. Benefits provided to full-
time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or part-
time employees. 
“Employee benefits are 
applied equally among all 
Abengoa workers, 
regardless of whether they 
work full or part-time” 
(Abengoa Annual Report 
2011, p72). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
4. Return to work and retention 
rates after parental leave. 
“In 2011, 100% of 
employees who requested 
maternity/paternity leave 
were reinstated and held 
their respective posts. In 
Spain, 54% were men and 
46% were women” 
(Acciona Sustainability 
Report 2011, p210). 
 







Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Labour/management relations 
5. Employees covered by 
collectives bargaining 
agreements. 
At the moment practically 
all employee are covered 
by collective labour 
regulations in the different 
countries (in certain 
countries and for 
operational reasons or 
because of the legislative 
framework there may be 
the odd group of workers 
that aren’t covered, but in 
any case it is less than 1% 
of the total workforce). 
(Acciona Sustainability 
Report 2011, p53). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
6. Notice period regarding 
operational changes. 
“ACCIONA complies with 
current law by providing 











Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Occupational health and safety 
7. Total workforce represented 
in formal health and safety 
committees. 
“Labor Safety Council: 
Staffed with the Deputy 
General Director in 
charge of production 
(chairman of the Council), 
the chairman of 
Imexpharm’s Labor Union 
(deputy chairman of the 
Council), a labor safety 
specialist (secretary of the 
Council) and several 
employees from the 
company’s health 
department and other 
relevant departments” 
(Imexpharm Annual 
Report 2011, p83). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
8. Rates of injury, occupational 
diseases, etc., and work-related 
fatalities. 
“2011 was a “no labor 
accident, no fire, no 
explosion” year” 
(Imexpharm Annual 
Report 2011, p84). 
 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
9. Education, training, 
counseling, prevention and 
“In 2011, the Company 
held periodic health and  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




risk-control programs for 
employees & their families 





information technology in 
controlling of health 
records for each person, 
provided counseling for 
individuals who showed 
abnormal symtoms on 
health, created conditions 
for laborers contracting 
disease to cure heir 
disease promptly” (Binh 
Minh Plastics Annual 
Report 2011, p18).  







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
10. Health & safety topics 
covered in agreement with 
Trade Union. 
“With respect to formal 
agreements with unions, 
the matters dealt with in 
the Prevention of 
Occupational Hazards are 
regulated by agreements 
in different sectors, such 
as for example, 
construction, logistics, and 
energy, among others” 
(Acciona Sustainability 
Report 2011, p62). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Training and education 
11. Average hours of 
training/employee. 
“Total training hours in 
company are 51,520 
hours, at the average of 
80.6 hours/person/year” 
(DHG Pharma Annual 
Report 2011, p45). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
12. Programs for skills 
management and lifelong 
learning that support 
employees. 
“Delegate 16 leaders and 
key staffs to participate in 
master’s degree in 
business administration-
UBI Brussels with total 
cost nearly VND3 billion” 
(DHG Pharma Annual 
Report 2011, p45). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
13. Percentage of employees 
receiving regular performance 
and career development 
reviews. 
“Every 6 months and 1 
year, Imexpharm 
evaluates and ranks the 
performance of each 
employee and the results 
are stored on a human 
resource management 
software” (Imexpharm 
Annual Report 2011, p64). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 










Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Diversity and equal opportunity 
14. Compositions of 
governance bodies & 
distribution of employees. 
“The Board of Directors is 
composed of 8 members, 3 
women and 5 men, whose 
ages range from 37 to 60” 
(DHG Pharma Annual 
Report 2011, p18-22). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Equal remuneration for women and men 
15. Basic salary & 
remuneration of women to 
men. 
“Abengoa’s pay scheme 
makes no distinction as to 
gender in any of the 
professional categories or 
physical locations where 
the company operates” 
(Abengoa Annual Report 
2011, p67). 
 





Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 






Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Thank you so much for your valuable time to complete this survey. I wish you are at 




Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Appendix E. Questionnaire for lawyers and regulators about the human rights aspect 
(English version) 
 
The following is a list of items relating to Human Rights. Please indicate your 
assessment of the importance of Vietnamese listed firms disclosing each of these items 
in their annual reports by choosing the scale number that best describes your feeling. 
Note: 0 (Unimportant) ..........................5 (Moderate)..............................10 (Important). 
ASPECTS EXAMPLES RATING SCALE 
Investment and procurement practices 
1. Investment agreements 
that include human rights 
clauses. 
“To guarantee the integrity of 
those who may influence company 
activities, Abengoa requires all 
suppliers to adhere to the Social 
Responsibility Code (SRC) for 
Suppliers and Subcontractors, 
which includes 11 clauses based on 
the principles of the United 
Nations Global Compact and 
inspired by the international SA 
8000 standard. In 2010 suppliers 
signed 2,406 agreements with 
Abengoa companies, and in 2011 
the total was 2,368” (Abengoa 
Annual Report 2011, p87). 
 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
2. Suppliers that have 
undergone screening on 
human rights, and actions 
taken. 
“During 2011, Abengoa analyzed 
approximately 17,500 suppliers in 
terms of human rights-related risk 
over the course of the year. Of all 
the suppliers analyzed only 3.5 % 
were flagged as critical suppliers” 
(Abengoa Annual Report 2011, 
p86). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 










Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
3. Total hours of 
employees training on 
policies and procedures 
concerning aspects of 
human rights that are 
relevant to operations, 
including the percentage of 
employees trained. 
“A Sustainability one-day training 
event was organized in October 
2011 for Procurement managers 
and directors, giving the people 
responsible for Procurement at 
ACCIONA a grounding in 
Sustainability principles, including 
human rights issues (7.5 training 
hours; 30 participants)” (Acciona 
Sustainability Report 2011, p210). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Non-discrimination 
4. Total number of 
incidents of discrimination 
and actions taken. 
“There were no reports in 2011 via 
Abengoa’s information channels of 
any discrimination related 
incidents, nor is there any record of 
incidents involving infringements of 
the rights of indigenous people” 
(Abengoa Annual Report 2011, 
p114) 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Narrative  
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 








Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
5. Operations where 
freedom of association and 
collective bargaining may 
be at significant risk and 
actions taken. 
“There are no operations in which 
the right of association to collective 
agreements is at risk; subsequently 
100% of the Spanish workforce is 
covered by a collective agreement” 
(Acciona Sustainability Report 
2011, p 210). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Child labour 
6. Operations identified as 
having significant risk for 
incidents of child labor and 
actions taken. 
In 2011, no cases of child labour 
were detected by the Company’s 
ordinary management information 
channels. (Acciona Sustainability 
Report 2011, p210). 
 







Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Forced and compulsory labour 
7. Operations identified as 
having significant risk for 
incidents of forced or 
compulsory labor and 
actions taken. 
In 2011, no cases of forced or 
involuntary labour were detected 
by the Company’s ordinary 
management information channels. 












Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Security Practices 
8. Percentage of security 
personnel trained in 
organization‟s policies or 
procedures regarding 
human rights. 
“The security activities are 
entrusted to an external security 
company. The rules of conduct for 
security staff comply with those in 
force in the security corps of the 
Italian state” (Acea Sustainability 
Report 2011, p64). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Indigenous Rights 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




9. Total number of 
incidents of violations 
involving rights of 
indigenous people and 
actions taken. 
“There were no reports in 2011 via 
Abengoa’s information channels of 
any discrimination related 
incidents, nor is there any record of 
incidents involving infringements of 
the rights of indigenous people” 
(Abengoa Annual Report 2011, 
p114) 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Assessment 
10. Percentage and total 
number of operations that 
have been subject to 
human rights reviews 
and/or impact assessments. 
“In the awareness of its 
responsibility to abide by and 
ensure compliance with Human 
Rights, Abengoa submits all its 
operations to assessment and 
review in terms of their impact on 
human rights, across the more than 
600 entities of the Group and the 
five continents where Abengoa does 
business” (Abengoa Annual Report 
2011, p66). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Remediation 
11. Number of grievances 
related to human rights 
filed, addressed and 
“In 2011, no human rights 
violations were detected by the 
Company’s ordinary management 
information channels” (Acciona 
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




resolved through formal 
grievance mechanisms. 
Sustainability Report 2011, p 210). 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Thank you so much for your valuable time to complete this survey. I wish you are at 
your best and success in your career as well as your life. 
****** 
  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Appendix F. Questionnaire for local comunities about the society aspect (English 
version) 
 
The following is a list of items relating to Society. Please indicate your assessment of 
the importance of Vietnamese listed firms disclosing each of these items in their 
annual reports by choosing the scale number that best describes your feeling. 
Note: 0 (Unimportant)..........................5 (Moderate)........................10 (Important). 
 
ASPECTS EXAMPLES RATING SCALE 
Local Communities 




“For floods victims in the Central 
Coastal Region in late 2011, 
Vinamilk sharing the difficulties 
with homeless people by paying 
visits to the victims and 
encouragement them by gaving 
presents worth VND500 million in 
total to people in the provinces of 
Quang Nam, Quang Binh and 
Quang Tri” (Vinamilk Annual 
Report 2011, p65). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  





Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
2. Significant potential or 
actual negative impacts on 
local communities. 
“NA30 Project impacts on fauna 
(water birds) and habitat. 
Appraisal of the impact is medium” 
(Acciona Sustainability Report 
2011, p133).   
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Narrative   
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 






Numerical Quantification  
Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
3. Prevention & mitigation 
measures implemented in 
operations with significant 
potential or actual negative 
impacts on local 
communities. 
“Control of the area of occupancy. 
Control of movement of personnel 
and machinery. Restoration of the 
affected area. Control of not 
harming the nesting of waterfowl” 
(Acciona Sustainability Report 
2011, p133). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Corruption 
4. Business units analysed 
for risks related to 
corruption. 
Percentage of business units 
analyzed with respect to 
corruption-related risks 100 % 









Numerical Quantification  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
5. Employees trained in 
organization‟s anti-
corruption policies & 
procedures. 
Percentage of employees trained in 
company anti-corruption policies 
and procedures 85.6 % (Abengoa 
Annual Report 2011, p21). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  





Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
6. Actions in response to 
incidents of corruption. 
There were no reports over the 
course of the year of any incidents 
involving corruption. (Abengoa 
Annual Report 2011, p131). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Public Policy 
7. Public policy positions 
and participation in public 
policy development and 
lobbying. 
“POSCO PLANTEC, as an 
engineering company, does not 
provide political support or engage 
in lobbying activities” (Posco 
Plantec Sustainability Report  
2010, p17). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 










Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
8. Total value of financial 
and in-kind contributions 
to political parties, 
politicians. 
“Donations over KRW 10 million 
to any organizations are allowed 
only with BOD’s approval. There 
were no political fund donations 
made in 2010 except for corporate 
philanthropic activities and we 
maintain our political neutrality” 
(Posco Plantec Sustainability 
Report  2010, p17). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Anti-Competitive Behaviour 
9. Legal actions for anti-
competitive behaviour, 
anti-trust, monopoly, etc. 
“Board of Directors  is determined  
to defend the benefits of 
shareholders and  
will make petitions against any 
unfounded slander that influences 
the reputation of the Company  in 
order to get back TTF’s 
transparency and protect the 
benefits of TTF’s shareholders at 
best” (Truong Thanh Furniture 
Corporation Annual Report 2010, 
p134). 
 
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Narrative  
 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 








Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Compliance 
10. Fines & sanctions for 
non-compliance with laws 
and regulations. 
“In the fourth quarter of 2010, 
State Securities Commission of 
Vietnam imposed a fine of VND 70 
million because TTF had violated 
the provision of Point 1.3 of 
Section II of Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC about the disclosure of 
information on securities market” 
(Truong Thanh Furniture 
Corporation Annual Report 2010, 
p145). 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Thank you so much for your valuable time to complete this survey. I wish you are at 




Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant Moderate Important 




Appendix G. Questionnaire for customers of Vietnamese listed firms about the 
product responsibility aspect (English version) 
 
The following is a list of items relating to Product Responsibility. Please indicate 
your assessment of the importance of Vietnamese listed firms disclosing each of 
these items in their annual reports by choosing the scale number that best describes 
your feeling. 
Note: 0 (Unimportant)........................5 (Moderate)...........................10 (Important). 
 
ASPECTS EXAMPLES RATING SCALE  
Customer health and safety  
1. Life cycle stages in 
which health and safety 
impacts of products and 
services are assessed for 
improvement, and 
percentage of significant 
products and services 
categories subject to such 
procedures. 
“Beside of new products, 
Vinamilk keeps researching to 
increase the product value, 
quality and manufacturing 
technology in order to satisfy the 
consumers’ needs more.  The 
typical sample for this research is 
the mini-test of assessment of 
effciency of Vinamilk Calcium 
product in preventing 
osteoporosis” (Vinamilk Annual 
Report 2011, p41). 
 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical  
2. Incidents of non-
compliance with 
regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning health & 
safety. 
“There were no incidents 
reported through Abengoa’s 
reporting channels in 2011 
deriving from failure to comply 
with legal regulations or 
voluntary codes and relating to 
the impacts of products and 
services on health and safety 
during their lifecycle (Abengoa 
Annual Report 2011, p79). 
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Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Product and Service Labelling  
3. Type of product & 
service information 
required by procedures. 
Imelazide coordinates the diet to 
treat diabetes, not depend on 
insulin (diabetes type II) if the 
application of the strict diet is not 
balanced between weight and 
blood sugar. (Imexpharm Annual 
Report 2011, p131).  
 
 







Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
4. Incidents of non-
compliance with 
regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning product 
& service labelling. 
“There were no cases of non-
compliance in this regard 
reported through Abengoa’s 
reporting channels over the 
course of the year” (Abengoa 
Annual Report 2011, p80). 
  
Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Narrative   
Monetary Quantification  
Numerical Quantification 
 
Both Monetary and Numerical  
5. Practices related to 
customer satisfaction. 
“In order to improve the 
company’s customer service 
quality, Vinamilk conducted a 
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customer satisfaction survey with 
its retail outlets on a quarterly 
basis in order to receive feedback 
for further improvements” 
(Vinamilk Annual Report 2011, 
p34). 





Numerical Quantification  
Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Marketing Communications  
6. Programs for adherence 
to laws, standards & 
voluntary codes. 
“Cooperating regularly with 
VCCI, HCMC Union of Business 
Association, HCMC Real Estate 
Association, Real Estate Forum, 
Real Estate Club, etc. in order to 
do brand marketing and search 
for joint venture partners” (Thu 




Type of Information Disclosed of this item  
Narrative  
 
Monetary Quantification  
Numerical Quantification  
Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
7. Incidents of non-
compliance with 
regulations & voluntary 
codes concerning the 
aspect. 
There were no reports through 
Abengoa reporting channels of 
any claims filed with respect to 
this matter at any Abengoa 
company in 2011. (Abengoa 
Annual Report 2011, p82) 
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Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Customer Privacy  
8. Complaints about 
customer privacy & losses 
of customer data. 
There were no reports through 
Abengoa reporting channels of 
any claims filed by customers 
with respect to customer privacy 
and personal data leaks at any 
group companies in 2011. 











Both Monetary and Numerical 
 
Compliance  
9. Fines for non-
compliance with law & 
regulations concerning the 
provision & use of 
products & service. 
“In 2011, fines due to contract 
breach are VND 722,472,308” 











Both Monetary and Numerical 
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Thank you so much for your valuable time to complete this survey. I wish you are 
at your best and success in your career as well as your life. 
****** 
 
 
